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Preface
It  h a s  b e e n  sa id  t h a t  La t in  Am e r ic a n  thought is the history of a quest 
to harmonize modernization and identity. Ever since its founding, the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
has sought to contribute to this undertaking by highlighting the spe­
cific nature of regional situations, while at the same time advocating 
efforts to change the region’s production patterns in conjunction with 
the promotion of social equity and, more recently, environmental sus­
tainability. Globalization shapes the context in which this task must be 
undertaken. Precisely for this reason, the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean asked ECLAC’s Secretariat to prepare a document 
on globalization and development (ECLAC 2002a) that was discussed 
in the 29th Session of the Commission (Brasilia, Brazil, May 2002).
The main motivation to produce this book lies in our perception of 
a sharp contrast between problems that are increasingly global in 
scope and international institution building, which lags behind. This 
uneven advance jeopardizes the balance of opportunities and risks of 
globalization. Thus, this book presents an analysis of the opportuni­
ties that are open to the developing world, but it also examines the 
asymmetries and risks entailed in this process, which may hinder 
development unless suitable institutional frameworks are put in place 
at the national, regional, and global levels. Although the conceptual 
considerations explored in this volume are based on one particular 
region of the developing world, Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
analysis is undertaken in a broader spirit and may therefore be relevant 
for other regions as well.
Economic globalization has deep historical roots. The current phase 
of globalization shares certain features with previous stages, but it also 
has a number of characteristics that set it apart, such as mass real-time 
access to information; the global planning of production by transnational
xm
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corporations; the expansion of free trade, albeit still limited by multiple 
forms of protectionism in the industrial world; the contradictory combi­
nation of a high degree of mobility of capital and tight restrictions on the 
migration of labor; evidence of growing environmental vulnerability and 
interdependence; and an unprecedented trend toward the homogeniza­
tion of institutions. This standardization of the applicable rules is biased, 
however, because only the most powerful international actors have suc­
ceeded in safeguarding their interests. The outcome of this bias is an in­
complete international agenda. Both of these features— namely the bias 
and incompleteness of the current order—have profound implications 
for analysis and for public policy.
The vision of globalization set out in this analysis highlights the 
multidimensional nature of the process and, by extension, underscores 
the fact that it is not determined by economic forces alone. One of the 
dimensions of globalization, which ECLAC has termed the “global­
ization of values,” consists of the gradual spread of common ethical 
principles, including those embodied in declarations of human rights 
and the principles enshrined in summits held by the United Nations. 
These processes have their roots in international civil society’s long 
struggle to instill respect for human rights, social equity, gender equal­
ity, and environmental protection and, more recently, the globaliza­
tion of solidarity and the right to be different.
Given the forcefulness of these processes, the lack of any true inter­
nationalization of politics is undoubtedly the greatest paradox of the 
current phase of globalization. The mismatch between problems that 
are worldwide in scope and national political processes has translated 
into a “governance deficit” at the global level, which has made it 
harder to balance the opportunities and risks inherent in globalization. 
The fact that the political arena continues to be essentially national in 
scope also has profound implications for the international order. In 
particular, it implies that the promotion of democracy as a universal 
value makes sense only insofar as national processes of representation 
and participation are allowed to shape strategies of economic and 
social development and to mediate effectively among sectors that are 
affected differentially by globalization.
Various aspects of globalization offer significant opportunities for 
developing countries. Potentially, developing nations stand to gain 
from broader market access and the availability of capital and tech­
nology from the rest of the world, but the globalization process also 
holds out an opportunity for championing human rights and other 
universal values. In light of these opportunities, the greatest risk of all 
may lie in exclusion from the process. At the same time, however, glob­
alization carries the risks associated with new sources of instability (in
p r e f a c e x v
the spheres of trade and, particularly, finance), the risk of exclusion for 
countries that are ill-prepared for the modern world’s relentless 
demand for competitiveness, and the risk of heightened structural het­
erogeneity among social sectors and regions in countries whose inte­
gration into the world economy has been segmented. How successful 
the countries will be in taking advantage of the opportunities of glob­
alization and mitigating its risks will depend upon the effectiveness of 
their national and regional strategies for participating in this process 
and upon the global institutions that establish the framework for those 
strategies.
The most reasonable response to the complex situation created by 
globalization is to pursue a positive agenda. Experience has shown, 
moreover, that in the long run mere resistance to such deeply rooted 
processes inevitably proves futile. We should not, however, view glob­
alization as a natural, unalterable phenomenon that we have no alter­
native but to decry or embrace. The existence of various possible 
global orders is borne out not only by the history of the globalization 
process itself, but also by the range of different modalities of develop­
ment and integration into the global economy pursued by industrial 
and developing countries alike.
The first of this book’s five chapters focuses on the multidimen­
sional nature of globalization; describes the current phase of the 
process within its historical context of global economic international­
ization; and briefly examines its social, political, and cultural dimen­
sions. Chapters 2 and 3 look at how the economic facets of the glob­
alization process have evolved. Chapter 2 explores trends in 
international trade and in the new global production structure, and 
chapter 3 analyzes the international mobility of capital—within the 
framework of the various macroeconomic regimes of the world econ- 
omy— and of labor. Income disparity trends and the underlying asym­
metries of the current global order are discussed in chapter 4. The fifth 
and final chapter proposes an agenda for the global era. As part of this 
proposal— and on the basis of certain fundamental principles, such as 
global institutions that respect diversity; complementarity among 
global, regional, and national institutions; and equitable participation 
by the countries based on suitable rules of governance— this chapter 
outlines the national, regional, and global measures that are needed to 
achieve the three foremost objectives of a new international order: a 
supply of global public goods, the gradual correction of international 
asymmetries, and the progressive construction of a rights-based inter­
national social agenda.

1Globalization: A Historical, Multidimensional Perspective
In  t h e  1990s t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  globalization was widely employed in ac­
ademic and political debates, but the meanings attributed to this term 
are far from consistent. In this volume globalization  will be used to re­
fer to the growing influence exerted at the local, national, and regional 
levels by financial, economic, environmental, political, social, and cul­
tural processes that are global in scope. This definition of the term 
highlights the multidimensional nature of globalization. Indeed, al­
though the economic dimensions of globalization are spoken about the 
most, they are concomitant with noneconomic processes, which have 
a dynamic of their own and are therefore not determined by economic 
factors. In addition, the tension that is generated between the different 
dimensions of globalization is a pivotal element of the process. In the 
economic sphere, but also— and especially— in the broadest sense of 
the term, the current globalization process is incomplete and asym­
metric and is marked by major shortcomings in terms of governance.
The dynamics of globalization are shaped, to a large extent, by the 
fact that the actors involved in this process are on an unequal footing. 
Industrial-country governments, together with transnational corpora­
tions, exert the strongest influence, whereas developing-country govern­
ments and civil society organizations hold much less sway. Moreover, 
some of these actors—particularly industrial-country governments— 
reserve and exercise the right to take unilateral and bilateral action and 
to participate in regional processes while continuing to engage in global 
debates and negotiations.
The meaning of the term globalization  as used in this book is 
couched in positive terms and is intended to serve the purposes of 
analysis. It does not embrace the normative use of the concept, which 
is based on the idea that there is only one possible road to the full
1
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liberalization and integration of world markets and that this path traces 
the inevitable and desirable fate of all humankind.1 The history of the 
20th century refutes such a view; the period between the world wars 
was marked by a long and conflictive reversal of the internationaliza­
tion process. The development of multilateral institutions that has ac­
companied the globalization process and the current debate on global 
governance show that there is not just one possible international order, 
nor is there a single way of dividing responsibilities among global, re­
gional, and national institutions and agencies. Moreover, the course of 
events in industrial and developing countries has revealed that there 
are many ways to establish a position in the global economy (Albert 
1993; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
[ECLAC] 2000a; Rodrik 2001b). The differences are a reflection of 
each country’s history and of how each one weighs the opportunities 
and risks involved in becoming integrated into the world economy.
This chapter presents an initial approach to the globalization 
process as a whole. The first section gives a general description of the 
history and economic dimensions of the process, and the following sec­
tion analyzes the main noneconomic factors (ethical, cultural, and po­
litical principles). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the op­
portunities and risks inherent in globalization.
Economic Globalization
The contemporary process of internationalization dates back to the 
emergence of capitalism in Europe in the late Middle Ages, the new 
scientific and cultural thinking embodied by the Renaissance, and the 
establishment of the great European nations and their empires. The ex­
pansion of capitalism is the only historical phenomenon to have been 
truly global (albeit incomplete) in scope. To a greater extent than other 
parts of the developing world, the history of Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been strongly influenced by the development of capi­
talism ever since the late 15th century.
Modern historians distinguish a number of stages in the last 130 
years of globalization; with a few adaptations, three stages will be used 
in this volume.2 The first stage, from 1870 to 1913, was marked by a 
high degree of capital and labor mobility, together with a trade boom 
that was the result of reduced transport costs rather than of free trade. 
This stage of globalization was cut short by the First World War, 
which gave way to a period that was characterized first (in the 1920s) 
by the impossibility of resuming the trend of previous years and then 
(in the 1930s) by an open reversal of the globalization process.
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After the Second World War, there was a new impulse toward 
global integration. This period consisted of the second and third stages 
of globalization. The watershed events of the early 1970s marked the 
changeover from the second to the third stage. These events included 
the disintegration of the macroeconomic regulation regime established 
in 1944 in Bretton Woods, the first oil crisis, the increasing mobility of 
private capital, intensified by the first two events, and the end of the 
“golden age” of growth in the industrialized countries (1950-73 ) 
(Marglin and Schor 1990). If 1973 is taken as the turning point, then 
the second stage of globalization can be circumscribed to the period 
1 945-73 . This period was marked by a major effort to develop inter­
national institutions for financial and trade cooperation and by a sig­
nificant expansion of trade in manufactures among industrial coun­
tries. It was also characterized by widely varying models of economic 
organization and limitations on the mobility of capital and labor. The 
final quarter of the 20th century (1973 onward) ushered in a third 
stage of globalization, with the gradual spread of free trade, the grow­
ing presence on the international scene of transnational corporations 
operating as internationally integrated production systems, the expan­
sion and notable mobility of capital, and a shift toward the standard­
ization of development models. At the same time, selective trade pro­
tection mechanisms and tight restrictions on the movement of labor 
persisted.
This long process has been fueled by successive technological revo­
lutions and, most importantly, by advances that have cut the costs of 
transportation, information, and communications.3 The shortening of 
distances, in the economic sense, is a cumulative effect of cost reduc­
tions and of the development of new means of transport, in combina­
tion with the capacity for the real-time transmission of information, 
which started with the invention of the telegraph and expanded with 
the advent of the telephone and television. Access to information on a 
mass scale, however, became possible only with the development of in­
formation and communication technologies in recent years. These 
technologies have drastically reduced the cost of access to information, 
though not, obviously, the cost of processing it or of making effective 
use of it.
Advances in transportation, information, and communications are 
part of a wider range of technological innovations that have resulted 
in unprecedented advances in productivity, economic growth, and in­
ternational trade. In the European countries, the major capital cities 
have been engaged in international trade ever since the inception of 
modern capitalism (Braudel 1994). The internationalization of corpo­
rate production dates back to the late 19th century, when it emerged
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as a by-product of economic concentration in the industrialized coun­
tries. In fact, this phenomenon marked the birth of transnational cor­
porations. From the 1970s on, the increasingly common practice of 
outsourcing labor-intensive tasks, such as assembly or maquiladora 
activities, to other countries was facilitated by the reduction in trans­
port costs and the trade regulations established by the industrial coun­
tries. This was the first step toward the development of internationally 
integrated production systems, in which production can be divided 
into various stages (a process known as “the dismemberment of the 
value chain”). In such systems, the outsourcers in different countries 
can then specialize in the production of certain components, in partic­
ular phases of the production process, or in the assembly of specific 
models.
These changes in the structure of production and trade have en­
abled large corporations and business conglomerates to come to the 
fore. In fact, the development of internationally integrated production 
systems and increased flows of trade and foreign direct investment go 
hand in hand with the growing influence of transnational corpora­
tions. The key factor has undoubtedly been the liberalization of trade, 
financial flows, and investment in developing countries, and the pace 
of liberalization has been increasing over the last two decades. These 
phenomena are some of the factors behind the huge wave of foreign in­
vestment and the marked concentration of production at the world 
level that were hallmarks of the final decade of the 20th century.
As in the case of trade, international financial transactions origi­
nated in Europe at about the same time as modern capitalism (Braudel 
1994; Kindleberger 1984). In the 19th century, London was the main 
international financial center and presided over the consolidation of 
the gold standard as a system of international payments and macro­
economic regulation. Paris and, by the early 20th century, New York 
were its closest competitors. The subscription of capital for large-scale 
projects, especially in infrastructure and natural resources, and the cre­
ation of an international market in public bonds were the predominant 
sources of long-term international capital movements during the first 
stage of globalization. These developments were complemented by the 
emergence of an incipient international banking network that began to 
create instruments for financing international trade. Long-term fi­
nancing arrangements were then hit by a series of crises, however, and 
nearly disappeared altogether as a result of the worldwide depression 
of the 1930s, the collapse of the gold standard, and the massive de­
faults that ensued. In response to this situation, the Bretton Woods 
agreements were adopted in 1944 with a view to creating a multi­
lateral system of macroeconomic regulation based on fixed but
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adjustable exchange rates and on financial support for countries 
threatened with balance-of-payments crises. Another response was the 
establishment of an official international banking system at both the 
national level (export and import banks) and the multilateral level (the 
World Bank and, later, the Inter-American Development Bank and 
other regional banks).
In the 1960s, private long-term international flows reappeared, 
thanks in part to a new phase of global economic stability but also to 
other factors: the surplus of dollars that built up in the 1960s and of 
petrodollars in the 1970s; the abandonment of the Bretton Woods sys­
tem of fixed rates and the flotation of the main currencies in the early 
1970s; the rapid development of institutional saving in the 1980s, led 
by the United Kingdom and the United States; and the emergence of an 
increasingly large financial derivatives market in the last decade of the 
20th century, which made it possible to hedge the risks associated with 
different financial assets and liabilities.
Globalization has proceeded at a faster pace in the financial sphere 
than in trade and production, and it can plausibly be argued that we 
live in an era in which the financial sphere holds sway over the real sec­
tor of the economy (ECLAC 2001b). Both processes are taking place 
within a framework of thoroughgoing institutional restructuring at the 
global level, the essence of which has been the liberalization of inter­
national current and capital transactions. The progress made in de­
signing new global economic rules continues to be inadequate, how­
ever, and this structure clearly suffers from institutional gaps.
On the other hand, there has been no corresponding liberalization 
of labor flows, which are subject to strict regulation by national au­
thorities (except among the member countries of the European Union). 
This is one of the major differences between the first and current stages 
of globalization. The first was marked by two major migratory flows: 
of European labor to temperate zones and of primarily Asian labor to 
tropical areas. Together, these two migrations encompassed around 10 
percent of the world population of the time (World Bank 2002b).
In addition, the regulation of migratory flows is biased against un­
skilled labor, which consequently tends to seek out irregular channels. 
This exposes immigrants to abusive practices by traffickers, heightens 
their defenselessness against the authorities, and generates further 
downward pressure on wages for unskilled labor in the receiving coun­
tries. Meanwhile, as a result of the preference for skilled labor, the 
most highly qualified— and relatively scarce— human resources are 
drained out of developing countries. The segmentation of labor mo­
bility therefore exacerbates income disparities between workers with 
different skill levels in both their home and their host countries.
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A number of other factors that are closely associated with economic 
activity have taken on great importance at the world level. One of 
these factors is the scope of global environmental problems. In the last 
three decades it has become clear— and has been scientifically docu­
mented— that the entire planet is being subjected to unprecedented im­
pacts as a result of the increasing scale and cumulative effect of human 
activity. The consequences are being felt worldwide and include global 
warming, the thinning of the ozone layer, the decline in biodiversity, 
and the spread of desertification and drought, which have taken on the 
perverse dimension of “global public bads.” By revealing the existence 
of a web of causes and effects that are generated by human activities 
having global environmental impacts, advances in scientific knowl­
edge have highlighted the increasing ecological interdependence and 
vulnerability of countries, regardless of their level of development.
The need to reverse these global ecological processes has given rise 
to new imperatives and opportunities for international cooperation, 
which have been reflected in the various world summits and confer­
ences held in the 1990s and in the multilateral environmental agree­
ments concluded on those occasions. In the course of these processes, 
governments have adopted a proactive attitude toward cooperating in 
order to protect and manage global public goods on the basis of inno­
vative multilateral arrangements. They have also adopted principles 
based on the need for an equitable sharing, between rich and poor 
states, of the responsibilities and costs of reversing environmental 
damage. Accordingly, the environmental dimension is taking on in­
creasing significance as an arena for negotiations between developing 
and industrial countries. Because regions of the developing world that 
are rich in biodiversity or are extensively forested provide important 
global environmental services by, for example, serving as carbon sinks 
(carbon dioxide is the primary cause of climate change through the 
greenhouse effect), the developing countries have both the potential 
and the opportunity to play a key role in solving global problems. The 
responses that have been developed thus far are clearly inadequate, 
however, given the magnitude of these problems, especially in view of 
the threat they pose to the sustainability of economic growth.
In the 1990s, great strides were made in this regard with the ap­
proval of new international legal principles concerning the environ­
ment and development, one of which is principle 7, on “common but 
differentiated responsibilities,” of the Rio Declaration on Environ­
ment and Development, adopted at the Earth Summit held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. Under this principle, industrial countries explicitly ac­
knowledge the environmental debt they have accumulated vis-à-vis the 
rest of the international community as a result of the cumulative global
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externalities generated by their industrialization processes. This princi­
ple provides a political basis for industrial countries’ assumption of 
greater environmental commitments than developing countries under 
multilateral agreements. It also reflects the express recognition that 
countries cannot and should not aspire to “level the playing field” in the 
environmental sphere, in contrast to the principles currently governing 
efforts to change the economic aspects of the international order.
Another variety of global public bads that is also linked to economic 
activity is the spread of international crime: the production, trade, and 
consumption of narcotics and their close linkage with terrorist financ­
ing, arms trafficking, and the international circulation of illicit capital 
generated by drug trafficking and by the different forms of corruption 
that transcend national borders. The system has been slow to recog­
nize the need to control the circulation of illicit capital in both devel­
oping and industrial countries as well as in offshore financial centers, 
in large part because existing bank secrecy provisions will have to be 
scaled back to permit the operation of special mechanisms to monitor 
the circulation of illicit funds. Unfortunately, the systems that have 
been developed thus far do not include international measures to com­
bat a number of forms of corruption that are particularly a problem 
for developing countries, such as tax evasion, illegal capital flight, 
bribery, and illicit enrichment.
Noneconomic Dimensions of Globalization
Ethical and Cultural Dimensions
Economic globalization is taking place alongside other processes that 
have a dynamic of their own. One of the most positive of these 
processes has been called the “globalization of values.” This concept 
refers to the gradual spread of shared ethical principles (ECLAC 
2000a) and is manifested most clearly in declarations on human rights. 
The two main dimensions of concern in this book are (a) civil and po­
litical rights, by virtue of which individuals have autonomy from the 
power of the state and are entitled to participate in public decision­
making, and (b) economic, social, and cultural rights, which reflect the 
values of economic and social equality, solidarity, and nondiscrimina­
tion. This process has also found expression in the accession of a grow­
ing number of governments to U.N. human rights conventions (see fig­
ure 1.1). It is also reflected in the declarations issued by the 
participants in world summits held under U.N. auspices on the envi­
ronment, social development, population, women, and the rights of
Figure 1.1 Ratification of Human Rights Conventions
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Universal
Year
 Rights o f  the child —0 — Discrimination against women
O Civil and political rights —A— Econom ic, social and cultural rights
Source: United Nations (1999b).
children, among others. The Millennium Declaration (United Nations 
2000) is one of the most comprehensive expressions of the principles 
agreed upon at these summits.
It is important to note that, like economic globalization, the global­
ization of values has a long history that is linked to the aspirations of 
international civil society. Its most recent manifestation is the forma­
tion of a “global civil society” whose capacity for mobilization and for 
information exchange has been multiplied by the new information and 
communication technologies. The history of this society dates back to 
the liberal internationalism that emerged in the wake of the American 
and French revolutions in the late 18th century, which was expressed 
most clearly in the French revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen. As is well known, these values strongly influ­
enced the independence movements in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, which began with the outbreak of the Haitian revolution 
in 1791 as a direct consequence of the French revolution.
Whereas the civil and political rights enshrined in the Universal De­
claration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations (1948) are
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rooted in the liberal movements of the late 18th century, the Interna­
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Na­
tions 1966) is a product of the social movements of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, whose chief political manifestation has been the Interna­
tional Socialist Organization in its successive forms. In addition, 
throughout the 20th century, feminist internationalism had a decisive 
influence in winning the recognition of women’s equal rights, and en­
vironmental internationalism has played a major role since the 1960s 
in incorporating sustainable development principles into national and 
international agendas. Beginning at the Stockholm summit in 1972 
and extending to the U.N. Conference on Environment and Develop­
ment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Johannesburg, 2002), global environmental conven­
tions have been aimed at implementing some of the mandates of envi­
ronmental internationalism.
At the same time, it is important to note that this globalization of 
values sometimes comes into conflict with a diametrically opposed type 
of globalization that reflects the penetration of market economy values 
into social relations (in the areas of production, culture, and even the 
family). The tension generated between these shared ethical principles 
and the extension of market relations into the sphere of values, which 
is implicit in the concept of a market society, is another hallmark of the 
globalization process. This tension sometimes generates conflicts be­
cause the international market lacks the mediation mechanisms that the 
political sphere has traditionally provided at the national level.
In recent years, the long history of social movements has taken on 
a new dimension: the effort to preserve the identity of peoples and so­
cial groups that feel threatened by the tendency toward cultural ho­
mogeneity that globalization engenders. This “right to be different” is 
interrelated in various ways with human rights in the traditional sense, 
which highlight the equality of citizens, both among themselves and 
before the state. Thus, at the global level, equality and identity are in­
terrelated in complex ways.
Globalization simultaneously undermines cultural diversity and af­
fords new opportunities for its expression. Indeed, large segments of 
the world population feel that their unique histories and the values 
that govern their communities are in jeopardy. At the same time, how­
ever, globalization builds closer relationships among different cultural 
traditions and ways of life, thereby increasing their visibility and the 
likelihood that they will be duly appreciated. This, in turn, promotes 
the emergence of myriad interpretations of the global order.
Nonetheless, the speed of this process poses unprecedented chal­
lenges. On the one hand, it threatens to turn the enriching dialogue of
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Box 1.1 Inclusion and Identity: The Issue of Ethnicity
Latin America and the Caribbean comprise a melting pot of cultures in 
which diversity and universality are mixed and blended. The region is 
home to over 400  indigenous peoples who number 50 million individu­
als. These groups have gradually been strengthening their ability to or­
ganize politically, to assert their ethnic identities, and to defend their cul­
tures. Five countries account for nearly 90 percent of the region’s 
indigenous population: Peru (27 percent), M exico (26 percent), 
Guatemala (15 percent), Bolivia (12 percent), and Ecuador (8 percent). 
The Afro-Latin and Afro-Caribbean populations total almost 150 million 
people, most of whom live in Brazil (51 percent), Colombia (21 percent), 
the Caribbean subregion (16 percent), or the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela (12 percent).
In these early years of the new millennium, the indigenous, Afro-Latin, 
and Afro-Caribbean peoples of the region have the worst economic and 
social indicators, enjoy very little cultural recognition, and lack access to 
public decisionmaking circles. The Latin American and Caribbean coun­
tries face a formidable challenge in this respect. Social integration re­
quires the acknowledgement and appreciation of cultural diversity, and 
this means that states, governments, and societies must recognize the 
rights of the different ethnic groups, incorporate those rights into their 
legislation, and provide the necessary means of exercising those rights. 
Development policy must also provide opportunities for these popula­
tions to develop their potential and share in the basic codes of modern life 
without losing their identities.
Source: Hernández (2002).
cultures into a monologue. On the other, interaction opens up cultural 
opportunities, including those created by the mixture of different cul­
tures, to new and varied groups and individuals (see box 1.1). This 
process of incorporation through participatory and exclusionary 
mechanisms has given rise to new forms of organization. New net­
works, including some virtual ones, are replacing the organizational 
channels traditionally used by protest movements, for example.
The remarkable development of the communications media has 
strongly influenced these processes and has also given rise to new prob­
lems. First, it has greatly widened the gap between the cultural norms 
most broadly disseminated through global channels of communication 
and the cultural and artistic roots of countries and regions. Second, con­
trol of the media at the national and international levels is concentrated 
in the hands of a few. This situation threatens the ideal of cultural
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diversity, because the control of symbolic exchanges influences identity 
building, opinions, and beliefs.4 Third, the development of audiovisual 
media has led to greatly heightened personal expectations regarding ma­
terial wealth. Access to information is not always in balance with op­
portunities for steady employment and incomes and, accordingly, for 
well-being and consumption. Today, more than ever before, the demon­
stration effect cuts across national boundaries. Finally, participation in 
or exclusion from the electronic exchange of information has become a 
crucial factor for the exercise of citizenship, thereby posing the basic 
problem of how to prevent the emergence of a gap between those with 
access to information technology and those who suffer from what has 
been called “electronic invisibility” or “electronic blindness.”
Political Dimension
International political relations have also undergone far-reaching 
changes in recent decades. The end of the cold war brought a dramatic 
change in the climate of international relations among sovereign states, 
and the exacerbation and increased visibility of a number of localized 
conflicts generated international tensions of a very different nature 
than those seen before. These trends had been in evidence since the 
1970s, but they strengthened in the closing decade of the 20th century, 
particularly as a result of the profound changes that took place after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. The heightened predominance of the United 
States, European efforts to form a bloc capable of playing a leading 
role in global economic and political affairs, the setbacks suffered by 
Japan, the increased prominence of China and India, and the sudden 
transition experienced in the former socialist countries were the most 
salient features of this period.
These sweeping political changes have placed representative democ­
racy in a position of unparalleled preponderance. Political discourse is 
being shaped by an acceptance of the principles of pluralism, alterna­
tion of power, division of the powers of the state, election of authori­
ties as a basis for legitimacy, and recognition of the majority combined 
with respect for minorities, and these principles have begun to be ap­
plied much more widely.
Nevertheless, the transformations now under way have raised ques­
tions about how democratic institutions should function in societies 
where information, “image,” and the power of money play a funda­
mental role. Criticism along these lines extends to political parties, leg­
islatures, the relationship between voters and representatives, and even 
the very meaning of politics, especially— though not exclusively— in 
the parts of the developing world that suffer from exclusion and
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poverty. Although democracy is the choice of the majority, there is cer­
tainly no scarcity of negative views regarding its workings and its ef­
fectiveness in meeting the population’s needs.5 As with the peace divi­
dend that countries expected to receive after the end of the cold war, 
which has failed to yield significant benefits, it has not yet been possi­
ble to cash in on the “democracy bonus” either.
Despite these difficulties, it is generally recognized that democracy 
is the best means of setting a development agenda (Sen 1999) and that 
good governance is characterized by a focus on improving the design, 
management, and evaluation of public policy, which serves as the an­
alytical and operational tool of government (Lahera 2002). Nonethe­
less, government authorities and political leaders are under pressure to 
win broad local support and, at the same time, to abide by the rigid 
rules deriving from specific forms of globalization. In this connection, 
it may be categorically stated that the promotion of democracy as a 
universal value is meaningless if national processes to provide for rep­
resentation and participation are not allowed to define economic and 
social development strategies or to mediate effectively among the var­
ious actors affected by the tensions inherent in the globalization 
process.
In addition, the reduced capacity of the state in the current context 
of globalization limits the role the public sector can play in lowering 
the cost of the “creative destruction” associated with rapid structural 
change and may exacerbate the difficulties involved in the moderniza­
tion of the state itself. It is therefore less than realistic to sing the 
praises of both globalization and the disintegration of the state at the 
same time. The role of the social state as a generator of technological 
and institutional externalities is and will remain very important. In a 
world of global risks, the claim that economic forces can and should 
take the place of public policy and the state is less and less convincing. 
It is helpful, in this connection, to recall the categorical warning issued 
by Polanyi (1957) in his analysis of the collapse of the first stage of 
globalization: if the market seeks to subordinate society, it will end up 
destroying its own foundations.
Opportunities and Risks
In terms of access to new technologies, as in the area of trade and fi­
nancing, globalization offers developing countries ample opportunity 
to integrate themselves more fully into the world economy. The sus­
tained growth of international trade and the strengthening of multilat­
eral rules and dispute settlement mechanisms within the framework of
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) are promising signs in this re­
gard, as is regionalism when understood in the positive sense of open 
regionalism proposed by ECLAC (1994). However, although inroads 
are certainly being made in these directions, progress is being hindered 
by the incomplete liberalization of industrial economies. The partial 
nature of this process is itself a reflection of the protectionist practices 
that still predominate in the world, as well as the oversupply of certain 
goods in international trade, particularly raw materials. In addition, 
developing countries face the challenge of adapting their policies to the 
institutional mechanisms required by the W TO. This task has not been 
easy, and it may have consequences that are more restrictive than 
desired.
The explosive pace of global financial development has created op­
portunities for financing and for hedging financial risk, but it has also 
revealed the enormous problems caused by the asymmetry existing be­
tween the powerful market forces and the weak institutional structures 
that exist for regulating them (see ECLAC 2001a; UNCTAD 1998, 
2001a; United Nations 1999a). The coexistence of financial globaliza­
tion and national macroeconomic policies, which are still formulated 
on the basis of domestic interests and contexts, creates considerable 
tension for developing countries. Their governments are subject to the 
uncertainty generated by the macroeconomic policies of industrial 
countries, which do not adequately internalize their effects on the rest 
of the world and lack coordination mechanisms to ensure global co­
herence. These difficulties are compounded by the problems inherent 
in the financial market, particularly its volatility, which have had such 
a strong impact on the Latin American and Caribbean countries in re­
cent decades. These phenomena are related to the market’s inability to 
distinguish properly between different groups of borrowers, which 
produces contagion effects that influence the behavior of the financial 
market during both booms and busts. The developing countries are 
thus threatened by the globalization of financial volatility, which can 
have adverse effects on economic growth and social equity (Ffrench- 
Davis and Ocampo 2001; Rodrik 2001a).
Financial instability is the clearest, but not the only, manifestation of 
the increasing asymmetry between the power of the market and the lack 
of adequate economic governance. Other manifestations include the 
considerable economic concentration in evidence throughout the world 
and the multiple distributional tensions caused by the globalization 
process both between and within countries (see Bourguignon 
and Morrison 2002; Cornia 1999; Rodrik 1997; UNCTAD 1997; 
UNDP 1999b; see also chapter 4 of this book). These phenomena 
reflect, among other factors, the stringent educational and knowledge
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requirements of global technologies and markets, which threaten to 
marginalize those who are not fully prepared and to further confine the 
availability of these technologies and of new knowledge to just a few 
countries, social groups, and enterprises. This process is part of an ar­
ray of old and new threats to the economic and social security of the 
population, whose position is being made all the more precarious by a 
progressive debilitation of the entire range of social safety nets, includ­
ing both those provided by the family and those furnished by the state.
Globalization can also promote the emergence and valuation of en­
vironmental comparative advantages, including the sustainable use of 
natural capital that has economic value (forests, fisheries, tourist at­
tractions); ecological value (genetic information afforded by biodiver­
sity or the role of forests in absorbing carbon dioxide and other pollu­
tants); or aesthetic, historical, or scientific value. These positive 
developments can serve as the basis for countless policies on the de­
velopment of ecotourism, research on new medicines or agricultural 
products, the use of empirical knowledge concerning natural resources 
management and the economic properties of local biodiversity, the use 
of the regional ecological supply (such as biomass and natural re­
sources), the productive utilization of unique ecological niches, and in­
ternational negotiations on regional environmental services of global 
interest. In addition, new technologies for clean production, low-emis- 
sions transport, and energy efficiency and the use of renewable sources 
represent a new wave of technological innovation and market cre­
ation, and these processes will no doubt flourish in the coming 
decades. At the national level, globalization can promote the improve­
ment of public policies by raising the cost of implementing unsustain­
able strategies that adversely affect long-term development. One of the 
risks that arise in this connection, however, is the possibility that tra­
ditional comparative advantages may be lost without necessarily being 
replaced by new ones.
By definition, global environmental processes affect all countries, 
but small tropical countries, particularly island states, are especially 
vulnerable to global environmental changes, as is demonstrated by the 
increasing frequency and violence of weather-related disasters. Indeed, 
unless specific national and international policies are adopted, the 
trend toward the overexploitation of certain natural resources, the un­
derutilization of others, and the transfer of environmental costs from 
major polluting countries to the region can be expected to intensify.
Globalization also provides unprecedented opportunities in 
noneconomic areas. The spread of global values, the struggle for the 
right to be different, and the establishment of international mecha­
nisms to defend the exercise of citizenship are notable advances that 
are reflected in the consolidation— insufficient though it may be at this
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point— of respect for human rights, democracy, gender equality, and 
ethnic diversity. The breakdown of archaic structures of domination 
and the control of abuses of power at the country level are some of the 
areas in which advances have been made during this new global era. 
Nonetheless, tensions continue to arise owing to the lack of channels 
for reducing the enormous imbalances of power existing at the global 
level and, in some cases, for legitimizing international actions. The 
globalization and concentration of the communications media also 
pose new problems. A particularly disturbing noneconomic aspect of 
globalization is the enormous distance existing between symbolic inte­
gration into the globalized world and the achievement of true integra­
tion; sharp inequalities militate against the latter.
In the term used in the financial debates of recent years, all of this 
underscores the need for a new “international architecture” for this 
era of globalization based on a wide-ranging agenda and a representa­
tive and pluralistic negotiation process. Such a global agenda should 
be aimed at correcting serious flaws in the existing international order. 
One of the flaws of the current international structure is the contrast 
between the rapid development of markets and the slow development 
of global governance, which has resulted in a suboptimal supply of 
global public goods (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999). A second cate­
gory of problems are the asymmetries faced by developing countries in 
the global order in the areas of production and technology, finance 
and macroeconomics, and factor mobility (Ocampo 2001b). A third 
problem area has to do with the lack of effective international instru­
ments for guaranteeing the achievement of the development goals that 
have been formulated on numerous occasions, most recently in the 
U.N. Millennium Declaration (United Nations 2000).
In the first decades following the Second World War, the need to 
correct the asymmetries of the international economic system was ex­
pressly acknowledged. The commitments entered into in relation to of­
ficial development assistance and preferential treatment for developing 
countries in international trade were some of the partial results of this 
effort to build a “new international economic order,” although they 
clearly fell short of what was required. This vision has been seriously 
undermined in recent decades and has been replaced with an alterna­
tive paradigm whereby the basic objective of changes in the interna­
tional economic order should be to “level the playing field” in the reg­
ulatory sphere to allow market forces to operate freely. However, in 
the absence of genuine equality of opportunity, this “leveling” can 
actually lead to greater inequalities. The evidence that inequalities have 
worsened over the last half century (and especially in the last quarter 
of the 20th century), thereby prolonging more long-standing trends, 
makes it clear that neither approach has had the hoped-for results.
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The lack of global governance, which is implicated in all these prob­
lems, reflects another deep-rooted conflict: the contrast between global 
issues and local political processes. The exercise of citizenship and 
democracy remains confined to the national and local spheres6; in fact, 
in today’s world, this is still the most basic meaning attached to the 
concept of a nation. The lack of global governance means that there 
are no decision-making mechanisms at the global level to ensure that 
the interests of the least powerful countries and social sectors are ade­
quately represented. These tensions are all the more significant because 
globalization has made it more difficult for countries to reconcile the 
demands of their citizens, which have increased with the advent of 
democracy, with the limitations that globalization itself has imposed 
on the ability of governments to take action.
Notes
1. Helleiner (2000a) presented a comparison of these two visions.
2. See Dowrich and DeLong (2001), Lindert and Williamson (2001), Mad- 
dison (1991, 1995, 2001), O ’Rourke (2001), and O ’Rourke and Williamson 
(1999). The starting point, set at around 1870, is somewhat arbitrary, but it 
reflects the incipient and still limited integration at the international level (and 
even at the domestic level, in large countries) of goods, capital, and labor mar­
kets up to that time, as well as the restricted scope of the industrialization 
process in most of the countries that formed the nucleus of the world economy.
3. In fact, globalization could not have come about without the railway, 
the steamship, and the telegraph in the 19 th century; the construction of canals 
connecting oceans (Suez in 1869 and Panama in 1903); automobiles, air­
planes, telephones, and television in the 20th century; and, of course, the rev­
olution in information and communication technologies in the final decades of 
the 20th century.
4. None of the world’s 20 largest multimedia groups is Latin American, 
and four of the five largest conglomerates are from the Anglo-Saxon world. In 
1999, just four agencies controlled the international flow of news in print.
5. This is definitely the situation in Latin America, as shown by the results 
of successive Latinobarómetro polls. See T he E con om ist (2002).
6. Certainly, there are areas in which a form of “global citizenship” is 
emerging, as manifested in the participation of civil society organizations in 
U.N. world summits and in global debates on the environment and trade. This 
was demonstrated very clearly by the civil society event that took place in par­
allel with the Ministerial Meeting on Trade of the Summit of the Americas 
(Toronto 1999) and by stand-alone events such as the World Social Forum in 
Porto Alegre (2001 and 2002). The clashes surrounding the W TO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle (1999), the annual meeting of the International M one­
tary Fund and the World Bank in Prague (2000), and the meeting of the Group 
of Eight in Genoa (2001) are further examples of this kind of participation.
2International Trade and the New Global Production Structure
Al t h o u g h  t h e  g l o b a l i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s  is a multidimensional phe­
nomenon, some of its most visible and influential aspects are economic 
in nature. This chapter analyzes major trends in international trade 
and the new global production structure; the mobility of capital and 
labor is considered in the next chapter. This analysis covers a long pe­
riod in history, from the last quarter of the 19th century to the pres­
ent, and is structured according to the successive stages of globaliza­
tion identified in the preceding chapter. The first section focuses on the 
development of trade and investment flows among the major regions 
of the world, and on the main challenges faced by developing countries 
as a result of these global trends. The second section highlights the mi­
croeconomic foundations of the new forms of production and market 
organization, their impact on business decisions and strategies, and the 
corresponding dynamics of foreign direct investment.
International Trade
Contrary to what is often believed, there has been no clear association 
between the expansion of trade and economic growth throughout suc­
cessive stages in the internationalization of the world economy.
International Trade and Econom ic Growth: A Variable 
Historical Relationship
During the 19th century world trade expanded rapidly, outpacing 
world gross domestic product (GDP), which also grew briskly (see 
figure 2 .1). This expansion can be traced to a number of factors, 
including the early industrial revolutions and the consequent drop in 
transport costs, the “pax Britannica” imposed at the end of the
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Figure 2.1 Trade and Global Output, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 9 8
A. Growth in world output and exports of goods
□  Growth in world GDP
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Napoleonic wars, and the replacement of the principles of mercantilist 
regulation with those of free enterprise.
This period and, in particular, what was referred to in the preced­
ing chapter as the first stage of globalization (1 8 7 0 -1 9 1 3 ) were 
marked by a considerable degree of international capital and labor 
mobility and by the spread of the gold standard, from 1870 on, as a 
system of international payments and macroeconomic regulation. 
Contrary to what is widely believed, however, another notable feature 
of the period was the emergence of new forms of state regulation, not 
only in the economy (currency and financial system) and in social areas
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(principles of worker protection and social security), but also, most 
important, in the persistence of numerous trade restrictions.
In fact, except in the European powers committed to free trade 
(England and the Netherlands, in particular), in colonies whose eco­
nomic relations with their ruling powers were governed by this system, 
and in some independent powers on which similar requirements were 
imposed (China, Japan, which did not regain tariff autonomy until 
1911, and the Ottoman Empire, among others), and apart from a 
more widespread trend toward this form of trade in the 1860s and 
1870s,1 trade protectionism was the rule of the day in all nations that 
maintained tariff autonomy. Indeed, protectionism was the predomi­
nant practice in the self-governing territories of the British Empire that 
kept their autonomy (Australia and Canada), continental Europe, 
many Latin American countries, and the United States.2 Bairoch 
(1993) rightly argued that it was economic growth that fueled the ex­
pansion of international trade during this period, not vice versa. This 
being the case, the idea that free trade was the primary engine of world 
economic growth between the mid-19th century and the First World 
War is one of the great myths of economic history.
The rapid growth of international trade was interrupted between the 
two world wars. Factors contributing to this break in the trend included 
global political instability, the deceleration of economic growth in the in­
dustrial countries, the inability to restore the gold standard, and in par­
ticular the frequent use of protectionist measures (exchange and import 
controls) and the widespread breakdown of the multilateral payments 
system during the depression of the 1930s. This combination of factors 
explains the importance that was attached, after the Second World War, 
to the establishment of standards and the founding of international or­
ganizations, which evidently were shaped by the unequal power structure 
of the players taking part in that process (discussed later in this chapter).
As a reflection of the manner in which the international trading sys­
tem was structured in the postwar period, the most dynamic trade 
flows were originally centered in the two large European trading blocs. 
Subsequent developments in the two blocs were dissimilar because the 
European Community (now the European Union) succeeded in con­
solidating its position, whereas the Council for Mutual Economic As­
sistance— consisting of the socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe— began to decline in importance and eventually disappeared 
altogether. Japan and the first generation of “Asian tigers” also began 
to increase their share of world trade shortly after the end of the war, 
thanks to their use of planning systems in which the conquest of for­
eign markets was a central component of development strategy. All the 
other regions of the world saw their shares of world trade shrink be­
tween 1950 and 1973 (see table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Global Exports, by Origin
(Percentage share a t  current exchange rate, 56 countries)





A frica 1973 1990 1998
Western Europe 65.7 56.3 47.4 40.8 38.6 50.3 51.9 47.4
United Kingdom 21.7 15.0 12.1 12.7 12.0 5.8 6.1 5.6
Continent 44.1 41.3 35.3 28.1 26.6 44.6 45.8 41.7
Central and Eastern Europe 5.8 6.0 6.6 8.3 7.8 9.2 5.4 4.9
North America3 10.3 16.4 21.4 26.7 25.3 19.1 17.0 18.6
Other industrial countries 2.8 4.7 6.2 6.0 5.7 9.6 11.0 9.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.9 7.2 7.9 9.8 9.3 3.9 3.5 5.0
Asian developing countries 10.6 9.3 10.5 8.4 7.9 5.1 9.5 13.1
Africa — — — — 5.4 2.9 1.7 1.5
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
—  Not available.
a. Canada and the United States.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from Maddison (2001).
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Beginning in the mid-1970s, the emergence of a highly dynamic 
trading bloc in East Asia ultimately came to be the most striking fea­
ture of world trading activity. Japan lost its lead in the last decade of 
the 20th century, and China emerged as a hub for the expansion of in­
ternational trade. Other major changes that took place in the 1990s 
included an upsurge in exports from the United States.
This brief historical overview illustrates how the relationship be­
tween trade and economic growth has varied, not only in the course of 
the century that preceded the Second World War, but also during more 
recent stages of globalization. As shown in figure 2.1, world trade and 
world economic growth accelerated simultaneously between 1950 and 
1973, but the upswing in world trade was largely a result of the rever­
sal of the trend toward national isolationism observed between 1913 
and 1950. The slowdown of the world economy between 1973 and 
1990 also coincided with more sluggish growth in world trade, but the 
latter’s great dynamism in the last decade of the 20th century was not 
accompanied by a commensurate global economic expansion.
This variable relationship is confirmed by the data shown in fig­
ure 2.2. The upswings in GDP growth seen in the various countries be­
tween 1950 and 1973 were associated with widely differing patterns 
of integration into the world economy. Thus, the second stage of glob­
alization was not characterized by a strong positive correlation be­
tween export growth and GDP growth in the different countries, even 
though it is true that some of the fastest growing economies in that pe- 
riod— particularly Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan 
(China)— were also highly successful exporters. This correlation was, 
however, quite positive in the third stage of globalization. Thus, even 
though the liberalization and expansion of world trade did not trans­
late into faster world economic growth in the period after 1973, the 
success achieved by individual countries has been closely linked to 
their effective integration into international trade flows.
In the developing world, the relationship among development strat­
egy, external trade, and economic growth has undoubtedly varied 
since the end of the Second World War. Comparative analyses (see, for 
example, Helleiner 1994) categorically demonstrate that trade policy 
has played an important role in development strategies, but they also 
show that there is no simple correlation applicable to all countries in 
all time periods or to a given country in different periods. The import 
substitution strategy yielded benefits in terms of rapid economic 
growth at certain stages and was even a necessary factor in enabling 
many countries to begin exporting manufactures at a later stage, 
as noted by Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986). Nonetheless, 
the effects of protectionist policies tended to weaken over time.
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Furthermore, as noted earlier, in recent decades rapid economic 
growth has increasingly been linked to success as an exporter, but such 
success has been achieved under widely varying trade policy strategies. 
There is no close linkage between export growth and a liberal trade 
regime (Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001). Moreover, as indicated in the 
extensive literature on East Asia (see, for example, Akyüz 1998; Amsden 
1989, 2001 ; Chang 1994; Wade 1990), cases of strong economic 
growth have been accompanied by mechanisms for state intervention 
in external trade, the financial sector, and technology. As noted by 
Rodrik (1999, 2001b), rapid growth in developing countries has coin­
cided with various combinations of economic orthodoxy and “local 
heresies.”
In the particular case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the re­
gion’s share of world exports fell steeply between 1950 and 1973, sta­
bilized between 1973 and 1990, and then began to increase. Admit­
tedly, most of the increase is attributable to the upsurge in Mexican 
exports under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Nevertheless, swift growth in exports from small economies, as com­
pared to the growth of aggregate output, can be observed starting as 
early as the mid-1950s, whereas exports from large and medium-size 
economies began to speed up shortly thereafter (see figure 2 .3).3 It was 
then that the countries of the region began to implement various com­
binations of import substitution and export promotion measures, in­
cluding a number of subregional integration arrangements, the first of 
which was in Central America in the 1950s. It was this “mixed 
model”— rather than import substitution alone, as is often claimed— 
that was the most widely used arrangement in the region beginning in 
the 1960s (Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 2000b) and that had been 
advocated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) since the late 1950s (Bielschowsky 1998; ECLAC 
1998b; Rosenthal 2001). As early as the mid-1970s export growth be­
gan to surpass GDP growth in the region as a whole. This trend inten­
sified during the “lost decade” of the 1980s, but more as a result of the 
slowdown in GDP growth than of an increase in exports and, in the 
last decade of the 20th century, as a consequence of export expansion.
Development o f  the Institutional Framework for 
International Trade
Such was the scale of the new international institutional framework 
that took shape after the Second World War that it marked a turning 
point in trade and financial history. Economic transactions had obvi­
ously begun to expand and bring about changes in international
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Figure 2.3  Exports from Latin America 
A. Percentages of GDP
P hQO
B. Percentages of GDP by size of countries (simple averages)
N ote: GDP = gross domestic product. The large countries are Argentina, Brazil, and 
M exico; the medium-size ones are Chile, Colombia, Peru, and the República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela; and the small ones are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of official figures from the countries.
relations in the 19th century, two of which changes were the adoption 
of the “most favored nation” principle in trade agreements (although 
it was frequently contravened in the 1930s) and recourse to interna­
tional arbitration to settle disputes between states. In addition, the 
gold standard came to be adopted by an increasing number of coun­
tries, although this primarily reflected a gradual acceptance of the 
monetary system employed by the leading international power of the
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time, rather than the implementation of principles of international co­
operation. The application of this system was confined to weak forms 
of cooperation among the main central banks of the industrial coun­
tries during this period (Eichengreen 1996). In the 19th century, a 
number of conventions were signed and various specialized agencies 
were established, including the World Health organization and the 
Pan American Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, but the 
most significant step in terms of international cooperation came later 
with the creation of the League of Nations in 1919. None of these 
processes, however, matched the scope of the international coopera­
tion seen after the Second World War.
The period in which the international institutional framework de­
veloped most prolifically— the final years of the war and those imme­
diately following it— was characterized by a vision whose first mani­
festation was the founding of the United Nations. In the economic 
domain, this vision led to the establishment of three key institutions: 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was to restore multi­
lateralism in current operations and provide financial support in times 
of crisis; the International Trade organization, which was to oversee 
the development of multilateral trade principles; and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank, which 
was to facilitate the reconstruction of countries devastated by war. 
When the effort to create the International Trade organization failed 
following the Havana Conference of 1948, the role it was intended to 
perform passed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which had fewer members.
There were two major counterweights to the strengthening of mul­
tilateralism in trading activity. The first was the formation of regional 
blocs, within whose borders trade expanded rapidly. The European 
Economic Community was the most striking example, and a number 
of agreements were established on a smaller scale, including several in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The former Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance also served to boost trade among the centrally 
planned economies.
The second counterweight to multilateralism was widespread re­
course to protectionism in the developing world. This took the form 
not only of high tariffs, but also of quantitative restrictions, local con­
tent requirements for assembly industries, and minimum export 
requirements for firms and industrial sectors experiencing foreign 
exchange shortages. For newly independent countries, protectionism 
amounted to an expression of autonomy, as the colonial past was per­
ceived as an era of economic failure that had to be overcome by means
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Table 2 .2  GDP Growth: W orld and Largest Regions, 
1 8 2 0 -1 9 9 8
(W eighted average annual grow th rates)
Region 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1998
Western Europe 1.65 2.10 1.19 4.81 2.11
Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand,
and United States 4.33 3.92 2.81 4.03 2.98
Japan 0.41 2.44 2.21 9.29 2 .97
Asia (not including
Japan) 0.03 0.94 0.90 5.18 5.46
Latin America 1.37 3.48 3.43 5.33 3.02
Eastern Europe 
and the former
Soviet Union 1.52 2 .37 1.84 4.84 -0 .5 6
Africa 0.52 1.40 2.69 4.45 2.74
World 0.93 2.11 1.85 4.91 3.01
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from Maddison (2001).
of deliberate action on the part of the nation-state. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean the increasing use of interventionism and protec­
tion represented what was perceived as a success. In fact, in the early 
stages of the import substitution period, between the two world wars, 
the region had achieved rapid economic growth, which facilitated a 
relatively easy transition from export-based development to the “in­
ward-looking” development model (see table 2.2).
In addition, during the period between the two world wars devel­
opment and industrialization were considered to be one and the same, 
and interventionism and state planning were standard practice world­
wide, with very few exceptions. In several cases this represented an ex­
tension of the strict public controls imposed during periods of armed 
conflict. Consequently, in the developing world the choice was seen as 
being between central planning and the weaker forms of planning typ­
ical of mixed economies, rather than between state planning and a free 
market.
There were also some notable departures from the move toward 
trade liberalization within the framework of GATT. In fact, although 
the first six rounds of negotiations promoted the liberalization of 
intraindustrial trade in the industrial economies, the areas requiring 
internal adjustments on the part of the industrial countries— including 
the agricultural and textile sectors— remained outside the scope of 
multilateral trade rules. These rounds reduced levies on imports of
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nonagricultural products from industrial countries to a low average 
level.4 From the late 1960s on, and in parallel with the lowering of tar­
iffs, the multilateral trade agenda began to be focused on other public 
policies affecting competition between domestic and imported goods, 
such as administrative barriers, technical standards, contingency pro­
tection measures (safeguards), and trade protection (antidumping and 
subsidies), many of which came to be used for openly protectionist 
purposes. Voluntary export restraints, which became more wide­
spread in the 1970s and 1980s, added to the use of protectionist 
instruments outside the GATT framework.
The Uruguay Round (1986-94) was unquestionably the most com­
prehensive of all the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The 
countries agreed to lower the effective average level of industrial tar­
iffs even further. In addition, the number of duty-free tariff lines was 
increased, virtually all the tariff structures were bound, and stricter 
trade remedies (antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures) 
were adopted. With respect to issues that had previously remained out­
side the GATT framework, commitments were established for the 
agricultural sector not only to protect trade, but also to address export 
and production subsidies; agreement was reached on the gradual dis­
mantling of the Multifibre Arrangement, voluntary export restraints 
were prohibited, and the signatories agreed to eliminate trade-related 
investment measures (local content or export requirements), which 
were used liberally by many developing countries. In addition, when 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) was given its mandate to take 
over the role formerly played by GATT, two new areas were included 
in its terms of reference: the liberalization of services and the develop­
ment of international rules on the protection of intellectual property. 
In addition, a new dispute settlement mechanism was created.
More than seven years after the entry into force in 1995 of the M ar­
rakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, the 
great majority of the member countries are well aware that the proper 
functioning of the W T o  is important for the orderly conduct of inter­
national economic relations. W T o  has fostered the settlement of trade 
disputes through mutually beneficial cooperation between countries 
and, as a result, has helped to create a framework of trade rules that 
are more reliable and predictable than those of the past. The fact that 
developing countries have made increasing use of the W T o  dispute 
settlement mechanism demonstrates the importance of the organiza­
tion’s active role in upholding the system of standards in order to ar­
bitrate trade disputes.
There is a serious imbalance, however, in the distribution of the ben­
efits deriving from the Marrakesh Agreement. The industrial countries
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have continued to gain the most from the liberalization of trade in 
goods and services.5 First, these countries were able to reduce the costs 
of adjusting their agricultural and textile sectors because they made 
sure they were given generous transition periods to make the 
changeover to more open and competitive markets. In addition, they 
introduced varying degrees of flexibility into the disciplines relating to 
their policies on agriculture and on certain industries. They also ex­
tended the GATT rules, which originally referred only to products, to 
cover the rights of private agents (firms) and brought into the multi­
lateral trading system those areas in which they enjoy a solid techno­
logical predominance, including the protection of intellectual property 
rights. Although there are no specific agreements on investment or the 
safeguarding of competition, the industrial countries ensured that the 
commitments on investments, subsidies, and trade in services confer 
national treatment to transnational corporations (TNCs). Further­
more, they laid a firm legal foundation for the liberalization of some 
service delivery modes and sectors, such as financial services, basic 
telecommunications, electronic commerce, and information technolo­
gies. By contrast, despite the commitments undertaken, not only have 
the sectors that could be important markets for developing countries’ 
exports been slow to open up, but their liberalization, such as it is, has 
been coupled with the introduction of measures that undermine exist­
ing obligations and new forms of selective protectionism, such as an­
tidumping measures.
This asymmetry in the distribution of benefits and the slow progress 
made since the 1960s in terms of special and differential treatment 
prompted the developing countries to seek a new round of trade nego­
tiations that would focus on areas of particular interest to them (chap­
ter 4 analyzes this issue in greater depth). The commitment to develop 
measures to address this situation forms the basis of the Doha Decla­
ration, which was adopted at the Fourth World Trade Organization 
Ministerial Conference (Qatar, November 2001), and lays out the 
work program of the W TO. This program covers several areas of in­
terest to the multilateral trading system.6 Deliberations and negotia­
tions, to be completed by 2005, will be conducted to review, broaden, 
or alter the rules established at the Uruguay Round.
Recent Patterns o f  World Trade
In view of the increasing importance of export strength for countries’ 
economic growth, it is important to pinpoint exactly what patterns 
have promoted an expansion of exports in recent decades. Table 2.3 
illustrates the changes that have taken place in the international trade
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m atrix, by geographic origin and destination, between 1985 and 
2000. The most striking trend that can be discerned is the increase in 
the Asian developing countries’ share of world trade. This was 
achieved largely at the expense of the relative volume of trade among 
industrial countries, which, in any case, still represents more than half 
of the world total. The share held by Canada and the United States 
grew as well, thanks to the considerable expansion of their exports to 
the developing world. Intraregional trade also rose steadily in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and, even more, within the Asian bloc. In 
contrast, the weighted share of Africa and the rest of the world 
(chiefly the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) continued to 
fall. The Latin American and Caribbean region’s share of exports 
rose, but to a much lesser extent than its share of imports, with the re­
sult that the region’s large trade surplus of 1985 had turned into a 
deficit by 2000, sharply contrasting with the Asian developing coun­
tries’ hefty trade surplus.
The composition of world trade by category of goods has changed 
substantially over the last 15 years.7 Table 2.4 classifies products as 
dynamic or nondynamic and indicates their importance relative to two 
categories of international trade: the category involving the intensive 
use of natural resources or technology, as identified by ECLAC,8 and 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). The slow 
growth of trade in commodities and natural resource-based manu­
factures is one of the most striking phenomena in this regard. M ore­
over, increasing market competition has resulted in a severe downturn 
in raw material prices, which constitutes a continuation of a more 
long-standing trend (see box 2.1). Among manufactures, those based 
on the use of advanced technology show a much higher growth rate 
than manufactures as a whole. The shares of agricultural products, 
nonfood raw materials, and especially fuel are declining. Finally, the 
largest increases are found in the category of machinery and equip­
ment, especially electrical equipment and equipment related to the in­
formation and communications industry, whose share swelled by 9 
percentage points.
An analysis of the growth of international trade can be combined 
with an analysis of the “revealed competitiveness” of various regions, 
as reflected in their share of different types of products. This gives rise 
to four categories: (a) dynamic products in which a given region’s 
share of trade is increasing (“rising stars”), (b) dynamic products in 
which its share is falling (“missed opportunities” ), (c) nondynamic 
products in which the region’s market share is increasing (“falling 
stars”), and (d) products that combine low relative growth with a loss 
of market share (“retreat products” ).
oTable 2.3  Structure of W orld Imports, by Origin and Destination, 1985 and 20 0 0
(Percentages o f  total w orld  imports)
R egion o f  destination  
Latin
A m erica T ota l
W estern United O ther T ota l and  the Asian developing T ota l by
R egion o f  origin E u rope States industrial industrial C aribbean  developing A frica countries origin
1985
Western Europe 30.0 5.2 1.6 36.8 0.8 2.5 1.2 4.6 41.4
Canada and United States 3.8 7.1 2.4 13.3 1.1 1.8 0.3 3.2 16.4
Other industrial 2.3 4.8 1.0 8.1 0.3 2.6 0.2 3.0 11.1
Total industrial 36.1 17.1 5.0 58.1 2.2 6.9 1.7 10.8 68.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.5 2.9 0.4 4.8 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 5.8
Asian developing countries 3.5 4.2 4.1 11.7 0.3 3.8 0.2 4.3 16.1
Africa 2.9 0.8 0.2 3.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 4.3
Total developing countries 7.9 7.9 4.7 20.5 1.1 4.3 0.4 5 .7 26.2
Rest of world 3.3 0.2 0.3 3.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 4.9
Total by destination 47.3 25.2 10.0 82.4 3.4 12.0 2.3 17.6 100.0
000
Western Europe 25.5 4.6 1.5 31.7 1.0 2.9 0.6 4.5 36.1
Canada and United States 3.7 6.6 1.9 12.2 3.2 2.4 0.1 5 .7 17.9
Other industrial 2.0 3.1 0.6 5.7 0.3 3.4 0.1 3.7 9.4
Total industrial 31.2 14.3 4.0 49.5 4.4 8.7 0.8 13.9 63.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.8 3.7 0.2 4.7 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.3 6.0
Asian developing countries 4.7 5.9 3.8 14.4 0.5 8.2 0.2 8.9 23.3
Africa 1.1 0.4 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 2.2
Total developing countries 6.6 10.0 4.1 20.7 1.6 8.8 0.3 10.7 31.4
Rest of world 3.7 0.5 0.2 4.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.7 5.1
Total by destination 41.6 24.8 8.3 74.7 6.1 18.0 1.2 25.3 100.0
N ote: The data on world imports refer to the total imports of 82 reporting countries, corresponding to approximately 90 percent of world trade. “1 9 8 5 ” 
figures are the annual averages for the period 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6 . “2 0 0 0 ” figures are the annual averages for 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0 . The countries not included as reporting 
countries are primarily those with economies in transition. Western Europe =  European Union plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Other 
industrial =  Australia, Israel, Japan, and New Zealand. Rest of world is not included as a destination because of lack of information and, as an origin, it 
refers to economies in transition, Oceania except Australia and New Zealand, free zones, and so forth.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from UNSD (2002).
Table 2 .4  Dynamic and Nondynamic Products in W orld Imports, 1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 0
(Percentage o f  total imports)
D ynam ic products N ondynam ic products
Product
N um ber  
o f  item s 1985 (1) 20 0 0  (2)
Increase  
A = ( 2 ) -  (1)
N um ber  
o f  item s 1985 (3) 20 0 0  (4)
L oss  
B = ( 4 ) -  (3)
o r  reduct 
( A - B ,
B y  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  c a t e g o r y  
Commodities 15 0.7 0.8 0.1 132 22.5 11.6 -1 0 .9 -1 0 .8
Natural resource-based manufactures 65 5.3 6.8 1.6 134 14.3 8.9 -5 .4 -3 .8
Low-technology manufactures 71 7.3 10.8 3.5 90 7.1 4.9 -2 .2 1.3
Midlevel technology manufactures 91 16.7 21.1 4.4 111 11.8 8.6 -3 .3 1.1
High-technology manufactures 45 9.5 21.6 12.2 21 2.2 1.3 -0 .9 11.3
Unclassified products 4 1.4 2.8 1.4 7 1.4 0.9 -0 .5 0.8
Total 291 40.8 63.9 23.1 495 59.2 36.1 -23 .1 0.0
B y  S IT C  c la s s i f ic a t io n  
Food and live animals for food 17 1.1 1.4 0.3 77 7.5 4.3 -3 .2 -2 .9
Beverages and tobacco 4 0.3 0.3 0.1 7 0.7 0.6 -0 .2 -0 .1
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 8 0.1 0.1 0.0 96 6.1 3.4 -2 .7 -2 .6
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related 
materials 2 0.1 0.1 0.0 18 17.2 8.6 -8 .6 -8 .6
Animal and vegetable oils, fats, 
and waxes 3 0.0 0.1 0.0 15 0.6 0.3 -0 .3 -0 .3
Chemicals and related products 39 3.6 6.0 2.4 56 4.5 3.3 -1 .2 1.3
Manufactured goods classified by 
material 76 6.5 7.9 1.4 115 9.1 6.1 -3 .1 -1 .6
Machinery and transport equipment 89 22.0 35.6 13.6 70 7.9 5.6 -2 .3 11.3
Power-generating machinery and
equipment 
Machinery specialized for particular
9 1.6 2.3 0.7 10 0.5 0.4 -0 .2 0.5
industries 6 0.9 1.1 0.2 22 1.9 1.3 -0 .6 -0 .4
Metalworking machinery 
General industrial machinery and
4 0.3 0.3 0.0 4 0.4 0.3 -0 .1 0.0
equipment 
Office machines and automatic data
16 1.9 2.6 0.7 11 1.2 1.0 -0 .2 0.6
processing equipment 
Telecommunications and sound
7 2.4 6.0 3.6 4 0.4 0.3 -0 .2 3.4
recording apparatus 
Electrical machinery, apparatus,
6 1.6 3.7 2.1 6 1.2 0.8 -0 .3 1.8
and appliances 
Road vehicles, including air cushion
25 4.7 9.8 5.1 0 — — 0.0 5.1
vehicles 8 7.6 8.1 0.6 5 1.5 1.1 -0 .4 0.2
Other transport equipment 8 1.1 1.6 0.6 8 0.7 0.3 -0 .3 0.2
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions not
52 5.8 9.6 3.9 36 4.7 3.6 -1 .1 2.8
elsewhere classified 2 1.3 2.7 1.3 4 1.0 0.5 -0 .6 0.8
—  N ot available.
Note: SITC is the Standard International Trade Classification (Rev. 2) and it is used at the level of subgroup (four-digit level). Dynamic products are 
those whose rate of growth exceeded the average rate of growth of world imports, and nondynamic products are those whose rate of growth lagged behind 
the average rate of growth of world imports.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from UNSD (2002).
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Box 2.1  The Long-Term Deterioration of Raw M aterial 
Prices
The terms of trade between commodities and manufactures have a cru­
cial influence on both short-term macroeconomic performance and the 
developing countries’ growth prospects, owing to the importance of com­
modities in these countries’ export structures. In the 1950s Prebisch 
(1951) and Singer (1950) formulated the hypothesis of a secular trend to­
ward a decline in the terms of trade for commodities. This hypothesis has 
been studied in depth since then, and both its theoretical and empirical 
bases have been called into question. Be that as it may, price data for 24 
commodities in the period between 1900 and 2000  show that the terms 
of trade for nonfuel commodities have deteriorated to such an extent that 
they now represent less than one-third of their pre-1920 levels (see fig­
ure 2.4). This is equivalent to an annual decrease of 1.5 percent over the 
last 80 years, which is obviously a significant decline.
Figure 2 .4  Real Commodity Price Indexes, 1900 = 100
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Variable weighting by share o f  world trade  Industrial commodities
Source: T he E con om ist  (2002).
A time series analysis does not reveal a persistent downward trend, 
however, but rather two structural changes, one occurring around 1920 
and the other around 1980. Historical analyses indicate that the First 
World War ushered in a period of slow economic expansion in the in­
dustrial countries, particularly the European countries, which interrupted 
the brisk growth that had characterized the first stage of globalization. 
The first structural change in the terms of trade coincided with the severe 
postwar crisis of 1920 and 1921, when real raw material prices plum­
meted by 45 percent. As a consequence of overproduction in both indus­
trial and developing countries, the terms of trade improved over the rest
(Box continues on the fo llow in g  page.)
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Box 2.1  (continued)
of the decade but never again reached their prewar levels, despite the 
fleeting growth spurt in the world economy and especially the U.S. econ­
omy. The global economic collapse of 1929 triggered another slide in the 
prices of raw materials, which remained low until the end of the 1940s.
Economic growth sped up sharply throughout the world after the Sec­
ond World War, but commodity prices never regained the ground they 
had lost in earlier decades. The expansion of supply hindered their re­
covery, despite increased demand. The 1973 oil shock brought a strong 
upturn in commodity prices but also the onset of a new period of slower 
growth worldwide. The real turning point in commodity price trends, 
however, came in 1979, when the U.S. economic authorities decided to 
raise interest rates to curb inflation and protect the value of the dollar. 
Since then, despite the upswing in the U.S. economy in the 1990s, world 
economic growth has been sluggish, and the industrial countries have 
stepped up their policies of instituting protectionist measures and provid­
ing agricultural subsidies. The deterioration of the terms of trade for com­
modities, which accelerated during this period, has not been reversed. 
Currently, the oversupply of commodities and the slowdown in the world 
economy hold out little hope for a recovery in the near future.
Source: Ocampo and Parra (2003).
Export growth in the Asian developing countries and in Canada 
and the United States in the 1990s was associated with the first group 
of products (see table 2.5). In contrast, Europe’s market reveals the 
increasing weight of low-growth products in which the region also is 
losing its market share. In the group of other industrial countries 
(dominated by Japan), dynamic products prevail, although with a loss 
of market share. The export position of Africa is marked by an over­
whelming predominance of nondynamic products in which the region 
is losing its market share, and the export position of the rest of the 
world (basically Central and Eastern Europe) is characterized by a loss 
of market share in dynamic products.
Within these parameters the Latin American and Caribbean region 
has a large share of the less dynamic products, which, in fact, represent 
the largest proportion of its exports (more than three-fourths in the 
1990s). However, there are actually two main patterns of specializa­
tion. In one, the relative share of exports of manufactures is on the rise 
(some Caribbean and Central American countries and Mexico); in the 
other, natural resource-intensive products— whose share of world 
trade is growing sluggishly— predominate (South America). The most 
notable change between the periods 1985-90  and 1990-2000  was the
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Table 2 .5  Export Structure, by Type of Competitive Situation
(Percentage o f  exports)
D ynam ic products N ondynam ic products R eg ion al 
change in 
m arket  













19 8 5 -1 9 9 0  
W estern E u rope  
Base year 30.7 36.7 20.5 12.1 3.3
Final year 36.5 38.9 16.7 7.9
N orth A m erica11 
Base year 15.3 44.5 13.3 26.9 -0 .6
Final year 22.9 47.2 11.8 18.0
O ther industrial 
Base year 21.0 47.0 11.2 20.9 -0 .1
Final year 30.9 44.1 12.4 12.6
Latin  A m erica an d  
the C aribbean  
Base year 11.4 20.8 23.9 43.8 -1 .1
Final year 22.6 24.3 24.5 28.6
A frica 
Base year 5.2 11.0 14.3 69.5 -1 .4
Final year 12.5 13.4 17.2 56.9
Asian developing  
countries 
Base year 38.2 6.7 44.4 10.7 1.2
Final year 57.8 6.3 31.0 4.8
R est o f  w orld  
Base year 10.8 30.4 7.9 50.9 -1 .3
Final year 21.9 34.4 14.2 29.5
19 9 0 -2 0 0 0  
W estern E u rope  
Base year 2 .7 37.9 4.8 54.5 -8 .6
Final year 5 .7 44.8 5.7 43.8
N orth A m ericaa 
Base year 31.3 13.3 32.3 23.2 2.1
Final year 43.2 14.7 28.9 13.2
O ther industrial 
Base year 6.4 48.8 19.5 25.3 -1 .5
Final year 10.4 51.3 22.0 16.3
Latin  A m erica an d  
the C aribbean  
Base year 18.1 2 .7 57.2 22.0 1.3
Final year 37.0 2.2 49.8 11.0
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Table 2.5  (c o n tin u e d )
3 7
A frica
Base year 2.5 8.6 19.8 69.1 -0 .8
Final year 6.6 9.1 23.9 60.4
Asian developing
countries
Base year 31.4 3.9 37.0 27.6 6.0
Final year 50.1 3.0 31.7 15.2
R est o f  w orld
Base year 24.3 2.0 44.1 29.6 1.5
Final year 49.8 1.2 39.0 9.9
a. Canada and the United States.
N ote: Dynamic products are those whose rate of growth exceeded the average rate 
of growth of world imports, and nondynamic products are those whose rate of growth 
lagged behind the average rate of growth of world imports.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from UNSD (2002).
expansion in the market share of nondynamic products (both raw 
materials and manufactures), as reflected in the increase in falling stars 
relative to retreat products. In addition, as the region upped its market 
share in dynamic products, the weight of the rising stars increased rel­
ative to the products classified as missed opportunities. In sum, the fac­
tor that has contributed most to the growth of regional exports has 
been not their reorientation toward the fastest growing products in 
international trade, but rather the enhancement of competitiveness 
within the existing export structure.
Two Challenges Posed by the Relationship between Trade 
and Econom ic Growth
In recent decades, the relationship between external trade and eco­
nomic growth has raised two basic issues for developing countries, 
whose responses will have significant implications for the future. The 
first question is how to translate the opportunities provided by world 
markets into rapid economic growth. The second issue concerns the 
pattern of change in the structure of employment.
There is no simple answer to the first of these questions. As noted 
previously, countries’ opportunities for advancement have been linked 
to their success as exporters, but the swift growth seen in international 
trade, especially over the 1990s, has not resulted in a commensurate 
expansion of world output. Figure 2.5 shows that this was clearly the 
case in Latin America; although export growth was faster in the 1990s
Figure 2 .5  Trade and GDP in Latin America, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 9 8
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than at any other time in the region’s history, that decade was also a 
period of relatively slow economic expansion, with the growth rate un­
questionably falling short of the rates recorded in the region in the pe­
riod of state-led industrialization between the 1950s and the 1970s.
This situation can be explained in part by the dynamics of interna­
tional trade itself. When more successful countries seize the few 
opportunities that arise in a sluggish international environment, they 
deprive other developing countries of potential markets, including 
their own domestic markets, or they cause export prices to fall, as hap­
pened with commodity prices over the last two decades.
In addition, trade liberalization has entailed a restructuring of the do­
mestic macroeconomic framework and production sector, which has 
not been conducive to rapid economic growth. From a macroeconomic 
standpoint, increased openness to foreign trade has reduced the antiex­
port bias of protectionist regimes, but it has also led to a contraction in 
the sectors that compete with imports. Indeed, export success has been 
based in large part on the more intensive use of imported raw materials 
and capital goods. For most developing countries, the net result has been 
a structural deterioration in the correlation between economic growth 
and the trade balance (UNCTAD 1999). The case of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, as shown in figure 2.6A, illustrates this situation: The re­
gion’s trade deficit in the 1990s was similar to that of the 1970s, but its 
growth rate was much lower than it was earlier. Furthermore, this
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Figure 2 .6  Relationships among Economic Growth, Trade, and 
the Technology Gap in Latin America, 1 9 5 0 -2 0 0 0
A. Relationship between trade balances and economic growth
Trade balance as a percentage o f  GDP
B. Relationship between the rate of reduction of the productivity gap 
and the income-elasticity of imports
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from Maddison (2001).
deficit increased the region’s dependence on international financing, 
which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, has been volatile.
Another facet of this process is that certain features of the production 
structure have hindered the achievement of sustained high rates of eco­
nomic growth.9 Although a number of developing countries, especially
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those of Latin America and the Caribbean, have managed to increase 
their share of world markets and of foreign investment flows, the pro­
duction linkages of these dynamic activities have been weak. In addition, 
the increasing use of imported intermediate and capital goods, which is 
characteristic of internationally integrated production systems, has led 
to a breakdown in pre-existing production chains and national innova­
tion systems. Moreover, developing-country participation in the fastest- 
growing activities in international trade, especially those that are tech­
nology intensive, has been limited in most cases (UNCTAD 2001a, 
2002a).
As a result, progress in narrowing the productivity gap has been 
slow. Figure 2 .6B  illustrates the relationship between the rate at 
which the gap separating the region’s average labor productivity 
from that of the United States has been reduced, and the income- 
elasticity of imports, which is consistent with equilibrium in the balance 
of trade. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Latin America and the 
Caribbean were on the part of the curve characterized by a “virtuous” 
growth trend— that is, a trend in which GDP grew faster than exports. 
The increase in the income-elasticity of imports in the 1970s was thus 
accompanied by a still faster reduction in the productivity gap. In the 
1990s, however, the increase in the income-elasticity of imports far 
outpaced the reduction in the productivity gap; consequently, the 
region entered a “vicious” economic growth cycle in which robust 
export growth translated into lackluster economic growth (Cimoli and 
Correa 2002).
It should be added that given the insufficient “pull” exerted by high- 
growth sectors and the low rate of overall economic growth, the struc­
tural heterogeneity (dualism) of production sectors has increased: 
although there are now many more “world-class” firms, many of 
which are subsidiaries of TNCs, a growing proportion of the work­
force is concentrated in low-productivity informal sector activities.
The second basic issue is related to patterns of change in the struc­
ture of employment over the course of the development process and 
how this structure has been affected by worldwide technological 
change and the international specialization of different countries. As is 
well known, the primary sector of the economy is not a major source 
of new jobs, whereas the manufacturing sector tends to create a large 
number of jobs at first, then stabilizes and finally trends downward as 
per capita income rises, following the inverted U pattern propounded 
by Rowthorn (1999). The tertiary sector accounts for the remaining 
jobs. In view of the particular trend followed by job creation in the 
manufacturing sector, the tertiary sector will be considered in more 
detail.
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Palma’s (2002) analysis, which is based on a wide sample of coun­
tries, not only confirms the inverted U pattern of job creation in the 
manufacturing sector, but also introduces three striking considera­
tions, two of which are illustrated in figure 2.7A. One of these is the 
continuous downward curve seen over the last four decades, which in­
dicates a decrease in the share of manufacturing in total employment 
at all levels of per capita income. Palma attributed this trend to the fact 
that productivity has increased more rapidly than GDP, which implies 
that employment in manufacturing has expanded at a slower pace and, 
in some cases, has contracted in absolute terms.10 The other is a shift 
in the peak rate to lower levels of per capita income from 1980 on­
ward. This means that the point at which the manufacturing sector’s 
share in total employment begins to decrease is located at progressively 
lower levels of per capita income. In 1990, more than 30 countries 
recorded per capita incomes that were higher than the level at which 
manufacturing employment begins to decrease. The services sector ex­
hibits a very different trend, with productivity growing much more 
slowly than GDP; as a result, employment in the sector has increased 
as a proportion of the total.11
The third consideration points to the need to assess the phenome­
non of “Dutch disease” from a fresh perspective.12 First, the ratio be­
tween the share of manufacturing in total employment and per capita 
income is a function of the pattern of international trade. Both indus­
trial- and developing-country exporters of raw materials or services— 
especially financial services and tourism— thus exhibit a lower ratio 
than exporters of manufactures at all levels of per capita income (see 
figure 2.7B).
Although these countries are usually less industrialized than ex­
porters of manufactures, this does not alter the general trend toward 
deindustrialization in either group. In fact, as figure 2.7C  shows, from 
1960 to 1998 manufacturing employment as a proportion of the total 
decreased by half in both groups of countries: from 39 percent to 21 
percent in exporters of manufactures and from 29 percent to 16 per­
cent in exporters of natural resource-based goods or services. The 
peak rate on the respective curves also shifted to a level of per capita 
income equivalent to half as much as before (from U S$18,000 to 
U S$9,000 in that period).
Dutch disease should thus be understood as an excess of deindus­
trialization owing to a change in the reference group. This occurred in 
the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as in 
Cyprus, Greece, and M alta (tourism); and Hong Kong (China), 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland (financial services). None of these con­
siderations give substance to the idea that what has been called the
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Figure 2 .7  Deindustrialization, Foreign Trade, Employment, 
and Income
A. Sources of deindustrialization, 1960-1998
Logarithm of per capita GDP (1985 US$)
B. Foreign trade effect, 1998
1  = 22 S3 Oh
Logarithm of per capita GDP (1985 US$)
C. Changes in employment and income, 1960 and 1998
Logarithm of per capita GDP (1985 US$)
Figure 2 .7  (continued)
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D. Latin America and the Caribbean, 1998
Logarithm of per capita GDP (1985 US$)
N ote: Ar =  Argentina; Au =  Australia; Bo =  Bolivia; Br =  Brazil; Bw = Botswana; 
Ca = Canada; Cl =  Chile; Cn =  China; Co =  Colombia; Cr =  Costa R ica; Do = 
Dominican Republic; Ec = Ecuador; Eg = Arab Republic of Egypt; Eu5 =  Austria, 
Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium; Gb =  United Kingdom; Gr =  Greece; Hn =  Hon­
duras; Ht =  Haiti; Jm  =  Jam aica; Jp = Japan; Kr =  Republic of Korea; Lk =  Sri Lanka; 
M x =  M exico; My =  M alaysia; Ng =  Nigeria; Ni =  Nicaragua; No =  Norway; 
Pa =  Panama; Pe =  Peru; Pk =  Pakistan; Py =  Paraguay; Sg =  Singapore; Sv =  El Sal­
vador; Tn =  Tunisia; Uy =  Uruguay; Ve =  República Bolivariana de Venezuela; Zw = 
Zimbabwe.
a. Specialization in manufactures.
b. Specialization in natural resources and services.
Source: Palma (2002).
“curse of natural resources” is at work here, however. In fact, in a 
number of well-known cases, such as those of Finland and of Malaysia 
and other Asian countries (all of which have a generous endowment of 
natural resources), the countries concerned have been able to avert this 
phenomenon, either by carrying forward the industrialization process 
using the resources available or by developing a complementary man­
ufacturing industry for the domestic market and for export. This indi­
cates that although opportunities do exist, few countries appear to be 
prepared to take advantage of them.
One of the striking features of Latin America and the Caribbean is 
that whereas the ratio of manufacturing employment to total em­
ployment was similar in most of the countries of the region before 
they embarked on economic reform programs, marked divergences 
have emerged since then (see figure 2.7D ). Brazil and the three South­
ern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) have exhibited 
the greatest degree of deindustrialization following their economic re­
form efforts and now conform to the typical pattern of raw material
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exporters, of which the República Bolivariana de Venezuela is a clas­
sic example. The second pattern corresponds to a number of Central 
American (El Salvador, Honduras) and Caribbean countries (the Do­
minican Republic), in which manufacturing employment has increased 
considerably as a result of their active involvement in assembly activi­
ties. Finally, in Costa Rica, Mexico, and the other Andean countries 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), economic reform has not sig­
nificantly altered the share of total employment provided by the man­
ufacturing sector, which can be taken as a sign that these countries 
have not been affected by either Dutch disease or the assembly activi­
ties that have had a pronounced impact on other economies.
The New Global Production Structure
The technological revolution is at the heart of the forces driving the 
third stage of globalization. The emergence of new technologies and 
the ever-faster evolution of existing ones have significantly altered the 
ways in which production is organized in firms, production sectors, 
and ultimately the world economy. In fact, these changes are so far- 
reaching that they have been called one of the greatest transformations 
in history (Piore and Sabel 1984). Of all these new technologies, in­
formation and communication technologies (ICTs) have had the most 
direct impact on the globalization process.
Microeconomic Foundations
The effects of the microeconomic forces generated by the ongoing 
technological revolution are mediated by social and political variables, 
and particularly by the policy of opening up the countries’ economies 
to international trade and foreign investment. These variables can ei­
ther speed up or slow down the absorption of new technologies. To 
understand the implications of this premise, it is important to identify 
the features of new technologies and to determine how they affect pro­
duction, the structure of markets, and business decisions.
Industrial organization in the digital age involves a complex net­
work of markets (such as markets for equipment, fixed or cellular tele­
phone services, fiber-optic cable, connectivity, and application services) 
that converge in the transmission of data, voice, and sound. Each of 
these markets has its own types of industrial organization, intellec­
tual property rules, conditions for reaping the benefits of research 
and development (R&D) investment in new products and processes, 
regulatory frameworks and bodies, competition rules, and forms of
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interdependence among production agents. Some of these markets are 
highly competitive, and others are characterized by collusion among 
firms to set exclusionary prices that block new competitors’ access to 
the market. O f particular significance is the nonrivalrous nature of 
many digital goods and services, which opens up virtually infinite pos­
sibilities for realizing economies of scale. The industrial countries’ 
technological leadership accounts for the advantages they enjoy in the 
current stage of globalization, as well as the disadvantages faced by de­
veloping countries (Katz and Hilbert 2002).
The impact of ICTs on the structure of the economy can be seen in 
the digitization of information flows, communication processes, and 
coordination mechanisms. This, in turn, has altered variables relating 
to firms’ cost structures, in many cases practically eliminating the im­
portance of segments that, until a few decades ago, determined the 
conditions of supply. In particular, these technologies have reduced the 
cost of processing and transmitting information; lowered the cost 
associated with distance; led to smaller product sizes and miniaturiza­
tion; and absorbed complexities in the organization of production that 
previously had been handled by management teams, thereby paving 
the way for flexible forms of production (Cairncross 1997; Turner and 
Hodges 1992). The new technologies have also made it possible to 
achieve higher quality, greater precision, and enhanced product com­
patibility, which have significantly reduced the unit cost of products of 
a given quality.
What is more, technological change has been a key component of 
the changes that have taken place in dynamic learning curves, in com­
bination with changes in learning processes themselves and in 
economies of scale (Chesnais 1993), all of which affect business deci­
sions, the structure of markets, and patterns of productive specializa­
tion. Firms respond to signals from their environment when they ac­
quire, adapt, and refine technologies in order to build up their 
technological capacities and competitive advantages. Because these 
signals come from the incentive structure, from factor and resource 
markets (skills, capital, technology, suppliers), and from institutions 
(in the fields of education and training, technology, and finance, 
among others) with which the firm interacts, innovation is the out­
come of an interactive process linking agents that respond to market 
incentives— such as firms— with other institutions that operate on the 
basis of strategies and rules that are independent of market mecha-
13nisms.
The reduction in the cost of transporting goods and transmitting in­
formation made possible by the technological revolution has led to a 
broadening of markets, which in some cases have reached global
46 GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
proportions.14 As markets increase in size, economies of scale become 
more important in firms’ cost functions. Both processes have been re­
inforced by the trend toward the homogenization of the preferences of 
large groups of consumers. This has, in turn, expanded the market for 
products that can meet this type of demand on the basis of keen price 
competition. In this context, there has been a relative decline in the im­
portance of economies of scope, especially because of the impossibility 
of preventing competitors capable of operating in the world market 
from reproducing product mixes that achieve these kinds of 
economies. As competition has come to focus on the variable of price, 
the tendency toward technological homogenization has strengthened. 
This, together with the homogenization of preferences, is leading to 
the emergence of a “global consumer” in a global market dominated 
by economies of scale (Levitt 1983). This stylized fact is a key element 
in the current stage of globalization, but the extent to which it can be 
generalized will be considered later in this chapter.
Forms of global consumption have been available to elite social 
groups for at least a century. The current stage stands out because it 
has made this pattern of consumption available on a massive scale, en­
compassing many more people and categories of goods and services 
than it did a few decades ago. In any case, this trend toward the ho­
mogenization of consumption patterns is only a trend and does not, 
therefore, imply that all markets have become globalized.
The trend toward the homogenization of production technologies 
and consumer preferences in many markets, as well as the consequent 
trend toward the homogenization of products, has changed the condi­
tions of competition. In particular, it has prompted firms to move 
away from competition based on mechanisms for covering variable 
costs— an example of which was the “redeployment” of industrial ac­
tivities to some developing countries that began in the 1970s— toward 
competition in covering fixed costs. Production, especially manufac­
turing, has tended to become an activity involving a very large pro­
portion of fixed costs. This does not mean that competition to cover 
variable costs has disappeared, but only that it has become relatively 
less important. This is particularly true of cutting-edge activities and 
processes; it is far less applicable to the production of goods, which 
continue to be assembled in locations with low variable costs (partic­
ularly wages). By reducing labor costs, the increased flexibility of la­
bor markets has hastened the reduction of the proportion of variable 
costs. This is illustrated by the fact that in some manufacturing seg­
ments, variable costs amounted to 10 percent of total costs or less in 
the 1990s, after having represented some 25 percent just two decades 
earlier (Oman 1994).
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In particular, the development of global brands and the intensifica­
tion of product and process R & D  have raised firms’ fixed costs, which 
they cannot meet without increasing the scale of production. Thus, 
economies of scale in R & D  and in marketing are combined with 
economies of scale in production. This sets the stage for the emergence 
of global producers that vie for market shares that are large enough to 
cover their fixed costs. This process, in turn, reinforces the trend to­
ward market expansion, and the organizational structure of those 
markets changes accordingly.
N ew  Forms o f  Production and Market Organization
The technological revolution has changed the way in which produc­
tion is organized. In the early and mid-20th century, firms responded 
to the emergence of new markets and the expansion of existing ones 
by organizing production according to the Taylor/Ford paradigm, 
which was based on a strict separation between design and planning 
activities, on the one hand, and direct production operations, on the 
other. Many firms adopted the organizational features of this mode of 
production: a very high, narrow hierarchical pyramid; specialization 
in narrowly defined activities and skills; and separation between 
thought and action. In sum, these were the well-known “principles of 
scientific management.” The revolution in technology, and particu­
larly in ICTs, has made this form of organization obsolete and shifted 
the emphasis to a new set of features that are summed up in the idea 
of “flexible production” (Dussel Peters 2000).
This new way of organizing production can be described on the ba­
sis of six activities, all of which make use of ICTs to break down the 
old paradigm’s dichotomy between thought and action. Specifically, it 
involves techniques of (a) simultaneous engineering, which integrates 
the design and manufacturing stages into a single process; (b) continu­
ous, incremental innovation, sometimes by means of quality circles; (c) 
teamwork involving multiskilled workers; (d) production and man­
agement of just-in-time and real-time inventories, which permit pro­
duction to adjust more quickly to changes in demand; (e) incorpora­
tion of quality control into the production process itself in order to 
avoid the costs associated with the ex post facto correction of errors; 
and (f) increasing interaction between suppliers and users in the areas 
of innovation, design, and production, which gives rise to global pro­
duction and marketing chains and networks (Oman 1994).
One particularly important form of interaction has been the devel­
opment of horizontal links between firms that have led to the forma­
tion of strategic alliances. Because technical progress has involved the
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use of many basic technologies, which no single firm can master in 
their entirety, firms have had to develop networks of agreements to 
complement one another— while continuing to compete with each 
other— in the area of innovation.
The combination of operations under the flexible production para­
digm and the expansion of markets has given rise to two of the traits 
of the current model of market organization: the trend toward eco­
nomic concentration and the trend toward the consolidation of global 
production chains or internationally integrated production systems, 
which cover the whole range of design, production, and marketing ac­
tivities for a given product (Gereffi 1994; Mortimore and Peres 2001). 
In more analytical terms, the new forms of business organization, such 
as outsourcing, virtual cooperation, and strong vertical integration, 
are contingent on the trend in transaction costs and their impact in set­
ting the production frontier between hierarchical coordination and 
market coordination (Hilbert and Katz 2002). Depending on whether 
transaction costs are reduced further within firms or within markets, 
this frontier will move toward either the expansion of firms or a 
greater reliance on outsourcing.
Global oligopolies are not new in the world economy, having char­
acterized the production and marketing of products such as petroleum, 
minerals, and even some types of machinery and equipment since the 
first stage of globalization in the late 19th century. What is new is the 
increase in the number of sectors where oligopoly is the typical form 
of productive organization, as it is now the predominant configuration 
of supply in most industries with a strong technological R & D  compo­
nent and in manufacturing segments with sizeable economies of scale 
(Chesnais 1993). The ubiquity of oligopolistic structures is a product 
of efforts to achieve economies of scale in production, marketing, and 
technological research and development, which have surpassed even 
the market expansion driven by the new technologies.
These oligopolistic structures and the trend toward concentration 
exhibit dissimilar features in two types of internationally integrated 
production systems, with these systems being defined according to 
whether they are led by producers or marketers. In producer-led sys­
tems, large manufacturers (generally TNCs) coordinate the entire pro­
duction chain, including its backward and forward linkages. In these 
systems, profits are derived from economies of scale and technological 
advances, as in the case of the automotive, aeronautical, computer, 
semiconductor, and heavy machinery industries.
However, in systems led by wholesalers and other vendors, such as 
large retail chains, wholesalers, and own-brand producers, more de­
centralized networks are set up. This is true in the clothing, footwear,
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toy, appliance, consumer electronics, and even handicraft sectors. In 
these systems, profits are derived from value added in the areas of 
design, marketing, and financial services. Through these activities, 
leading firms link outsourced production with direct producers located 
anywhere in the world and carve out demand niches in the principal 
consumer markets (Gereffi 1994).
In both types of systems, coordination of the entire production 
chain is a key source of competitive advantage, and the network is 
therefore used as a strategic asset. Information flows are the basic 
means by which firms improve or consolidate their position in the 
production chain, whereas the appropriation of benefits depends on 
the influence that leading firms can exert on different segments of the 
chain, and this influence naturally changes over time (Gereffi 2000).
Also in both cases, as in the trend toward the formation of global 
oligopolies, the most dynamic economic players have been TNCs. The 
reduction in information costs— because the flow of information is 
vital in coordinating activities worldwide— and market expansion 
have added to the traditional advantages enjoyed by TNCs in terms of 
technology, management, and scale. Accordingly, TNCs have been 
able to respond faster to shifts in the organization of production to­
ward flexible arrangements and have capitalized on their competitive 
advantages to organize internationally integrated production systems, 
positioning themselves in the links of the production chain that enable 
them to capture a significant share of the profits it generates. The 
expansion of TNCs has entailed a sharp upswing in foreign direct in­
vestment (FDI) flows and has taken the form of both new investment 
and acquisition of existing assets, although to different degrees.
Implications for Business Decisions and Strategies
In a context in which production technologies and preferences tend 
toward homogenization, economies of scale necessarily lead to greater 
concentration. In fact, when firms are able to differentiate their prod­
ucts on the basis of trade or technological development strategies, mar­
ket expansion tends to increase the average size of such firms.
In some cases, product differentiation efforts are based on increases 
in variable production costs. For example, in furniture making, differ­
entiation may be based on the use of better wood, higher quality 
paints, or more labor per unit produced. In such situations, when the 
size of the market increases, there is always the possibility that new 
and relatively small firms may enter the market and capture part of its 
growth (Hotelling 1929). In this case, an increase in market size does 
not result in a concomitant increase in concentration.
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However, when differentiation is sought on the basis of sunk costs 
incurred in creating a brand image or publicity or in moving forward 
along the technology curve, these efforts result in escalation. Some 
firms will expand, and the market structure will become more concen­
trated. The essence of this mechanism is that differentiation efforts 
that are not profitable in smaller markets become profitable in larger 
ones. Strategies for creating and defending global brands and for com­
peting on the basis of technological progress are typical not only of 
technology-intensive activities, but also of marketing-intensive ones, 
even when they involve low- or mid-level technologies. These 
processes account for the highly concentrated supply structure for 
products such as certain processed foods and beverages, in which tech­
nology intensiveness is low (Sutton 1991, 1998).
Thus, there are forces that lead to larger average firm size and 
greater concentration, both when supply is highly homogenized and 
when significant differentiation efforts are made. In principle, this 
seems to conflict with the flexible production features that make it 
possible to reduce the scale of production and offer customized prod­
ucts. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between two types of 
concentration: technical concentration, which results directly from the 
minimum size requirements for optimal plant operation, and economic 
concentration, which takes the firm, rather than plants or production 
lines, as the relevant unit. Although some evidence points to a reduc­
tion in the technical scale of production activities involving dissimilar 
products, this does not mean that there is a trend toward smaller-sized 
firms. Only large firms can directly produce a broad range of products 
or coordinate internationally integrated production systems capable of 
supplying them. In these cases, economies of scope are usually signifi­
cant but can be achieved only by firms or systems with considerable 
economies of scale (mass customization).
This background explains why, despite the deverticalization and 
tertiarization of nonessential activities, large firms are the leading eco­
nomic players in the current stage of globalization and why, within 
that group, TNCs play an especially significant role. TNCs are the 
ones that set up both producer-led and marketer-led internationally in­
tegrated production systems either through new investment or by 
means of mergers and acquisitions, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
The ways in which TNCs organize production have changed during 
the current stage of globalization as a result of the interaction between 
two types of variables: the international location of their production 
processes (dispersed or concentrated activities) and the intensity of 
their coordination activities (high or low). Under the old paradigm,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51
firms usually followed a strategy of managing relatively similar activi­
ties in different locations and made little effort to coordinate them 
(Porter 1986). Then, however, the increasing importance of economies 
of scale led them to adopt a supply structure based on the provision of 
products to the global market from one or a few locations (Hamel and 
Prahalad 1985; Levitt 1983), and the coordination of the work being 
done at these locations was based on their physical proximity; a pio­
neering example of this was provided by Japanese automobile makers 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Then, the ICT revolution led to a second 
change: as the cost of long-distance coordination has fallen, business 
strategies have aimed at combining activities in several, although not 
many, locations while making major efforts to ensure their real-time 
coordination.
Since the 1980s, TNCs have experimented with various forms of or­
ganization. Some of the more noteworthy structures include elements 
of head office organization, or networks in which the components 
have different relative weights in order to allow the concentration of 
decisionmaking processes and operations between the parent company 
and its subsidiaries (Bartlett and Goshal 1989). The number of loca­
tions involved varies considerably depending on what economies of 
scale can be achieved in production, ranging from configurations that 
are highly concentrated in producer-led internationally integrated pro­
duction systems to configurations that are much more widely dis­
persed in marketer-led systems. In both cases, however, coordination 
is more intensive than in the past. The number of locations is deter­
mined by the characteristics of the firms’ learning curves and the 
economies of scale available to them, whereas the choice of locations 
is determined by the comparative advantages of each place and the 
coordination advantages to be derived from the geographic concentra­
tion of production, design, and technological R & D  activities (Porter 
1986).
Meanwhile, firms seeking agglomeration economies have become 
concentrated in areas where they have easy access to global markets 
and factors of production, as well as appropriate innovation capacity, 
suppliers, and institutions.15 The mobility afforded by technological 
advances has turned TNC subsidiaries, which used to operate as geo­
graphically dispersed but self-contained production units, into inte­
grated production and distribution networks at the regional and global 
levels. Within these networks, firms can purchase the inputs they need 
locally and produce for the local or regional market, or they can inte­
grate economic activities scattered over different regions. From this 
standpoint, the regionalization of the world economy is, paradoxi­
cally, a corollary of globalization.16
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The comparative and coordination advantages of different loca­
tions raise the question of how the global and local (including supra­
national or regional) dimensions are related in business strategies. The 
positions taken on this point have tended to illustrate the need to com­
bine the two. In particular, Akio Morita of Sony highlighted the need 
to think globally while taking local culture and demand into account, 
in a process of so-called global localization (Turner and Hodges 1992). 
Kenichi Ohmae, meanwhile, extolled the advantages of replicating, in 
different markets, strategies that have proved successful in North 
American, Western European, or East Asian markets as a means 
whereby firms can become “global insiders” (Ohmae 1985).
The local dimension is particularly important for national firms 
that cannot become transnational players in the globalization process, 
either as leaders of internationally integrated production systems or as 
participants in more or less significant segments of such systems. The 
firms that fit this description are highly diverse in terms of both their 
size and their managerial and learning capacity. These firms’ strategies 
revolve around the opportunities offered by niches that are generated 
or strengthened in global markets having a strong tendency toward ho­
mogenization. Rising income levels (which enable consumers to in­
dulge their taste for variety, quality, and novelty), regional and local 
differences in taste (idiosyncratic goods), and the demand for special­
ized inputs and equipment on the part of certain types of users are 
some of the factors that ensure the survival of what are sometimes very 
profitable niches for nonglobal firms (Mariti 1993). Within these 
niches, such firms have advantages over their global competitors, par­
ticularly because of their superior ability to monitor changes in local 
markets and their capacity to operate more flexibly.
Niche-oriented strategies can fail over the long term if global firms 
decide that a niche is profitable enough to warrant their entry with 
identical or substitute products or even their acquisition of the local 
producer. Usually, local firms are unable to counter such moves, be­
cause their more limited scale leaves them no resources for effectively 
developing a defensive strategy. For more advanced nonglobal firms, a 
particularly serious risk is that of falling into the “R & D  trap” or the 
“marketing trap”: in other words, trying to defend their niche through 
ever-greater efforts in technological R & D  and in marketing, which 
make mounting resource demands and cannot be sustained over the 
long term.
International experience has shown that small and medium-size en­
terprises (SMEs) not taking part in internationally integrated produc­
tion systems are nonetheless capable of maintaining market niches as 
well. This is true not only of low-value-added activities that hold little
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attraction for global firms, but also of sectors in which “disadvantages 
of scale” are offset by the advantages of flexibility and interaction with 
networks of similar firms that are usually in the same location. Indus­
trial districts are one of the best-known examples of this type of con­
figuration. There is a wide diversity of markets and business strategies. 
Even in the face of the overall trend toward homogenization that has 
given rise to global firms and internationally integrated production 
systems, niche strategies are still viable for nonglobal firms as a group, 
though they may entail high risks for the individual firms.
In any event, competitiveness conditions in different locations have 
not become homogenized, and global players see clear advantages of 
configuration and coordination in maintaining their operations in a 
limited number of locations in the world (Porter 1990). In particular, 
globalization and the lower cost of processing and transmitting infor­
mation have not been mirrored by similar developments in the area of 
knowledge and the capacity to generate it, which remain highly local­
ized and confined to specific individuals and, especially, institutions. In 
this respect, globalization has not eliminated the national, local, or sec­
toral dimensions of innovation systems and may even have strength­
ened them (Dosi 1999).
The components of an innovation system are arranged in a three­
tiered structure (Cimoli and Dosi 1995; Freeman 1987; Nelson 1993). 
First, firms and the production system are crucial (though not exclu­
sive) recipients of knowledge, which to a large extent is incorporated 
into operational routines and changes over time in response to rules of 
conduct and higher-level strategies (such as research activities, vertical 
integration, and horizontal diversification). Second, firms link up with 
networks consisting of other firms, nonprofit institutions, public sec­
tor agencies, universities, and organizations devoted to the promotion 
of production activities. These networks, as well as policies for im­
proving the environment in which scientific and technological activi­
ties are carried out, are key elements because they can either strengthen 
or constrain firms’ opportunities to improve their technological capa­
bilities. Finally, in the broader context of a given country, microeco­
nomic behavior is influenced by a series of macroeconomic effects, so­
cial relations, rules, and political constraints.
The generation and absorption of technology— and the consequent 
achievement and improvement of international competitiveness— are 
thus systemic processes, because an innovation system’s performance 
depends on synergies and externalities that transcend a firm’s efforts 
to optimize its position in response to changes in incentives. Techno­
logical opportunities and obstacles and the experience and skills 
acquired by the different participants in an innovation system flow
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through the system from one economic activity to another and set up 
a specific context in each country or region, so that a given set of eco­
nomic incentives will have widely varying effects in terms of stimulat­
ing and constraining innovation.
Patterns o f  FD I and TN C  Strategies at the Global Level
Historically, TNCs have focused on the exploitation of natural re­
sources (where they sometimes come into conflict with nationalist in­
terests in developing countries), on the construction and management 
of key segments of the infrastructure for agriculture- and mining-based 
export complexes, on the provision of domestic services in rapidly 
growing urban areas, and on capturing protected industrial markets 
under national import substitution strategies while, in some cases, also 
taking advantage of incipient subregional integration arrangements.
As a result of the changes in technology, production, and marketing 
analyzed in this chapter, FDI has soared, and the share of international 
production in the world economy has grown along with it. In the 
1990s, FDI flows grew remarkably, particularly in the second half of 
the decade, rising from an annual average of about US$225 billion be­
tween 1990 and 1995 to nearly US$1.5 trillion in 2000. Nonetheless, 
in 2001, for the first time since 1991, worldwide FDI flows declined 
significantly, dropping to around US$735 billion.17 Even so, this level 
is still equivalent to more than three times the annual average for 
1990-95  and exceeds the values for each year of the 1990s, with the 
exception of 1999 and 2000 (see table 2.6).
Thus, between 1982 and 1999, the percentage of worldwide gross 
fixed capital formation represented by FDI rose from 2 percent to 14 
percent, and the value added by TNCs climbed from 5 percent to 10 
percent of world GDP (UNCTAD 2000). Moreover, sales by TNC 
subsidiaries grew much faster than world exports.
This global expansion is driven by the operations of more than 
60 ,000  TNCs with nearly 800 ,000  foreign subsidiaries. Industrial 
countries remain the primary source and destination of FDI flows; in 
2000, 92.2 percent of total FDI came from such countries, and 82.3 
percent was directed to them. FDI flows have also increased signifi­
cantly in developing countries, however, more than tripling their aver­
age level for the period 1990-95  in the year 2000 (see table 2.6). The 
primary recipients were China, Hong Kong (China), and India in Asia 
and Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in Latin America.
A comparison of the global distribution of inflows and outflows in 
1985 and 2000 shows that FDI has become a very important variable 
for more countries than in the past. FDI inflows of over US$10 billion
Table 2 .6  Foreign Direct Investment
(Billions o f  US$)
A verage
19 9 0 -1 9 9 5 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
R egional distribution o f  inflow s an d  outflow s
Total FDI inflows 225.3 386.1 478.1 694.5 1,088.3 1,491.9 735.1
Industrial countries 145.0 219.9 267.9 484.3 837.8 1,227.4 503.1
Developing countries 74.3 152.7 191.1 187.6 225.1 237.9 204.8
Economies in transition 6.0 13.5 19.1 22.6 25.4 26.6 27.2
Total FDI outflows 253.3 395.0 474.0 684.0 1,042.1 1,379.5 620.7
Industrial countries 221.0 332.4 395.0 631.2 966.1 1,271.3 580.6
Developing countries 32.0 61.3 74.8 50.3 73.6 104.2 36.6
Economies in transition 0.3 1.3 4.2 2.5 2.4 4.0 3.5
C ross-border mergers an d  acquisitions
Total 117.9 227.0 304.8 531.6 766.1 1,143.8 593.9
Sales, by region o f  sale
Industrial countries 103.1 187.7 232.1 443.1 679.5 1,056.1 496.3
Developing countries 12.7 35.7 67.1 82.7 74.0 70.6 85.9
Economies in transition 2.1 3.6 5.6 5.1 10.4 17.1 11.7
Multinational3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.1 0.0 0.0
Purchases, by region o f  purchase
Industrial countries 108.5 196.8 269.3 508.9 700.8 1,087.6 534.2
Developing countries 9.2 29.6 35.2 21 .7 63.5 48.5 55.6
Economies in transition 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.5 1.7 2.2
Multinational3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 6.0 1.9
a. Sales or purchases involving more than two countries.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from UNCTAD (2002b).
56 GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
are now concentrated in more than 50 countries (including 24 devel­
oping countries), compared to only 17 countries (including 7 develop­
ing countries) 15 years ago. The pattern of investment abroad is simi­
lar: The number of countries with more than U S$10 billion in 
investments abroad rose from 10 to 33 and currently include 12 
developing countries, compared to 8 in 1985.
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been one of the chief 
mechanisms for the expansion of TNCs. These operations, which in­
tensified in the second half of the 1990s (see table 2.6), enable firms 
to rapidly acquire a portfolio of localized assets, which are essential in 
strengthening their competitive positions in the local, regional, or 
world economy. In many cases, a firm’s survival is the primary strate­
gic incentive for engaging in these operations, especially because firms 
that hesitate to do so may run a serious risk of being absorbed or of 
being placed at a competitive disadvantage when rival firms merge.18 
The intense interplay between changes in the global economic envi­
ronment and the factors that induce firms to engage in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions accounts for the steady increase in such op-
19erations.
Although FDI has expanded geographically, its distribution re­
mains highly asymmetrical. The parent companies of 90 of the 100 
largest nonfinancial TNCs (classified as such based on the value of 
their assets abroad) are located in the European Union, Japan, and the 
United States. In 1999, for the first time, three developing-country 
firms were among the world’s 100 largest (Hutchison Whampoa of 
Hong Kong, China; CEM EX of Mexico; and Petróleos de Venezuela). 
The 50 largest developing-country firms— the biggest of which are 
just barely comparable to the smallest of the world’s 100 largest— are 
scattered among 13 newly industrialized economies in Asia and Latin 
America. They include firms in Hong Kong (China), the Republic 
of Korea, M alaysia, M exico, and the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela.
In terms of major sectors of economic activity, the most striking fea­
ture is the significant expansion of services. The share of FDI inflows 
corresponding to services between 1988 and 1999 rose by more than 
6 percentage points worldwide, thus representing over half of cumula­
tive FDI by the end of that period (see table 2.7). In developing coun­
tries the share of services increased even more rapidly (by almost 17 
percentage points). This important change is essentially attributable to 
two factors. First, the liberalization and privatization policies adopted 
by developing countries in the last decade have prompted a copious in­
flow of FDI in financial services, telecommunications, and other com­
ponents of infrastructure. Second, the emergence of new marketable 
services (including software development, data processing, telephone
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Table 2 .7  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
(M illions o f  US$ and  percentages)
S ecto r
In d u str ia l cou n tr ies D ev e lo p in g  cou n tr ies W o r ld
1 9 8 8 1 9 9 9 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 9 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 9
Primary 10.3 5.7 13.7 5.4 10.7 5.6
Secondary 39.4 36.4 65.0 54.5 42.4 41.6
Tertiary 46.9 55.5 20.7 37.3 43.9 50.3
Unspecified 3.4 2.4 0.6 2.8 3.0 2.5
Total 890,456 2,520,194 119,016 1,014,657 1,009,472 3,534,851
N ote: The data are for 47 countries in 1988 and 57 countries in 1999, which represent 
more than 80 percent of foreign direct investment inflows in both years. Eastern Europe is 
excluded for both years.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of 
data from UNCTAD (2001b).
calling centers, and business support services) has enabled developing 
countries to benefit from localization advantages. Moreover, organi­
zational innovations such as just-in-time production require logistical 
and inventory management solutions that are supplied largely by in­
dependent service firms.
This process of services expansion has taken place alongside the re­
structuring of the industrial economies; as a result the relative share of 
services has risen to more than two-thirds of total value added in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries (OECD 2000a). Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing 
activities as such has declined, and they now represent less than a quar­
ter of the final price of goods; the rest is derived from the service 
activities that come into play all along the way, from the product’s 
conception to its final marketing (Giarini 1999). A majority of the 
earnings of firms classified as manufacturers now come from sales of 
services, which has prompted some authors to speak of an “encapsu­
lation” of services in manufactures.20
Alongside the growth in the share of the service sector and the de­
cline in the relative share of the manufacturing sector, a pattern 
marked by a strong geographic concentration of technology-intensive 
industrial production has proliferated. Table 2.8 shows indicators of 
geographic concentration for a number of industries, grouped accord­
ing to whether their technological level is high (semiconductors and 
biotechnology), intermediate (motor vehicles, radios, television sets), 
or low (food, beverages, textiles). The resulting picture is very clear: 
The more advanced the industry’s technology, the greater its geo­
graphic concentration, both within a small number of countries and 
within a small number of locations in each country. This is the case of 
biotechnology, which is highly concentrated in certain areas of industrial
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countries, and of the semiconductors industry, which is concentrated 
in those same countries and in some Southeast Asian nations. The 
manufacture of radios and television sets is somewhat less concen­
trated geographically and also extends to some developing countries, 
and this pattern is stronger in the case of the automotive industry. Fi­
nally, textiles and, particularly, the food and beverage industries are 
less concentrated in industrial countries.
Industrial countries’ predominance as recipients of FDI flows con­
tinues to be based on industries with high and intermediate levels of 
technological sophistication, but it has also increased in low-technol- 
ogy industries, which were more geographically dispersed in 1988 
than they were in 1999. This trend shows that the availability of low- 
skilled, low-cost labor, as well as opportunities to gain access to pro­
tected markets, holds less attraction currently for manufacturing in­
dustries than in the past. In this sector, flows from some developing 
countries, especially in Asia but also in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, have increased significantly. In contrast, many countries 
rich in natural resources have only a marginal share in such flows, in­
dicating that an abundance of natural resources is, by itself, an insuf­
ficient condition for the development of internationally competitive 
enterprises.
Another salient feature of recent decades has been the close rela­
tionship between international trade and FDI. Although the participa­
tion of industrial-country firms in international trade is hardly new— 
as mentioned earlier, it dates back at least as far as the 19th century— 
this phenomenon took on greater importance after the Second World 
War. Indeed, there is evidence that the growth of international trade in 
recent decades, the expansion of TNCs, and the emergence of interna­
tionally integrated production systems are closely related. As early as 
the m id-1990s, it was estimated that two-thirds of world trade in 
goods and nonfactor services was derived, in some way, from the in­
ternational production structure of TNCs.21 One especially significant 
phenomenon has been the increased trade in intermediate products 
and services as a result of the deepening of the international division 
of labor between industrial and developing countries (Baldwin and 
Martin 1999; Feenstra 1998; Feenstra and Hanson 2001).
The interaction between the growth strategies of TNCs and pat­
terns of production and competition in specific sectors, combined with 
localization factors, determine the characteristics of trade flows in 
products, parts, and components (Dunning 1993). One OECD study 
(1996) concluded that trade in the most science-intensive sectors (such 
as the pharmaceuticals industry) tends to take place within an in­
trafirm framework, whereas trade in scale-intensive industries and
Table 2 .8  Geographic Concentration of Foreign Subsidiaries in Selected Manufacturing Industries, by 
Technology Intensiveness, 1999
{Share o f  total num ber o f  subsidiaries)
M id-level technology
R ad io  and L o w  technology
High technology television F o o d  and
Share o f  total industrya Sem iconductors B iotechnology A utom obiles receivers beverages Textiles
First 3 recipient countries 0.496 0.627 0.294 0.356 0.237 0.287
First 5 recipient countries 0.629 0.71 0.44 0.502 0.353 0.401
First 10 recipient countries 0.787 0.852 0.71 0.696 0.561 0.601
First 20 recipient countries 0.945 0.953 0.884 0.893 0.747 0.795
Memorandum
Total number of foreign subsidiaries*3 272 169 1,296 253 2,250 1,445
Total number of recipient countries 31 28 55 36 101 77
a. Calculated as a proportion of the total number of each industry’s foreign subsidiaries throughout the world.
b. Only subsidiaries identified as primarily foreign owned.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from UNCTAD (2001b).
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those that use more mature technologies (motor vehicles and consumer 
electronics, among others) primarily reflects assembly operations and 
intraregional trade. Natural resource-intensive products show low 
levels of intrafirm trade, and international integration is usually hori­
zontal, meaning that it involves trade in homogenous products. In the 
garment industry, trade flows may involve either products assembled 
in different parts of the world (vertical specialization) or finished prod­
ucts (horizontal specialization). Both types of specialization generate 
intraindustry trade flows, which may or may not also be intrafirm 
flows.22 Thus, in trade based on the segmentation of the value chain 
(Krugman 1995), countries specialize, in line with their absolute ad­
vantages, in activities rather than production sectors (Feenstra 1998; 
Knetter and Slaughter 1999; Rayment 1983).
The links between FDI and free trade have also been facilitated by 
changes in the regulatory frameworks governing trade and invest- 
ment23 and by other factors related to the ongoing technological and 
managerial revolution. Furthermore, the increasing competition faced 
by business enterprises, the technological advances that have made it 
possible to establish real-time links over vast distances, and the liber­
alization of external trade policies have resulted in greater geographic 
dispersion of all business functions, even essential ones such as design, 
R& D , and financial management. Some important manifestations of 
this phenomenon are the establishment of subsidiaries catering to re­
gional markets (such as those in Singapore for the Asian market) and 
the international division of labor among various regions (as in the au­
tomotive sector) and continents (as in the case of semiconductors). In 
these complex systems, the reassigned functions encompass a wide 
range of activities; the simplest tasks, such as assembly, are assigned to 
less industrialized areas, whereas functions requiring specialized ex­
pertise and technology are transferred to more industrially advanced 
areas.
Notes
1. The most notable exception was the United States, which adopted 
highly protectionist policies after the northern states won the Civil War.
2. The Latin American countries concerned include Brazil, Chile, Colom­
bia, and M exico (Bairoch 1993 ; Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 2000a ; 
Coatsworth and Williamson 2 002 ; Maddison 1989).
3. The República Bolivariana de Venezuela is not included in the figure 
because its trend diverges radically from the regional average and, in fact, al­
ters it significantly. Venezuelan oil exports were very robust in terms of vol­
ume in the first decades after the Second World War, but this trend reversed
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direction beginning in the 1970s, partly as a result of the commitments entered 
into within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
4. The Kennedy Round (1963-1967) was the first in which an agreement 
was reached on effective tariff reductions, covering nearly 3 5  percent of tariff 
items corresponding to nonagricultural products, which represented 80  per­
cent of dutiable trade (Winham 1986).
5 . See, among others, Finger and Schuknecht (1999), François, 
McDonald, and Nordstrom (1996), Thomas and Whalley (1998), and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and World Trade Organiza­
tion (1996).
6. This agreement was reached after the failure of the Third Ministerial 
Conference (Seattle, Wash., 1999). The work program is set forth in the “M in­
isterial Declaration” (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 14 November 2001). This text 
and other declarations and final decisions of the Fourth Conference are avail­
able for consultation on the W TO Web site at www.wto.org.
7. The most recent report of UNCTAD (2002a) contains a complemen­
tary analysis of recent trends in international trade.
8. ECLAC (1992a) presented a system of classification by technology in­
tensiveness in line with the Standard International Trade Classification four­
digit classification system.
9. See ECLAC (2001b), Katz (2001), and Mortimore and Peres (2001) for 
a more extensive analysis of these issues.
10. In the European Union, for example, manufacturing employment de­
creased by almost a third in just three decades (from 1970 to 2000), whereas 
in the United Kingdom it fell by half during the same period.
11. This is also true of the European Union, in which the productivity of 
the services sector has increased at less than half the rate of GDP growth (1.1 
percent and 2 .6  percent, respectively) since 1973.
12. D utch d isease usually refers to a sharp appreciation of the local cur­
rency as a result of the discovery of internationally tradable natural resources.
13. The combination of agents, institutions, and rules on which techno­
logical absorption processes are based is called an innovation system , gener­
ally a national innovation system. These systems determine the speed with 
which technological know-how is generated, adapted, acquired, and dissemi­
nated in all production activities (ECLAC 1996b; Nelson 1988).
14. Other technological revolutions, such as the one driven by the devel­
opment of the railroad in the mid-19th century, had similar effects, breaking 
down local barriers to merchandise trade and creating national markets, even 
in countries of continental proportions such as the United States (Sylos Labini 
1957). W hat sets the current revolution apart, however, is not the broadening 
of markets as such, but rather its scope, which has resulted in the emergence 
of truly global markets and the inclusion of services in this process, thereby 
considerably reducing the number of products that cannot be traded in world 
markets.
15. Agglomerations of innovative activities, such as Silicon Valley in Cali­
fornia (United States), Silicon Fen in Cambridge (United Kingdom), Wireless 
Valley in Stockholm (Sweden), and Zhong Guancum in Beijing (China), have 
evident advantages for attracting high-value FDI. Bangalore, India, has be­
come a magnet in the area of software development, as have Penang, Malaysia, 
in the electronics industry and Singapore and the Special Administrative 
Region of Hong Kong, China, in the financial services industry.
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16. Feenstra (1998) referred to this as the “integration of trade and disin­
tegration of production.” See also Burda and Dulosch (2000).
17. The sudden drop that occurred in 2001 , which then steepened in 2002, 
is attributable to a number of factors, including the smaller number of cross­
border mergers and acquisitions, the slowdown in the world economy and the 
sharp decline in stock prices, the heightened macroeconomic uncertainty that 
prevailed, and the strong impact of the telecommunications sector, which was 
hurt by the less-than-successful introduction of third-generation mobile te­
lephony in Europe.
18. One of the most interesting examples in this regard is the strategy 
adopted by Spanish firms to expand their operations in a number of Latin 
American countries.
19. Changes in the environment are associated with technological innova­
tions, changes in the regulatory frameworks that influence a firm’s operations, 
and the development of capital markets. The primary strategic objectives are 
access to new markets, an increased share of such markets or a dominant po­
sition in them, ownership of natural resources, particularly nonrenewable 
ones, the use of synergies to boost efficiency, achievement of economies of 
scale through the firm’s enlargement, hedging of risks through the diversifica­
tion of activities, and financial considerations (UNCTAD 2001b).
20. For example, according to the relevant data, more than 50  percent of 
the earnings of IBM  and Siemens come from service activities (Howells 2000).
21. According to this estimate, one-third of world trade in goods and non­
factor services consisted of operations between the parent companies, sub­
sidiaries, and associates of transnational conglomerates, valued at transfer 
prices, whereas another third consisted of exports by TNCs to nonassociated 
firms (UNCTAD 1995).
22. The practice of producing and assembling a product in one country for 
subsequent re-export to the country in which the firm is based began in the late 
1960s as a strategy adopted by U.S. firms in Asian countries. In 1966 these op­
erations represented about 10 percent of the sales of subsidiaries of 
U.S.-owned firms in those countries; in 1977, they represented 25 percent 
(Grunwald and Flamm 1985).
23. Between 1991 and 2000, a total of 1,185 changes were introduced into 
national laws on FDI; 1,121 (95 percent) of these changes were aimed at cre­
ating more favorable conditions for such investment.
3The International Mobility of Capital and Labor
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  c a p i t a l  mobility and the movement of la­
bor has varied a great deal during the different phases of the global­
ization process. Whereas both factors were highly mobile in the first 
phase of this process (1870-1914), their movement was relatively lim­
ited in the period between the two world wars and in the second phase 
of globalization (1945-73). By contrast, one of the central features of 
the current phase is a marked asymmetry in this respect: Whereas cap­
ital has become more mobile than ever before, the movement of 
labor— particularly unskilled labor—is subject to tight restrictions.
This chapter begins by looking at the major historical developments 
and more recent changes in international finance and macroeconomic 
regimes. The second section presents an overview of international la­
bor migration. The relative magnitude of migratory flows and the reg­
ulatory environments in which they have taken place during the dif­
ferent phases of globalization are compared, as are the various 
patterns to be found around the world in terms of migrants’ points of 
origins and destinations.
International Finance and M acroeconomic Regimes
After discussing how the international financial system has evolved 
over the last century, this section focuses on the volatility and conta­
gion that have characterized capital flows in the third stage of global­
ization. It then goes on to analyze the scale and composition of capital 
flows to developing countries.
63
64 GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
History o f the International Financial System
The growth of international trade in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
was accompanied by an expansion of international finance and the 
consolidation of the gold standard as a system of international pay­
ments and macroeconomic regulation. This expansion required the de­
velopment of instruments for the settlement and financing of commer­
cial transactions (e.g., bills of exchange), and an international network 
of branches of large European and U.S. banks grew up around this sys­
tem. Long-term financing instruments, including both public bond is­
sues and private financing mechanisms, were developed around the 
same time. One of the main sources of private financing was the sale 
of equities in financial centers to fund infrastructure projects, espe­
cially railways, mining operations, and other ventures in different 
countries and territories. The first transnational corporations, many of 
which operated in the natural resources sector, came a little later on, 
but they developed rapidly and by the early 20th century had become 
a well-established feature of the international scene.
The gold standard, which was based on pre-existing monetary sys­
tems that relied on other metals, became an established feature of the 
system in the last three decades of the 19th century. Its emergence was 
the result of voluntary adherence to the system that had been adopted 
by what was by then the world’s major power— the United Kingdom. 
The stability of monetary units was reinforced by their convertibility 
into gold at fixed rates established by law, but the key factor in the ex­
pansion of the monetary base was the fiduciary money provided by 
banks of issue. These banks, which were generally privately owned or 
had been founded primarily by private agents, acquired monopolies 
over the issuance of currency (sometimes after a period of unrestricted 
issues) in exchange for services rendered to the state. The system there­
fore consisted of convertible bank notes backed only partially by gold 
reserves and, at locations further away from the financial centers, by 
holdings of foreign exchange; that is, the currency issued by these cen­
ters. Consequently, full confidence in the currencies’ convertibility into 
gold played a vital role in ensuring the system’s continued stability by 
averting a potential run on these banks’ reserves, which would invari­
ably be insufficient. In addition, this banking system operated with 
minimum legal reserve requirements that provided only partial back­
ing for deposits and for notes issued by private banks in economies and 
periods in which free stipulation was permitted. These minimum re­
quirements could pose the risk of a domestic financial crisis in the 
event that problems experienced by one institution were to trigger a 
loss of confidence in others, or even throughout the banking system.
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The systemic effects of such “contagion” led to the belated assignment 
of another function to the banks of issue: that of serving as lenders of 
last resort to commercial banks (Eichengreen 1996).
In order to sustain confidence in convertibility, the gold standard’s 
“rules of the game” required a procyclical approach to macroeco­
nomic policy in times of crisis: in the event of a dislocation in the sys­
tem of international payments, central banks were supposed to raise 
discount rates to generate contractionary pressures; if the misalign­
ment persisted, the outflow of gold would erode the monetary base, 
which could be expected to translate into a decrease in the money sup­
ply and hence lower demand. Finally, fiscal deficits could not exceed 
the amount of financing available, and in times of crisis, when financ­
ing dwindled and tax receipts were also likely to shrink, governments 
therefore had no alternative but to respond with austerity policies. As 
indicated by Triffin (1968) and further substantiated by more recent 
studies (Aceña and Reis 2000), this system operated in an asymmetric 
manner to the detriment of countries on the periphery of the system, 
who were both exporters of raw materials, whose prices tended to fall 
in times of economic turmoil, and importers of capital, whose inflows 
behaved procyclically. The strong pressures thus generated by the 
“rules of the game” in these cases account for the frequent episodes of 
inconvertibility seen in the peripheral countries, including several 
Latin American economies, during the crises of the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.
The European countries themselves abandoned the gold standard 
en masse during the First World War. Efforts to reinstate this system 
in the 1920s ran into difficulties, and it was finally abandoned alto­
gether during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Thus, the dual ten­
sions generated between belt-tightening policies and social pressures in 
the countries during crises, on the one hand, and between the central 
banks’ responsibilities as monetary regulators and as lenders of last re­
sort, on the other, ultimately spelled the end of this system in the in­
dustrial countries.
The demise of the gold standard was followed by an episode of 
macroeconomic anarchy at the international level whose hallmarks 
were exchange rate instability and, especially, widespread and dis­
criminatory exchange controls. This was exacerbated by the collapse 
of international finance. The First World War had raised New York’s 
profile as a new international financial center. The center’s expansion 
in the 1920s and subsequent breakdown in 1929, in combination with 
widespread moratoria during the depression of the 1930s, led to the al­
most total disappearance of long-term international financing. This 
absence was later compounded by the economic impact of the second
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World War and, in particular, by sharp structural imbalances between 
the United States and Western Europe, which gave rise to a chronic 
dollar shortage.
This was the context in which the countries embarked upon the in­
ternational cooperation efforts that ultimately led to the adoption of 
the Bretton Woods agreements in 1944. These efforts were channeled 
in two directions. First, even though Keynes’s ambitious proposals 
were rejected, a new international system of macroeconomic regula­
tion was established. This regulatory regime was intended to surmount 
the problems of both the gold standard and the chaotic period follow­
ing its downfall. The new system was built on three pillars. The first 
was a system of fixed but adjustable parities with respect to an inter­
national standard (known as the gold-dollar, as the parity between the 
two was fixed). The second pillar was the provision of exceptional fi­
nancing to countries that lapsed into deficit positions in times of crisis, 
on the condition that they make a commitment to carry out economic 
adjustments, which could include exchange rate variations. This un­
precedented combination of adjustment and international support was 
intended to prevent economic turmoil from spreading to the rest of the 
world via weaker demand for imports, excessive devaluation, in­
creased protectionism, and in particular restrictions on current pay­
ments. The third pillar was a return to the principle of convertibility 
and nondiscrimination in respect of current payments; no commitment 
to capital convertibility was made, however, and the control of capital 
movements was thus accepted as a legitimate international practice.1 
This element of the system released domestic policies, especially mon­
etary policy, from the limitations that the free movement of capital 
could place on the pursuit of full employment. The resources used by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to fund its exceptional financ­
ing programs initially came from the contributions of member coun­
tries, in addition to credit lines that some industrial countries began 
to extend from 1962 on (General Arrangements to Borrow) and issues 
of a strictly international reserve currency, special drawing rights 
(SDRs), in 1969; these issues have been repeated twice, the last time in 
1981.
The second direction taken by the postwar financial reforms was 
the development of new forms of long-term international financing. In 
response to the scarcity of private financing, official banking institu­
tions began to perform this role, first through the World Bank and 
later through regional development banks and domestic export-import 
banks as well. The Marshall Plan and, subsequently, official devel­
opment assistance served as complementary sources of long-term 
financing.
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Although official banks played a key role in providing trade financ­
ing, private banks also continued to perform this function even during 
periods when tension within the international payments system was at 
its height. The dollar surpluses generated by the United States’s per­
sistent external deficits in the 1960s— which succeeded the initial 
shortage of dollars more quickly than expected— and by the petrodol­
lars of the 1970s were recycled to provide the resources for a new 
growth phase in private international financing. The privileged posi­
tion that private banks had acquired enabled them to play a key role 
in this recycling process.
As is widely known, the dollar surplus also undermined the appli­
cability of the Bretton Woods agreements. The abandonment of the 
dollar-gold parity in 1971 and the decision to allow the major cur­
rencies to float rendered the first pillar of the agreement (fixed but ad­
justable parities) obsolete and profoundly altered the third (principle 
of convertibility). These changes were simply a consequence of events 
as they unfolded, rather than the outcome of explicit international 
agreements, nor were they the subject of broad negotiations such as 
those that had led to the Bretton Woods accords. The first pillar was 
replaced by national autonomy in the definition of each country’s ex­
change regime. The countries took widely varying approaches to man­
aging the new risks posed by exchange rate instability. The European 
Community attempted to reduce fluctuations among its members’ cur­
rencies, thereby giving priority to economic integration. This marked 
the beginning of a process that lasted a quarter of a century and cul­
minated in the formation of a monetary union; the final stage of this 
process was the replacement of most of the members’ national curren­
cies with the euro on January 1, 2002. The developing countries es­
poused a number of strategies, including the adoption of one of the 
major currencies as a reference or the diversification of risks by link­
ing their exchange rate to a currency basket.
The floating of the major currencies represented a genuine “privati­
zation of exchange risk.” This created a need for financial instruments 
to hedge against that risk and led to a steep increase in the volume of 
currency transactions. In fact, the ratio of currency transactions to the 
value of international trade soared from 2:1 in 1973 to 10:1 in 1980 
and 70:1 in 1995 (Eatwell and Taylor 2000). This, in combination 
with the burgeoning growth of international banking, substantially al­
tered the third pillar of the Bretton Woods accords. In practice, the lib­
eralization of capital flows became the norm in the industrial coun­
tries, which one by one eliminated controls on capital transfers in the 
1970s and 1980s. A number of developing countries followed suit. 
The convertibility of the capital account was, in fact, to be officially
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endorsed at the 1997 annual meeting of the IM F in Hong Kong. The 
formulation of this principle was then postponed, however, because of 
the series of financial crises that then began to erupt in a number of 
Asian countries and that have yet to come to an end. As actually ap­
plied by international financial institutions, the principle of capital ac­
count convertibility has given way to a gradual liberalization of the 
capital account and of domestic financial sectors. The aim has been to 
sequence this process properly and to align it with the development of 
a parallel institutional structure in order to ensure domestic financial 
stability. As will be discussed later in this chapter, this has resulted in 
the emergence of new responsibilities for the Bretton Woods institu­
tions.
The second pillar of the Bretton Woods agreement (exceptional fi­
nancing in times of crisis) also saw substantial changes for two rea­
sons. First, in the late 1970s, the IM F stopped lending to industrial 
countries, which had been a very significant part of its financing activ­
ities up until that time (see figure 3.1). The Fund thus began to con­
centrate on developing countries and, increasingly, on countries in 
which its operations were likely to have “systemic effects.” The second 
change was an upswing in the demand for resources because of the 
structural nature of certain types of balance-of-payments problems, 
the severity of the cyclical disturbances associated with fluctuations in 
raw materials prices, and especially the volatility of capital flows. The 
need for larger volumes of funding over longer periods of time led to 
the establishment of new lines of IM F financing in the final two 
decades of the 20th century. In a parallel development, in 1979 the 
World Bank launched its structural adjustment programs. These 
arrangements gradually came to take precedence over the traditional 
lines of project financing that had previously been the focus of its lend­
ing strategy.
New conditionalities grew up around these changes and gave rise to 
a new function that came to be performed jointly by the IMF and the 
World Bank from the 1980s on. This new duty, which was not con­
templated in the Bretton Woods accords, was the promotion of eco­
nomic liberalization in developing economies, based on the assump­
tion that their structural rigidities were caused by excessive state 
intervention. Like others before it, this new shift in the responsibilities 
of the Bretton Woods agencies did not arise from explicit negotiations 
but was instead a response to changes in the ideologies and power re­
lationships prevailing at the global level.
The growing internationalization of finance made it necessary to 
have new regulatory standards. An awareness of this need had existed 
since the start of the 1970s, and in 1975 the Basel Committee on Bank­
ing supervision was established under the auspices of the Bank for
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Figure 3.1  International M onetary Fund: Total Credits and 
Outstanding Loans, 1 9 5 0 -2 0 0 1
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from IM F (2001b).
International Settlements (BIS). The most significant result of this ini­
tiative was the adoption of the Basel principles on the regulation and 
supervision of banks in 1988. A number of reform proposals have 
been made since 19 9 9  with a view to bringing the Basel principles 
into line with recent developments in the global banking industry and
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rectifying the system’s shortcomings.2 The definition of minimum reg­
ulatory principles has extended to a growing range of issues, including 
rules on debt issues in financial markets, the insurance industry, and fi­
nancial accounting. One of the elements of this reform movement that 
has received strong backing in recent years is the creation of a program 
to strengthen financial systems in developing countries. Such a pro­
gram would include the adoption of these international standards, as 
well as a set of principles for the management of external and public 
debt and international reserves. This new function of the Bretton 
Woods institutions has not been clearly differentiated from the respon­
sibilities of other agencies, however, particularly in the case of the BIS.
Recent Changes and Volatility in Financial Markets
Developments in the macroeconomic environment have been accom­
panied by far-reaching changes in industrial countries’ financial sys­
tems. Broadly speaking, this process of change, which began in the 
1980s and was consolidated in the 1990s,3 has involved three basic 
trends. The first is the concentration of the industrial economies’ fi­
nancial systems.4 During the 1990s the world’s major private finan­
cial institutions embarked on an intensive process of mergers and ac­
quisitions. This process, which became the hallmark of the decade, 
quickened its pace as the decade drew to a close.5 As a result, the 
number of banking institutions declined in almost all countries, and 
banking concentration, calculated on the basis of the proportion of 
deposits controlled by the largest banks, tended to rise. In fact, this 
trend would be even more marked if operations off the balance sheet 
(particularly trading of financial derivatives) were included in the cal­
culations.
Second, a widespread trend toward banking disintermediation and 
an institutionalization of savings has accompanied the emergence of 
nonbank financial intermediaries, such as mutual and pension funds, 
investment banks, and insurance companies (see table 3.1). Competi­
tion from these agents has eroded the predominant position in inter­
national financial intermediation enjoyed by the banks in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It has also obliged traditional banking institutions to form 
conglomerates that offer an ever-broader range of financial services. 
As a result, the dividing line between bank and nonbank activities has 
become increasingly blurred.
The operations of nonbank intermediaries were deregulated in the 
1980s and this, in combination with the elimination of capital controls 
in industrial countries, allowed these institutions to play an increas­
ingly important role in international financial markets and their
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Table 3.1 Financial Holdings of Institutional Investors" in 
Selected OECD Countries
(Percentages o f  GDP)
Country 1992 1994 1996 1999 2000
Australia 61.6 65.9 92.4 127.9 131.2
Canada 68.6 80.2 92.1 112.7 111.3
France 61.9 71.8 86.6 125.4 133.3
Germany 34.0 41.3 50.6 76.8 79.7
Hungary 2.5 3.9 6.1 10.7 12.8
Iceland 55.3 66.7 79.6 111.3 110.1
Italy 21.8 32.2 39.0 96.9 —
Japan 78.0 81.6 89.3 100.5 —
Republic of Korea 51.8 53.7 57.3 88.5 72.6
Luxembourg 1,574.3 1,945.6 2 ,057 .0 4,172 .3 —
Netherlands 131.5 144.5 167.6 212.8 209 .6b
Spain 21.9 32.3 44.3 65.4 62.1
United Kingdom 131.3 143.8 173.4 226 .7 —
United States 127.2 135.9 162.9 207.3 195.2
—  Not available.
N ote: GDP =  gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development.
a. Insurance companies, investment firms, pension funds, and other institutional 
savers.
b. Insurance companies include life insurance only.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from OECD (2001a).
expansion, which did a great deal to bolster the growth of secondary 
debt markets. In these markets, as in stock markets, the increased par­
ticipation of institutional investors and of a large number of individual 
financial agents tended to push values higher, generating what was 
viewed by some as a virtuous circle and by others as a financial bub­
ble. In any event, it paved the way for the development of new sources 
of financing. This process lasted for quite some time, until it was in­
terrupted by the international crisis that began in 2000.
The expansion of secondary markets helped to deepen financial 
markets in industrial countries (Fornari and Levy 1999) and facilitated 
the emergence of new sources of corporate financing. One result was 
that the volume of bond issues in industrial-country markets, headed 
by Japan and the United States, more than doubled in the 1990s, and 
significant increases were seen in a number of Latin American coun­
tries as well. The depth and liquidity of this well-developed secondary 
market, particularly in the United States, helped to finance the new 
high technology sectors, which led the economic expansion of the
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1990s. Another recent innovation, the creation of risk capital funds, 
contributed to the growth of these activities; both processes came to an 
abrupt halt with the outbreak of the recent crisis, however.
The development of these markets has also given credit rating agen­
cies a considerably broader role than they had played before, as they 
provide information to investors and are consulted increasingly for 
regulatory purposes; for example, the Basel Committee on Banking Su­
pervision recently put forward a proposal to use agency ratings in the 
regulation of the banking sector. There has been widespread criticism 
of the short-term horizon and procyclicality of agency ratings, how­
ever, particularly in terms of their impact on financing for developing 
countries (Reisen 2001, 2002).
Third, the rapid growth of institutional investors’ financial holdings 
has boosted demand for new financial instruments and has encouraged 
risk diversification. Hence the development of specialized markets for 
particular instruments, such as high-yield bonds, bonds issued by 
emerging economies, and securitized assets (based on mortgages, au­
tomobile loans, and credit card receivables), as well as shares in for­
eign firms (American depository receipts and global depository re­
ceipts). This phenomenon, in combination with the privatization of 
exchange risk, is also behind the rapid expansion of the demand for 
financial derivatives designed to hedge specific kinds of risk (see fig­
ure 3.2). The Asian crisis has severely decreased the volume of ex- 
change-risk hedging contracts that are being concluded, however.
These trends have had both positive and negative effects on indus­
trial economies. On the positive side, financing opportunities for
Figure 3.2  Financial Derivatives Traded on Organized Exchanges
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production enterprises have increased substantially, with both high 
technology and medium-size firms reaping the benefits. On the nega­
tive side, however, these trends have heightened financial fragility, be­
cause many of the fastest growing activities are not covered by the reg­
ulatory mechanisms of traditional banking activities. In fact, the 
activities that entail the highest risks and the greatest degrees of lever- 
age— those associated with the derivatives market—remain outside the 
existing regulatory frameworks, and there are as yet no proposals to 
extend regulatory standards to this domain. Even in the case of insti­
tutional investors, regulatory coverage is far from sufficient (D’Arista 
and Griffith-Jones 2001).
There is, of course, nothing new about the volatility of financial 
markets, as economic history amply demonstrates (Kindleberger 
1978), even in recent times (BIS 2001). This volatility is clearly re­
flected in the remarkable frequency with which financial crises have 
broken out in both industrial and developing countries ever since the 
mid-1970s (IMF 1998). Because the transactions conducted on finan­
cial markets are essentially intertemporal operations, the lack of infor­
mation about the future constitutes the prime “market failure” of fi­
nancial markets (Keynes 1936; Eatwell and Taylor 2000). This 
volatility can thus be attributed to changes in agents’ opinions and ex­
pectations, which continually shift back and forth between optimism 
and pessimism.6 The impact of these shifts is magnified by the effects 
of the “contagion” of opinion and expectations from one market to 
another.7 These externalities constitute another market failure, be­
cause they can give rise to multiple equilibria and to what amount to 
self-fulfilling prophecies when the expectations of a majority of agents 
point in the same direction.
Information asymmetries between debtors and creditors (Stiglitz 
1994) are yet another market failure. These asymmetries translate into 
a bias in favor of borrowers that are considered low risk and generate 
a strong inclination to rely on creditors’ flawed information about 
their borrowers, especially the highest-risk debtors. Because confi­
dence varies over the course of the business cycle, the spreads on what 
are deemed to be the highest-risk loans on the market follow a strongly 
procyclical pattern, giving rise to alternating periods of investor ap­
petite for high-risk activities and flights to quality. These variations in 
confidence also account for the fact that secondary markets display 
much greater liquidity in times of plenty, as they too depend on the 
market’s confidence in the information available to buyers. For this 
same reason, derivatives markets also tend to behave procyclically, 
and the types of transactions considered to entail excessive risk may 
even dry up altogether during times of crisis.
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Contemporary financial markets exhibit a number of features that 
have tended to exacerbate their volatility8:
• Inadequate regulation, as mentioned above, affects the activities 
of both institutional investors and agents in the derivatives market, 
and the existing regulations have a procyclical bias.9
• Problems of contagion to different markets are caused by the liq­
uidity constraints faced by institutional investors. When the price of a 
given instrument falls, these investors may be obliged to sell other 
types of holdings— even assets that bear no relation to the first instru- 
ment—in order to restore their own liquidity. This pressure is even 
greater when funds are withdrawn from a market that generally oper­
ates on the basis of spot transactions or when these investors have to 
settle an account or make some other payment, including the collater­
als required for certain types of derivatives transactions. accordingly, 
the larger the stake of highly leveraged institutions in the market, the 
more serious this problem becomes.
• Agents tend to use the same risk assessment systems, which 
heightens the correlation between the financial behavior of sometimes 
dissimilar instruments and exacerbates the effects of contagion.
• There is a tendency to evaluate the performance of institutional 
investors over short time horizons, which has a similar effect.
• The behavior of credit rating agencies is procyclical.
Figure 3.3A shows the correlation between two risk markets during 
the turbulent period that began with the crisis of 1997: the bond market 
in emerging economies and high-yield bonds in the United States. In both 
markets, spreads narrowed during the bond market boom and widened 
sharply in response to the Asian crisis and, especially, the Russian crisis, 
after which they moved part of the way back toward more normal lev­
els. Throughout this cycle, the fluctuations were much sharper in emerg­
ing bond markets. By contrast, in the more recent crisis, which radiated 
from its epicenter in the United States, just the opposite occurred. Dur­
ing the period as a whole, there was a strong positive correlation be­
tween the two markets.10 The changing nature of contagion is illustrated 
in figure 3.3B, which shows the increase in spreads in the main Latin 
American economies during the five most recent crisis periods. All the 
countries exhibited an upward trend at these times, but the impact was 
much more powerful during the Asian and especially the Russian crises 
than during episodes centered in Latin American countries. This suggests 
that crises in industrial countries have a much greater impact, especially 
when they affect highly leveraged agents, some of which have with­
drawn from emerging markets in recent years.
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Figure 3.3  Spreads in Emerging M arkets
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State intervention to correct these market failures can easily give rise 
to “government failures” if adequate incentive systems are not in 
place. Regulation is the most important line of action, because it fo­
cuses on preventive measures aimed at ensuring that economic agents 
avoid assuming an excessive level of risk. The development of regula­
tory systems tends to lag behind that of the market, however, and can 
itself lead to evasion and avoidance (transactions conducted off the
0
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balance sheet, for example) or the use of suboptimal intermediation 
mechanisms. Supervision is also preventive, but it tends to be subject 
to information problems, and its discretionary nature can lead to 
abuses. Government intervention in response to systemic crises also of­
fers incentives for excessive risk taking (moral hazard). Lastly, inter­
vention intended to compensate for a market bias toward risk-seeking 
investors can create similar problems of moral hazard, such as the pro­
vision of guarantees to high-risk borrowers. The use of official financ­
ing to resolve the problem can generate dependence on the state 
(“graduation” problems) and can even oblige private creditors to take 
on higher risks owing to the preferred creditor status of official agen­
cies. For this reason, all that the authorities can do is to offset volatil­
ity and risk discrimination partially using an appropriate combination 
of instruments.
Capital Flows to Developing Countries
Over the last three decades, the developments in international markets 
described in the preceding section have also been reflected in major 
changes in capital flows to developing countries.11 The most striking 
aspect of these trends is the contrast between the slow growth of offi­
cial financing flows and the increase in highly volatile private flows. As 
shown in figure 3.4, official financing has tended to decline as a pro­
portion of developing-country gross domestic product (GDP), espe­
cially in the 1990s. This primarily reflects the scaling back of its main 
component, bilateral assistance, which, over a large part of that decade, 
declined both in real terms and as a proportion of industrial-country 
GDP (from 0.35 percent in the mid-1990s to an average of 0.22 percent 
in the period 1998-2000). The decrease in bilateral assistance has been 
most pronounced in the case of the largest industrial countries, al­
though this has been partly offset by the rising proportion of grants vis- 
à-vis concessional credits. Moreover, unlike private flows, official fi­
nancing has not been procyclical and, indeed, some components of 
it—particularly balance-of-payments support and multilateral develop­
ment finance— have displayed countercyclical behavior.
Private external financing has fluctuated sharply owing to the ef­
fects of its most volatile components: short-term flows and long-term 
commercial bank lending (which, in figure 3.4 , includes portfolio 
flows). During the most critical years, including both the debt crisis of 
the 1980s and the period since 1997, short-term flows have actually 
been negative at times. Together, these two sources of funding in­
creased from 1.0 percent of developing-country GDP in 1971-74  to 
2.3 percent in 1977-82 , fell to 0.5 percent in 1983-90 , peaked at 2.8
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Figure 3 .4  Net Flows to Developing Countries
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percent in 1993-97 , and dropped again to 0 .7  percent in 1998-2000 . 
A recovery began in 2000 but was interrupted in 2001. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has remained largely independent of this cycle and 
has tended to follow long-term trends instead, which were upward in 
the 1980s and reflected a significant upsurge in the 1990s. FDI was not 
affected by the series of crises that began in 1997 either, although it 
was affected in the 2001 crisis.
This cycle reflects only part of the instability that has characterized 
private financial markets. Since the Asian crisis, turbulence in these 
markets has taken various forms over shorter time spans: periodic in­
terruptions in market access that have lasted varying amounts of time, 
simultaneous increases in risk spreads, and a shortening of maturities 
(see, in this regard, the preceding section).12 In any event, it must be 
borne in mind that these short-term phenomena are compounded by 
the effects of contagion, which manifests itself over the medium term 
and affects access to financing for relatively long periods of time. In 
both cases, the essential characteristic of contagion is that it tends to 
have similar effects on countries regardless of whether they have sound 
or unsound economic fundamentals if the market classifies those coun­
tries in the same risk category.
The changes in the composition of financing that have occurred 
over the last three decades are detailed in table 3.2. The upsurge in the 
financing received by Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1970s
Table 3 .2  N et Resource Flows, 1 9 7 3 -2 0 0 1
(Annual averages, billions o f  US$ a t 1995 constant prices)a
D eveloping E ast Asia E u rope and  
R esources countries and  Pacific Central Asia
1973-81
Total 143.2 23.2  10.5
Official flows 44.6  6.8 3.0
Direct investment 11.4 2.3 0.2
Equity investment 0.0 0.0  0.0
Debt flows 87.1 14.2 7.4
Bonds 2.6 0.4 0.0
Commercial banks 44.1 5.9  4.7
Short-term 29.4  5.5 0.6
Other 11.0 2.3 2.1
19 8 2 -9 0
Total 107.5 25.0  10.0
Official flows 51.8 8.0 2.4
Direct investment 17.9 6.6 0.4
Equity investment 1.3 0.8 0.0
Debt flows 36.5 9 .7  7.1
Bonds 2.8 1.5 1.4
Commercial banks 16.0 3.8 2.2
Short-term 7.5 3.1 1.1
Other 10.1 1.3 2.4
Latin  M iddle
A m erica and  E ast and  South Sub-Saharan
C aribbean  N orth A frica Asia A frica
6 2 .6
6.6
7 .9  
0.0
48.1































































































































































































a. Original data at current prices were adjusted by the GDP deflator of the United States.
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and its subsequent contraction were primarily a reflection of trends in 
both long- and short-term bank financing. Whereas long-term syndi­
cated credits were the most common type of bank financing during the 
1970s, in the 1990s short-term financing took on much greater im­
portance. The Basel principles were undoubtedly a major factor in this 
respect, because they have resulted in a preference for lending short­
term, low-risk credits. In the 1990s, the East Asia and Pacific region 
was the epicenter of the boom in short-term bank credit and of its sub­
sequent contraction, which was much more severe and widespread in 
the developing world than the Latin American and Caribbean debt cri­
sis of the 1980s. Reflecting the trend toward banking disintermedia­
tion and the institutionalization of savings, the 1 9 9 0 -9 7  boom was 
particularly evident in the bond market and in portfolio equity flows. 
Their performance during the financing crunch of 1 9 98-99  varied 
widely from one region to another in relation to the averages for 
1990-97 : net bond issues turned negative in East Asia and the Pacific 
but rose in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Central Europe, 
whereas just the opposite occurred in the case of portfolio equity 
flows. FDI, meanwhile, tended to increase in all regions up to 1999.
The private credit boom of the 1990s was triggered not only by 
changes in financial intermediation, but also by monetary policy in the 
United States. Low interest rates were a decisive factor in the prefer­
ence shown by institutional investors for emerging economies (Calvo, 
Leideman, and Reinhart 1992; D ’Arista and Griffith-Jones 2001). 
Risk spreads were reduced in response to the greater supply of funds, 
strengthening the effects of low rates on these economies’ financing 
terms. Rates in the United States and risk premiums in emerging mar­
kets developed in a diametrically opposite manner in the period of tur­
bulence that began in 1997, demonstrating that varying perceptions of 
risk in emerging markets have been the predominant factor influenc­
ing the determination of those premiums and the size of capital flows 
(see box 3.1). What is more, U.S. interest rates have often responded 
endogenously to varying perceptions of risk, either because the flight 
to quality has raised the prices of U.S. government bonds, thereby re­
ducing their yields, or because the Federal Reserve has responded to 
market uncertainty by lowering interest rates.
In the 1990s, private flows were concentrated in middle-income 
countries (see table 3.3). Conversely, the share of total private financ­
ing received by low-income countries not only has been smaller than 
their share of the total population, but also has been less than their 
contribution to the total GDP of the developing countries. This fact is 
particularly striking in bond issues, commercial banking, and equity 
flows (with the exception of India in the latter case). In all these
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Box 3.1  Interest Rates and Emerging-Market Bond 
Spreads
One of the key external variables that influence emerging-market risk 
premiums are changes in U.S. interest rates (Calvo, Leideman, and Rein­
hart 1992). Theoretically, a rise in U.S. interest rates is supposed to lead, 
other things being equal, to an increase in the debt service to be paid by 
emerging-market borrowers, which will increase the likelihood of default 
and thus raise the corresponding risk premiums. Higher U.S. interest rates 
could also reduce investors’ appetite for risk and, accordingly, their par­
ticipation in risky markets (Kamin and von Kleist 1999). Similarly, a fall 
in U.S. interest rates ought to lead to a decrease in emerging-market risk 
premiums, both because of the positive impact lower rates will have on 
borrowers’ ability to pay and because investors will tend to prefer emerg- 
ing-market debt instruments whenever returns in mature markets fall.
Evidence for the 1990s indicates that prior to the Mexican financial 
crisis of December 1994, movements in emerging-market risk premiums 
and U.S. interest rates bore out this hypothesis. However, data for the sec­
ond half of the decade indicate that emerging-market risk premiums and 
U.S. interest rates moved in opposite directions. From March 1996 to 
September 2001 there was a strong negative correlation (-0.6) between 
10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields and the Emerging Markets Bond Index 
Plus (EMBI+) and Latin EMBI+ spreads estimated by J.P. Morgan. The 
correlation between risk premiums and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s bench­
mark interest rate was also negative, albeit less so (-0 .3  for the EMBI+ 
and -0 .4  for its Latin American component).
One of the factors at work is that during this period, financial conta­
gion became more intense than ever before and triggered a widespread in­
crease in emerging-market risk premiums during the bouts of market tur­
bulence set off by the Asian and Russian crises. Movements in risk 
premiums on U.S. high-yield corporate bonds were also strongly and pos­
itively correlated with movements in emerging-market risk premiums.
Moreover, flows to Latin America responded more to movements in 
risk premiums than to changes in U.S. interest rates during the period un­
der analysis. Other things being equal, an increase in the latter should be 
associated with capital outflows from emerging markets, and a decrease 
should be associated with inflows to emerging markets. However, when 
periods of expansionary and contractionary U.S. monetary policy are iso­
lated, the correlation between capital flows to Latin America and changes 
in U.S. interest rates does not show the expected negative sign. Instead, 
these flows (including debt paper issued abroad and Brady bonds) 
showed a positive correlation (0.6) with 10-year U.S. Treasury bond 
yields. This correlation was stronger in the periods corresponding to the 
Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises.
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Table 3.3  N et Resource Flows, 1 9 9 0 -9 9
(Annual averages, billions o f  US$ an d  percentages)
Countries
Direct investment Equity investment Grants Bilateral financing
Multilateral financing 
(excluding IMP) Bonds
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
Developing countries 103.7 100.0 2 7 .7 100.0 29.8 100.0 4.1 100.0 15.8 100.0 30.6 100.0
Excluding China 75.4 72.7 24 .8 89.4 29 .5 99 .0 2.6 62.4 13.9 88.0 29 .4 96.0
Low-income countries 10.2 9.8 3.9 14.0 15.2 51.0 2.5 59.9 6.7 42.4 1.7 5.6
India 1.5 1.4 1.7 6.0 0.5 1.8 0.0 0.3 1.1 7.2 0.7 2.2
Other countries 8.7 8.4 2.2 8.0 14.7 49.2 2.5 59.6 5.6 35.2 1.0 3.4
China3 28.3 27.3 2 .9 10.6 0.3 1.0 1.6 37.6 1.9 12.0 1.2 4.0
Middle-income countries 65.2 62.8 2 0 .7 74.6 14.3 48 .0 0.1 2.5 7.2 45.6 2 7 .7 90.4
Argentina 6.6 6.4 1.1 4.1 0.0 0.1 -0 .2 -5 .6 1.1 6.9 4.9 15.9
Brazil 10.9 10.5 2.8 10.1 0.1 0.2 -0 .8 -2 0 .4 0.6 4.0 2 .6 8.5
Indonesia 2.1 2.0 1.6 5.9 0.3 0.9 1.3 32.1 0.6 3.8 0.9 2.8
Republic of Korea*3 2 .6 2.5 3 .7 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 9.2 0.8 5.1 4.9 15.9
Mexico 8.2 7.9 3.8 13.5 0.0 0.1 -0 .4 -9 .7 0.5 3.3 4.2 13.7
Russian Federation 1.8 1.7 0.8 2 .7 0.8 2 .7 1.1 27 .0 0.7 4.3 1.6 5.4
Other countries 33.1 31.9 6.9 24.8 13.1 44 .0 -1 .2 -3 0 .1 2 .9 18.1 8.6 28.2
Commercial




debt flows Total net flows
M emo 
GDP Population
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Percentage Percentage
Developing countries 17.1 100.0 4.0 100.0 232 .8 100.0 22 .5 100.0 2 55 .4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Excluding China 16.6 97.1 1.1 26 .6 193.2 83.0 21 .7 96.2 2 14 .9 84.2 88.2 74.8
Low-income countries 0.8 4.5 0.4 9.1 41.3 17.7 0.7 2 .9 42.0 16.4 17.0 4 6 .7
India 0.5 2.9 0.1 2 .0 6.1 2 .6 -0 .4 -1 .7 5 .7 2.2 6.3 19.4
Other countries 0.3 1.6 0.3 7.1 35.2 15.1 15.1 67.1 50.3 19.7 10.8 27 .3
China3 0.5 2.9 2 .9 73.4 39.6 17.0 0.9 3.8 40.5 15.8 11.8 25 .2
Middle-income countries 15.9 92 .5 0.7 17.6 151.7 65.1 21 .0 93.3 172.7 67.6 71.1 28.1
Argentina 0.6 3.7 -0 .1 -1 .3 14.1 6.0 3.4 15.1 17.5 6.8 4 .5 0.7
Brazil 5.2 30.2 -0 .4 -9 .3 20 .9 9.0 1.0 4.5 21 .9 8.6 11.0 3.3
Indonesia 0.2 1.0 -0 .1 -1 .3 6.9 3.0 0.9 4.0 7.8 3.0 2 .9 4.1
Republic of Korea*3 -0 .9 -5 .5 -0 .1 -3 .6 11.3 4.9 5.9 26 .4 17.2 6.8 7.0 0.9
M exico 2 .6 15.0 -0 .3 -6 .5 18.6 8.0 0.3 1.2 18.9 7.4 6.7 1.9
Russian Federation 0.2 1.1 2 .0 51.1 9.0 3.9 -0 .8 -3 .4 8.2 3.2 7.6 3.1
Other countries 8.1 47.1 -0 .5 -1 1 .6 70.9 30.5 10.2 45.4 81.1 31.8 31.4 14.0
Source: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from the World Bank (2001a) and (2001b).
a. The W ord Bank considers China a middle-income country; in this table, it is presented in a separate category.
b. The World Bank considers the Republic of Korea a high-income country; however, the World Bank (2001a) includes it in the middle-income group.
ooOj
84 GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
instances, flows of private financing to poor countries are minimal. 
The share of FDI received by low-income countries is also smaller than 
their contribution to the developing countries’ GDP. For these reasons, 
the volatility of capital flows and issues of contagion have become par­
ticularly relevant to middle-income developing countries.
Accordingly, low-income countries have continued to depend on 
the dwindling supply of official funding. These countries rely heavily 
on official development assistance, particularly grants, most of which 
come in the form of bilateral aid. This is the only component of net re­
source flows to developing countries whose distribution is progressive. 
Multilateral financing has followed the same pattern, except in the 
case of IMF resources.
The volatility of private financial flows and their concentration in 
middle-income countries have created a strong demand for exceptional 
financing in a small number of emerging economies. As a result, IMF 
financing has exhibited a strongly countercyclical pattern and has been 
concentrated in the few countries where it could have systemic effects. 
However, exceptional financing has been lower than it was in the 
1980s, whether measured in terms of the level of the recipient countries’ 
international reserves or of their exports and also, in the case of inter­
national reserves, lower than it was in the 1960s (see figure 3.1). This 
is a clear sign that the level of IMF exceptional financing has tended to 
lag behind that of international economic transactions. Obviously, the 
comparison is even less favorable if the capital account shocks faced by 
the developing countries are taken as a point of reference, even though, 
in the view of the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, “the size 
of the breakdowns and required official finance to counter them is of a 
different order of magnitude than in the past” (Greenspan 1998).
As shown in figure 3.5A, the countercyclical pattern of financing 
and its concentration in a small number of countries are closely re­
lated. The proportion of IMF financing directed to large borrowers13 
has trended sharply upward over the last two decades. Indeed, IMF fi­
nancing data underestimate the provision of emergency funds to large 
borrowers, as they do not include bilateral contributions for the largest 
bailouts of recent years (Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, the Russian Federation, and Thailand, as well as the “finan­
cial armor” provided to Argentina in 2000).14 These programs have 
been severely criticized in industrial countries as creating moral haz­
ard, which has translated into a less favorable attitude toward excep­
tional financing. The outright renegotiation of external debts, on the 
other hand, has been supported, but the implementation of this type of 
process will nonetheless require the establishment of appropriate in­
ternational institutions to address this problem.
THE INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY OF CAPITAL AND LABOR 85
Figure 3 .5  Credits of International Financial Institutions 




□  Large borrowersa
□  Upper-middle-income, except Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
□  Lower-middle-income, except China, Indonesia, and Russia
□  Low-income, except India
O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'. O'.
B. Development bank credits
a
a. The Republic of Korea, which belongs to this group of countries, is classified as 
a high-income country by international financial institutions.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from the IM F (2001a).
Financing for middle-income countries provided by the World Bank 
and by multilateral development banks in general has displayed a sim­
ilar countercyclical pattern (see figure 3.5B). This kind of financing 
complements the credit supplied by IM F, because it provides govern­
ments with long-term resources. In view of the volatility of private 
financing, these funds are usually the primary, and sometimes the only, 
source of long-term financing available in times of crisis.
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The concentration of loans to middle-income countries has not 
completely crowded out low-income countries. Indeed, the flow of 
IM F resources to the latter has been fairly stable and has even in­
creased slightly when they have needed additional balance-of- 
payments support. This occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the 1980s and in East Asia and the Pacific during the 1997-98  cri­
sis. In the case of the World Bank, the flow of resources to low-income 
countries has followed an upward trend in recent decades.
Overall, the trend in developing countries’ external debt positions 
has not been positive, although the patterns do vary considerably from 
one region to another. External debt-to-GDP ratios for all parts of the 
developing world are higher than they were in 1980 (i.e., prior to the 
Latin American debt crisis), but for certain developing regions (in­
cluding Latin America and the Caribbean), these ratios have fallen in 
relation to the critical levels reached in the mid- or late 1980s (see fig­
ure 3.6A). External debt-to-exports ratios, meanwhile, have developed 
somewhat more favorably (see figure 3.6B). The problem appears 
more serious when both debt ratios are compared to certain bench­
marks that reflect the sustainability of levels of indebtedness. On the 
basis of World Bank data on 84 developing nations for which infor­
mation is available for the period 1980-2000 , the number of countries 
with external debt-to-GDP ratios of less than 40 percent fell from 45 
to 23 between the beginning and end of this period, whereas the num­
ber with external debt-to-exports ratios of less than 200 percent also 
fell, from 56 to 33.
Nonetheless, the risk of another interest rate spike such as the one 
seen in the early 1980s has declined as industrial countries have 
brought inflation under control. In any event, it should be remembered 
that real interest rates in these countries remained high in the last two 
decades of the 20th century (although they declined during the recent 
crisis) and, in particular, that the margins applying to developing 
countries in private capital markets are usually very high. In terms of 
the traditional sustainability criteria for debt ratios, calculated by com­
paring economic growth to real interest rates, the ratio continues to be 
unfavorable in most countries.
A final factor is that the banking system’s tendency toward concen­
tration at the international level has spread to developing countries. 
This process reflects both the expansion of large international banks 
and the strategy adopted by smaller ones to deal with international 
competition, as in the case of Spanish banks in Latin America. How­
ever, the degree to which banking is concentrated in foreign hands 
varies widely from one region to another and across countries within 
the same region. Central Europe and Latin America, for example,
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Figure 3 .6  External Debt 
A. Percentage of GDP (in current US$)
Latin America and the Middle East and North Southeast Asia Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacific Caribbean Africa
B. Percentage of exports
Latin America and the Middle East and North Southeast Asia Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacific 
Caribbean Africa
N ote: GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from the World Bank (2001a).
exhibit much higher levels of concentration than the countries of East 
Asia and the Pacific (52 percent, 25 percent, and 6 percent, respec­
tively, of total bank assets in 1999).
The share of foreign banks ranges from a high of between 42 percent 
and 54 percent in Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela to a low of around 
18 percent in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. This process of concentra­
tion has been encouraged by the regulatory authorities of industrial 
countries as a means of reducing the banks’ exchange rate risk (Hawkins 
2001). The financial services annex to the World Trade Organization 
General Agreement on Trade in Services constitutes an international in­
stitutional framework that provides legal guarantees for this process.
88 GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The combination of financial liberalization, penetration by foreign 
banks, and new private sector external linkages has led to a profound 
restructuring of developing countries’ financial systems. In many ways, 
national financial sectors are now more diversified in terms of services, 
but some of their traditional shortcomings persist. The bias toward 
short-term operations and high intermediation margins is still the 
norm, as is credit rationing, especially for small and medium-size en­
terprises and low-income households. Although local stock markets 
have expanded in some countries, primary equity issues have not in­
creased, as large firms have preferred to issue their shares in interna­
tional financial centers. Finally, despite major changes in banking reg­
ulation and supervision, the stability of local markets has shown no 
significant improvement, as demonstrated by the number and fre­
quency of banking crises.
This confluence of strong external dependency and underdeveloped 
national financial systems has dimmed the expectations that prevailed 
in the early 1990s with regard to the preferred approach to developing 
countries’ financial integration into the world market. It also reflects a 
rarely mentioned asymmetry in the globalization process. Essentially, 
the “one world, one financial system” approach has represented an at­
tempt not only to level the playing field, but also to reorganize the de­
veloping countries’ financial markets on the basis of the U.S. model by 
promoting convergence toward a financial structure based on the cap­
ital market.
The application of this approach has had negative consequences for 
the developing world. The most obvious one has been the aforemen­
tioned destabilizing effect of highly volatile capital flows. Another ma­
jor adverse consequence, however, has been the imposition of a finan­
cial structure that is alien to the institutional traditions of developing 
countries and even to those of certain industrial countries.15 This mis­
match can have adverse repercussions if the process of dismantling ex­
isting institutions takes precedence over the construction of new ones, 
given the crucial importance of financial intermediation for economic 
development.16
International M igration
In the first stage of globalization, from the last quarter of the 19th cen­
tury to the early 20th century, the expansion of trade and high capital 
mobility were accompanied by an increase in migratory flows, with the 
result that this period is also known as the “era of mass migration” 
(Castles and Miller 1993; Hatton and Williamson 1998). This wave of
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migration was directed toward a number of countries in the New 
World (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States). 
Between 1870 and 1920, the United States, which was the chief recip­
ient of these migrants, took in more than 26 million people, primarily 
from Europe, who came to represent more than 10 percent of the 
country’s total population (Solimano 2001).
Some of these migratory flows contributed to interregional and in- 
traregional economic convergence (European emigration to the New 
World and to other European countries, respectively), whereas others 
accentuated the inequality of the international economic order, as in 
the case of the Chinese “coolies” and the Indians who were trans­
ported to tropical plantations and cities. Thus, two disparate trends 
prompted by these migratory flows emerged: a trend toward the con­
vergence of wages at high levels in the industrial world and a trend to­
ward their convergence at low levels in the developing world (Lewis 
1978).
During that period, the countries of the New World adopted liberal 
immigration policies, and in a number of cases governments used var­
ious means to encourage foreigners to take up residence as they sought 
to increase the labor force and to populate their territories at a time of 
rapid economic expansion. In the early 20th century, governments be­
gan to apply increasingly restrictive policies, accompanied, in some 
countries (Australia, Canada, and the United States), by measures that 
discriminated against Asian immigrants, especially those from China 
(O ’Rourke and Williamson 1999).
Then, after more than half a century, migratory movements once 
again began to gather momentum as part of the third stage of global­
ization during the last quarter of the 20th century. In that period, mi­
gration to nearly all the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) was greater than it had been in 
previous decades, although these flows were still much smaller in vol­
ume than those of the late 19th century.17 In some countries of desti­
nation (Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United States), this process 
peaked in the early 1990s, whereas in others (Australia and the United 
Kingdom) it had reached its high point some years earlier. Since that 
time, migratory flows have declined significantly, largely as a result of 
the widespread imposition of legal limits on immigration (see table 3.4).
M ajor changes also occurred with respect to the immigrants’ re­
gions and countries of origin (see table 3.5). Immigration to the United 
States during the third stage of globalization has consisted primarily 
of Latin Americans and Caribbeans (46 percent) and Asians (34 per­
cent), in sharp contrast to the trend of the 19th century, when nearly 
90 percent of the immigrants to the United States came from Europe
oTable 3 .4  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: The 10 M ain Countries of 
Destination of Immigrants
(Thousands o f  persons)
R ecipient country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
United States3 1,537 1,827 974 904 804 721 916 798 661 647 979
Germany*3 842 921 1,208 987 774 788 708 615 606 674 812
Japan*3 224 258 267 235 238 210 225 275 266 282 265
United Kingdom3 — — 204 190 194 206 216 237 258 277 223
Canada3 214 231 253 256 224 213 226 216 174 190 220
Italy3 — — — — — — — — 111 268 190
France3 102 110 117 99 92 77 76 102 138 104 102
Australia3 121 122 107 76 70 87 99 86 77 84 93
Switzerland*3 101 110 112 104 92 88 74 73 75 86 92
Netherlands*3 81 84 83 88 68 67 77 77 82 78 79
— Not available.
a. Data based on residence permits or other sources.
b. Data based on population records.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from OECD (2000b), and SOPEMI (2001).
Table 3 .5  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Nations of Origin of Persons 
Migrating to the M ain Recipient Countries, 1999
(Percentages)
R ecipient country
Primary countries o f  origin
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Cumulative
United States Mexico China India Philippines Dominican Republic
(19.9) (5.6) (5.5) (5.2) (3.1) 39.3
Germany Yugoslavia Poland Turkey Italy Russia
(13.1) (10.7) (7.0) _ (5.2) (4.1) 40.1
Japan China Philippines Brazil United States Korea
(21.0) (20.3) (9.3) _ (8.8) (8.2) 67.6
United Kingdom United States Australia South Africa India New Zealand
(16.2) (12.1) (8.7) (7.1) (5.7) 49.8
Canada China India Pakistan Philippines Korea
(20.2) (9.2) (4.9) _ (4.8)_ (3.8) 42.9
Italy Albania Morocco Yugoslavia Romania China
(13.9) (9.3) (9.1) (7.8) _ (4.1) 44.2
France Morocco Algeria Turkey Tunisia United States
(13.5) (10.9) (5.5) (3.8) _ (2.6) 36.3
Australia New Zealand China United Kingdom South Africa India
(22.2) (11.4) (10.5) (5.9) (3.1) 53.1
Switzerland Yugoslavia Germany France Italy Portugal
(14.7) (12.8) (7.2) (7.0) _ (5.8) 47.5
Netherlands United Kingdom Germany Morocco Turkey United States
(6.4) (5.7) (5.6) (5.4) (4.2) 27.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from OECD (2001b).
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(Solimano 2001). In the European Union, internal migration predom­
inates, representing two-thirds of the total (66.2 percent); other major 
regions of origin are Africa (16.2 percent) and Asia (10.6 percent) (Salt
1999). Almost three-fourths of Japan’s immigrants come from Asia 
(53.3 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (10.2 percent), and 
the United States (8.8 percent) (Salt 1999; OECD 2001b).18 (The data 
in this paragraph correspond to 1997-98.)
The composition of these flows reflects the influence that factors 
such as distance, language, historical relations, and cultural affinity 
have on migrants’ choices of destination. More than half of Japan’s 
immigrants come from China, the Republic of Korea, and the Philip­
pines, whereas nearly a quarter of the immigrants to the United States 
come from Canada, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. The coun­
tries of origin of migrants to France and the United Kingdom reflect 
strong historical and cultural ties.
These ongoing migratory movements have taken place in the con­
text of significant changes in the relevant legislation. In general, im­
migration laws are much more restrictive than in the past and are ori­
ented toward achieving greater control over irregular immigration. In 
the United States, such legislation has been changed several times 
since the 1960s. The 1965 reform of the Immigration and Natural­
ization Act established a system of preferences based on family rela­
tionships with U.S. citizens, encouraged the immigration of individu­
als with the skills and training in greatest demand in the labor market, 
set quotas by country of origin, and introduced measures to eliminate 
ethnic discrimination. Further legislative changes were introduced in 
1986 with the aim of controlling irregular immigration through in­
creased vigilance at the country’s borders and programs to regularize 
the status of undocumented immigrants. Another reform was intro­
duced in 1996 with a view to strengthening the control of irregular 
immigration.
Since the early 1990s, the immigration policies of the European 
countries have been set by the European Union. The main feature of 
this legislation is the clear distinction laid down in the Treaty of Rome 
between immigrants from within the European Community and those 
of non-Community origin. Whereas the former have every right to re­
side and work in any country of the European Union, the latter are 
subject to strict limitations and are required to obtain a work visa be­
fore they can become residents. Australia, Canada, and Japan have 
also adopted restrictive immigration policies in recent years, particu­
larly with respect to the issuance of permanent residence visas. To 
counterbalance this situation, special programs have been imple­
mented to facilitate temporary residence, usually through the issuance
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of work permits in specific areas, as a means of either lending greater 
flexibility to the labor market or alleviating labor shortages in certain 
sectors (OECD 2001b).
One particularly disturbing issue is the selective “brain drain” of 
scientific researchers, engineers, and other qualified personnel engen­
dered by the OECD countries’ migration policies. This phenomenon is 
worsening the already sharp asymmetries between industrial and de­
veloping countries in terms of their capacity to carry out research and 
development activities (see chapter 4). In addition, as the literature on 
economic development has shown, although it is true that this can lead 
to virtuous circles, it may also create poverty traps (Easterly 2001a). 
Two factors have combined to trigger larger migratory flows of scien­
tific researchers and engineers from developing to industrial countries. 
One is the fact that the creation of knowledge has generated growing 
returns and strong externalities that encourage the clustering of scien­
tific communities. The other factor consists of the special migration 
policies adopted by the industrial countries in response to the rising de­
mand for highly qualified personnel. The main magnet has been the 
United States, which in the 1990s received nearly a million specialists 
from the developing world in the field of information technology 
alone, under the special H1-B visa program. A number of other OECD 
countries (Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the United King­
dom) have also implemented selective programs, such as Germany’s 
“green card” scheme (Solimano 2002).
Thus, even though it has coincided with an increased tendency to re­
duce obstacles to capital mobility, the free movement of persons is lim­
ited to specific regions within the OECD countries and to workers who 
are highly or very highly qualified. Yet the persons having the greatest 
propensity to emigrate are relatively low-skilled workers wishing to 
move from South to North. In addition, since the disappearance of so­
cialist governments, a strong trend toward emigration has been ob­
served in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially to Eu­
ropean Union countries. Consequently, tighter controls over irregular 
migration and the employment of undocumented workers, along with 
limitations on the right to asylum on political and humanitarian 
grounds, have become another pillar of industrial countries’ immigra­
tion policies (OECD 2001b).
In the 1990s this relationship between the propensity to migrate 
and restrictions on the free movement of labor resulted in a consider­
able increase in irregular migration to OECD countries, which, by its 
very nature, is impossible to measure with complete accuracy. The per­
sistence of irregular migration has prompted nearly all the OECD 
countries to tighten controls on the entry, residence, and employment
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of foreigners. At the same time, various programs have been adopted 
to regularize the status of undocumented residents.
International migration has a far-reaching impact on the basic 
structures of the sending and receiving countries. It is widely acknowl­
edged that inequalities in levels of development are the primary deter­
minant of migration. Accordingly, if globalization results in the accen­
tuation of these inequalities, the propensity to migrate will persist and 
may even increase. At the same time, growing interdependence among 
nations has heightened the transnationalization of communities and 
has led to the diversification of mobility patterns. Another factor that 
encourages migration is the wider dissemination of cultural models, 
modes of behavior, and aspirations, because potential migrants are 
more aware of existing global inequalities in levels of development. 
Moreover, advances in communications and transport have reduced 
the direct costs of migration.
In contrast to past trends, migration is not currently linked to the 
occupation of unpopulated areas. Because it is directed primarily from 
South to North, one of the challenges posed by migration is to incor­
porate immigrants into highly structured societies whose economic, 
social, and demographic conditions differ considerably from those of 
the immigrants’ countries of origin. The integration of immigrants into 
the host societies and the definition of their rights and demands for cit­
izenship have become a major political issue. Institutional responses to 
this situation have varied and have included both humanitarian and re­
strictive attitudes, with the latter based on the defense of sovereignty. 
In the countries of origin, ties with emigrants have become especially 
important, because they represent not only a source of funds (in the 
form of remittances), but also the potential for change and innovation. 
These links represent the reverse side of integration and, as shown by 
the emergence of immigrant communities and their social networks, 
one of the seeds of transnationalization.
Organizations of immigrants in the main recipient countries, such as 
those that have emerged in the United States, provide frames of refer­
ence for strengthening collective identity and facilitate the globalization 
of immigrants’ cultural expressions and the spread of their products in 
the host societies. Such organizations help immigrants to maintain close 
bonds with their places of origin; one of the most important of these ties 
is the sending of remittances. The use and origin of remittances, the 
channels used for them, and their real and potential effects on the de­
velopment of the recipient communities have been only partially as­
sessed, and few policies have thus far been introduced in this area.
Although the debate on migration, its causes, and its consequences 
has awakened greater interest today than ever before, the controversial
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nature of these issues hinders the adoption of global agreements and 
specific courses of action on the subject. In recent years, it has become 
clear that international migration must be understood as a phenome­
non requiring the adoption of multilateral measures based on cooper­
ation among states. It is also clear that governments and civil society 
organizations in countries of origin, destination, and transit share a 
concern for the human rights of migrants, in relation both to the deci­
sion to emigrate or stay in the country of origin and to the possibility 
of exercising the rights of citizenship in the countries of origin and des­
tination. These convictions have been strengthened by the need to join 
forces to mount a frontal attack on crime, which has grown to serious 
proportions: trafficking in immigrants is a source of illicit profits for 
organizations that operate on an international scale.
Notes
1. Article VI of the IM F Articles of Agreement provides that “Members 
may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital 
movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner which 
will restrict payments for current transactions.”
2. There has been criticism of the procyclicality of regulation, which the 
new proposals would tend to accentuate, and of the adverse impact this can 
have on risk markets, including those of emerging countries. See Reisen (2001) 
and Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001).
3. See, among others, Blommestein (1995), Culpeper (1995), D ’Arista 
and Griffith-Jones (2001), Feeney (1994), Franklin (1993), and Group of Ten 
(2001) for a more detailed account of the changes that have occurred in the fi­
nancial systems of the main industrialized economies.
4. The Group of Ten (2001) has offered a comprehensive analysis of the 
causes and consequences of this process.
5. Most of these mergers and acquisitions— 70 percent, in fact— correspond 
to banking institutions. In addition, joint ventures and strategic alliances between 
institutions increased significantly.
6. There are many examples of the change of mood vis-à-vis emerging 
markets since the mid-1970s. One of the most outstanding recent examples is 
that of Argentina, which went from “irrational exuberance” up to the Asian 
crisis to “irrational panic” in 2001. Levels of external debt that were consid­
ered manageable up to the late 1990s suddenly became unsustainable to mar­
ket analysts and the access to private financing was, in practice, closed off. As 
the financier George Soros has pointed out, the market has sometimes the ca­
pacity to impose its own views on reality, even when those expectations are ir­
rational. It may be argued that, beyond the fundamental factors that deter­
mined it, the recent Argentinean crisis was not totally alien to such 
“self-fulfilling expectations.”
7. As Bustillo and Velloso (2002) have pointed out, these contagion ef­
fects were stronger for Latin America during the Asian and Russian crisis of 
1997 and 1998 than during the later events in Brazil and Argentina. Nonethe­
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less the 2001 Argentinean crisis had strong effects on other Mercosur members 
and associates. Strong IM F support to Brazil and Uruguay was one of the fac­
tors that helped those countries avoid the meltdown that Argentina faced dur­
ing the last months of 2001 and the first few months of 2 002 , when this coun­
try lacked IM F support and even faced open criticism from that institution.
8 . An extensive range of literature has been produced on this subject. 
Among many other contributions, see Calvo, Arias, Rheinhart, and Talvi 
(2001), Dodd (2001), and Persaud (2000).
9. In the case of banking regulation, the rules on capital and loan loss re­
serves have this effect. In boom periods, increased earnings lead to credit ex­
pansion, which is further facilitated by the fact that debtors tend to make their 
payments on time, which permits creditors to reduce their reserves. During 
economic busts, however, defaults increase, which means that the reserve po­
sition must be strengthened, thereby reducing banks’ profits and thus their 
lending capacity. A number of proposals have been put forward to mitigate 
this procyclical phenomenon (Ocampo 1999, 2002a).
10. The correlation of monthly spreads on Latin American instruments 
and high-yield bonds in the U.S. market was 0.56 in the period from March 
1996 to September 2001 but rose to 0 .79 between September 1997  and 
November 1999.
11. For a detailed analysis of these trends, see UNCTAD (1999) and 
World Bank (1999).
12. For detailed analyses of these trends, see the IM F’s periodic reports on 
emerging markets and ECLAC (2001a).
13. This group consists of Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, M exico, and the Russian Federation.
14. It is true, however, that a smaller proportion of the bilateral financing 
that is pledged for such bailout packages tends to be disbursed than in the case 
of the multilateral financing.
15. This is evident in the policies that the industrial countries adopted in 
an effort to build up their financial institutions after the Second World War. 
These policies varied considerably from one country to another, depending on 
each country’s institutional features and the financial problems it had inher­
ited. In Germany, which had long had a universal banking system closely 
linked to production activities, the authorities decided to reconstruct large pri­
vate universal banks and introduce regulations and incentives so that these 
banks would provide intermediation between private saving and the financing 
needs of production firms. In France, on the other hand, efforts focused on re­
constructing the state banks in view of the prominent role those banks had 
played prior to the war. Japan, too, reorganized its financial system according 
to a credit-based banking structure. It should be recalled that Japan had main­
tained a strong push toward industrialization since the last third of the 19 th 
century, while at the same time establishing a financial system that was mod­
ern and sophisticated in terms of promoting development. The simultaneous 
development in these two areas was not spontaneous, but rather the result of 
deliberate public policies. In fact, Japan’s big banks were of decisive impor­
tance in financing large-scale enterprises under a system based on high lever­
age and low, stable interest rates.
16. A great deal of the recent economic literature highlights the importance 
of financial development for economic growth (see, among others, King and 
Levine 1993; Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Rajan and Zingales
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2001), which adds to the earlier analyses done more than half a century ago 
(such as Gerschenkron 1962; Keynes 1936; Schumpeter 1939). In these stud­
ies, economic development was normally associated with a significant demand 
for resources to finance the accumulation of capital, technological innovation, 
and growth and is linked to the fact that, in modern economies, these resources 
are mobilized through the creation of credit and financial intermediation. It is 
therefore not surprising that all the economies that have succeeded in achiev­
ing sustained growth have also developed financial structures that have en­
abled them to meet financing demands in the short, medium, and long terms 
(see Studart 1995).
17. In the case of the United States, the main country of destination, im­
migration rose to nearly 7.5 million people in the last two decades of the 20th 
century, compared to about 2.5 million in the 1950s and 1.0 million in the 
1940s. However, measured as a proportion of the country’s total population 
and in terms of annual averages, immigrants represented less than 3 percent of 
the population in the last third of the 20th century, which was much lower 
than the percentages recorded between 1870 and 1920 (over 10 percent).

4Inequalities and Asymmetries in the Global Order
Gl o b a l iz a t io n  h a s  n o t  o n l y  engendered growing interdependence; it 
has also given rise to marked international inequalities. Expressed in 
terms of a metaphor widely used in recent debates, the world economy 
is essentially an “uneven playing field” (in contrast to a level playing 
field) whose distinctive characteristics are a concentration of capital 
and technological innovation in industrial countries and the strong 
influence of those countries on trade in goods and services. These 
asymmetries in the global order are at the root of profound interna­
tional inequalities in income distribution.
This chapter analyzes those inequalities and asymmetries, whose 
accurate identification is essential in order to mitigate and, eventually, 
overcome these problems. The first section reviews the empirical evi­
dence on the inequalities existing in global income distribution over 
the last two centuries. The second examines the asymmetries that exist 
between industrial and developing countries and the different ways in 
which these asymmetries have been addressed in the international de­
bate since the Second World War.
Inequalities in Global Income Distribution
Per capita income disparities have been pervasive in the world econ­
omy both between regions and countries and among citizens in each 
society in more developed and less developed countries alike. Although 
there had been a few episodes of convergence in per capita income 
among some developed countries in the past, one of the central features 
of the third stage of globalization is the widening of inequality in both 
dimensions.
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Long-Term  Disparities between Regions and Countries
A widening income gap between different regions and countries has 
been a feature of the world economy for the last two centuries. Indeed, 
whereas per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the more devel­
oped regions of the world was around three times that of the less 
developed regions in the early 19th century, this ratio has grown 
steadily and currently stands at just under 20:1 (see table 4.1). The 
only exception to this trend was the period 1950-73 , in which the dif­
ferential decreased slightly (Madisson 1995, 2001).1
M ajor interregional disparities in per capita GDP were already evi­
dent prior to the First World War, but they intensified rapidly between 
then and the mid-20th century2 and have continued to increase ever 
since, although more slowly. These disparities follow a pattern that 
has been repeated by other indicators of inequality in global income 
distribution. The relatively slower increase in inequality after the Sec­
ond World War coincided with the acceleration of economic growth 
in the developing world, which was one of the distinguishing charac­
teristics of the second stage of globalization. This acceleration, how­
ever, was initially associated with protectionist policies that did not 
give way until much later— the trend began in the 1960s but did not 
really take hold until the 1980s and 1990s—to greater openness and 
participation in global trade (see chapter 2).
Latin America has exhibited a number of distinctive features in this 
connection. First, it was one of the first regions in the developing world 
to join in the trend toward globalization.3 Ever since the initial phases 
of that process, this region, together with Central and Eastern Europe, 
has made up the group of middle-income countries, which has ex­
panded to include several Asian nations in recent decades. Although 
no precise data are available on the subject, the gap in per capita out­
put between this group and the industrial region of the world widened 
between 1820 and 1870 but then stabilized. In fact, the disparity be­
tween the per capita GDP of Latin America and that of the industrial 
region remained constant, hovering in the 2 7 -2 9  percent range, for a 
little more than a century and began to decrease only in 1973, drop­
ping to 23 percent in 1990 and to 22 percent by the end of the 20 th 
century (see table 4.1). In terms of mean global GDP, the disparity in­
creased from 1870 to 1950 and then began to decrease, slowly until 
1973 and more rapidly from 1973 to 1990.
The Latin American countries’ relatively good performance— in 
comparison with that of other developing countries—in the first stage 
of globalization (1870-1913) was followed by similar successes during 
the first phases of “inward-looking development,” which took place at
101
Table 4.1 P a tte rn s  o f  In te r re g io n a l D is p a r it ie s
A rea o f  Disparity 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998
Per capita GDP, by region3
Western Europe 1,232 1,974 3,473 4,594 11,534 15,988 17,921
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United States 1,201 2,431 5 ,257 9,288 16,172 22 ,356 26 ,146
Japan 669 737 1,387 1,926 11,439 18,789 20,413
Asia (excluding Japan) 575 543 640 635 1,231 2 ,117 2,936
Latin America 665 698 1,511 2,554 4,531 5,055 5,795
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 667 917 1,501 2,601 5,729 6,445 4,354
Africa 418 444 585 852 1,365 1,385 1,368
World 667 867 1,510 2,114 4,104 5,154 5,709
Interregional disparities (percentages)
Developing region/industrial region 33.9 18.3 11.1 6.8 7.6 6.2 5.2
Latin America/industrial region 54.0 28.7 28.7 27.5 28.0 22.6 22.2
Latin America/world 99.7 80.5 100.1 120.8 110.4 98.1 101.5
Latin America/developing region 159.1 157.2 258.3 402.2 368.1 365.0 423.6
Regional share of world production (percentages)
Western Europe 23.6 33.6 33.5 26.3 25 .7 22.3 20.6
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United States 1.9 10.2 21.7 30.6 25.3 24.6 25.1
Japan 3.0 2.3 2.6 3.0 7.7 8.6 7.7
Asia (excluding Japan) 56.2 36.0 21.9 15.5 16.4 23.3 29.5
Latin America 2.0 2.5 4.5 7.9 8.7 8.3 8.7
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 8.8 11.7 13.1 13.0 12.9 9.8 5.3
Africa 4.5 3.6 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.1
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: GDP = gross domestic product, 
a. In 1990 Geary-Khamis international US$.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from Maddison (2001).
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a time when the globalization process was stalled at the international 
level. In the second stage of globalization (1945-73), the region expe­
rienced the highest rates of per capita GDP growth in its history, 
although they were nonetheless slightly slower than the global rate.4 
Thus, the most notable characteristic of the period between 1870 and 
1973 was the region’s inability to make steady progress in approach­
ing industrial-country levels. Within this general pattern, some coun­
tries experienced periods of rapid expansion,5 followed by periods of 
much slower growth or even declines. Over this long period, Latin 
America could be described as having stabilized at an intermediate po­
sition within the world context, with individual cases of “truncated 
convergence” rather than divergence from the industrial countries, al­
though divergence did occur in some instances.
In reality, the region began to fall behind only during the third stage 
of globalization (which began in 1973) as it failed to achieve a suffi­
cient degree of integration into the financial globalization process and 
was then overtaken by the ensuing debt crisis. Moreover, its recovery 
from the “lost decade” of the 1980s proved to be a hesitant one. As the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
has shown in various studies, this has been reflected in the fairly dis­
appointing growth rates attained by the region in the wake of its ma­
jor economic reform effort, which began in the 1970s in some coun­
tries and spread throughout the region between the mid-1980s and the 
early 1990s.6
Variations in per capita GDP and differences in population dynam­
ics between the different regions of the world have led to a significant 
skewing of the distribution of world production (see table 4.1). In the 
19th century, the most notable event was the preeminence of Western 
Europe and the emergence of “Western offshoots”— as Maddison 
(1989) called them—in the Americas and Oceania (Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States,) at the expense of Asia. This 
process led to an overwhelming concentration of the world’s produc­
tion of manufactured goods in the main bastions of capitalism. The 
trend reversed itself after the Second World War, but more than half of 
world output is still concentrated in the industrial countries (now in­
cluding Japan), especially in the technology-intensive manufacturing 
and service sectors. Table 4.2 shows the differences in per capita GDP 
between groups of countries. As in the case of interregional disparities, 
the most striking characteristic is the pronounced and sustained increase 
in inequalities across countries. This process also accelerated until 1950 
and then slowed, especially during the second stage of globalization.
The only apparent case of convergence in levels of per capita output 
occurred among industrial countries during this second stage, which
INEQUALITIES AND ASYMMETRIES IN THE GLOBAL ORDER 103
Table 4 .2  Indexes of Per Capita Income Inequality in the 
W orlda
Index 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998
D eviation indexb
Industrial OECD countries 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.22 0.22
34 countries 0.58 0.72
4 8  countries 0.70 0.87
1 4 1  countries 0.96 1.07 1.13 1.22
Developing countries 0.85 0.93 0.94 1.04
Latin America 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.70
M ean logarithm ic deviationc
Industrial OECD countries 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02
34 countries 0.16 0.23
48  countries 0.24 0.33
1 4 1  countries 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.65
Developing countries 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.51
Latin America 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.21
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic Devel-
opment and Co-operation.
a. In 1990 Geary-Khamis international US$.
b. Standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita GDP.
c. Average of the logarithms of the mean ratio of per capita GDP/per capita GDP 
of each country.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from Maddison (2001).
was their “golden age” (see table 4.2). This phenomenon has been the 
subject of several detailed studies (see, among others, Maddison
1991). The process proceeded steadily until 1990, albeit at a slower 
pace, but then came to a halt in the final decade of the 20th century. A 
historical period in which wage convergence was clearly occurring was 
the first stage of globalization in the second half of the 19th century. 
O ’Rourke and Williamson (1999) have demonstrated that during this 
period, the United States and Europe witnessed a convergence of wage 
levels, basically as a result of the mass migration of European labor to 
the New World. Within Western Europe, this process of wage equal­
ization also occurred between several of what were then peripheral 
countries (especially Austria, the Scandinavian countries, and to a 
lesser extent Ireland and Italy) and the most industrial countries 
(France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). How­
ever, the same authors also note that the process did not encompass 
other countries of the European periphery (the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries, with the
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exception of Italy) or other regions of the world. Hence, even within 
the group of countries that today make up the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), there was a slight 
divergence in the trend of per capita GDP, and this divergence appears 
to have been greater when considered in the context of a wider group 
of countries (see table 4.2).
This subject has been examined thoroughly in the literature on eco­
nomic growth in the last quarter century.7 In general, these analyses 
confirm that there was no worldwide convergence of per capita in­
come levels in the sense in which the term is used in this book. To use 
the terminology of the literature, there was no “unconditional conver­
gence.” However, various studies indicate that there is some statistical 
evidence of “conditional convergence,” in which other factors that in­
fluence the growth of countries are taken into account, including the 
education level of the population; infrastructure; macroeconomic sta­
bility; and the level of development of political, social, and economic 
institutions. These determinants of economic growth are distributed 
just as unequally as per capita GDP, or even more so. This fact has led 
some authors to question the validity of the concept of “conditional 
convergence.”
Table 4.3 illustrates another phenomenon that differs completely 
from those described above: the marked and growing dispersion of 
growth rates among the developing countries during the last quarter of 
the 20th century— in other words, the increasing number of “winners” 
and “losers” among developing nations. This dispersion increased just 
as much in the period 1973-90  as it did in the 1990s. This trend has 
been much more widespread than the trend toward greater interna­
tional disparities in per capita GDP; indeed, it has affected all regions
Table 4.3  Standard Deviation of Per Capita GDP Growtha
Countries 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1990 1990-1998
OECD 0.37 0.62 1.53 0.59 1.16
34 countries 0.54 1.04
48 countries 1.01 2.76
1 4 1  countries 1.73 2.35 2.95
Developing 1.69 2.50 3.09
countries
Latin America 1.50 1.43 2.15
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development.
a. In 1990 Geary-Khamis international US$.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from Maddison (2001).
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and both low- and middle-income countries. Within countries, a simi­
lar differentiation has occurred across both different social sectors and 
different geographic regions.
Undoubtedly, all these factors contribute to the tremendous uncer­
tainty about the future that exists in contemporary society. This inse­
curity places further demands on the international system and on the 
social safety nets of each country, in addition to the more traditional 
demands for a reversal of the trend toward greater distributional in­
equality.
Overall Effect o f International and National Inequality
Several recent studies offer a much more detailed view of trends in in­
ternational inequality. Figure 4.1 shows the results of Milanovic’s 
(2002) study on disparities in population-weighted per capita GDP.
Figure 4.1  International Inequality, Weighted by Population, 
1 9 5 0 -9 8
A. World
B. Excluding China and India
Source: Milanovic (2002).
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The calculations are highly sensitive to the inclusion of China and In­
dia, given their extremely large populations. Both of these countries 
registered relatively little economic growth during the second stage of 
globalization (1945-73) but rank among the most successful countries 
during the third stage (1973 to the present). When these two countries 
are excluded, it appears that the international disparities between the 
mean values lessened substantially from the 1950s to the 1970s, al­
though they widened considerably later, in the last two decades of the 
20th century. However, when China and India are included in the 
analysis, the results are quite different. Indeed, their excellent per­
formance in recent decades counterbalances the adverse distributional 
trend seen in the rest of the world.
The study by Bourguignon and M orrison (2002) examined the 
combined effect of trends in disparities between countries and in­
equalities within them.8 This analysis uses a broader concept of world 
inequality, according to which the units of analysis are not countries, 
but their inhabitants. Based on this concept, the authors concluded 
that international inequalities increased significantly between 1820 
and 1910, remained stable from 1910 to 1960, and grew again from 
1960 to 1992 (see figure 4.2). Up to 1910, the dominant aspect of this 
process was the deepening of international disparities, which increased 
quite sharply until the mid-20th century. However, during the period 
associated with a reversal of the globalization process (1914-50), this 
trend coincided with an improvement in income distribution within 
countries, which curbed the further growth of international inequality.
Figure 4 .2  Global Income Inequality, 1 8 2 0 -1 9 9 2
0 .90  -,
Global inequality
0.80
g  0.70 Inequality 
between countriesB 0 .60<uo
1  0.40
CT
,s  0 .30
£  0 .20H
0.10
0.00
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 200 0
Source: Bourguignon and M orrison (2002).
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This improvement was linked both to the emergence of the “welfare 
state” in the United States and Western Europe and to the socialist rev­
olutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The trend toward an amplifi­
cation of international inequalities in recent decades, on the other 
hand, can be attributed not only to moderate growth in international 
disparities, but also to a sharp increase in inequalities within countries.
The combination of these two trends is, in fact, one of the hallmarks 
of the third stage of globalization (see U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD] 1997; U.N. Development Programme 
[UNDP] 1999a; and Milanovic 1999). Indeed, several studies have 
shown that the relative stability of inequality within countries that 
marked the world economy in the decades after the Second World War 
(see Deininger and Squire 1996) was followed by a steady upward 
trend in inequality during the last quarter of the 20th century. Cornia’s 
(1999) figures are very informative (see table 4.4). According to his 
analysis, 57 percent of the population included in a sample of 77 na­
tions lived in countries that exhibited growing inequality in income 
distribution during the period 1975-95 . Only 16 percent lived in na­
tions where inequality decreased. The rest of the population lived in 
countries that had stable levels of inequality or in countries for which 
no trends could be discerned. These general trends were observed, with 
some variations, across the major regions of the industrial, transi­
tional, and developing worlds.
In the case of the industrial countries, the trend toward an increas­
ingly unequal distribution of income was more marked, because 
72 percent of the population lived in countries where the gap was
Table 4 .4  W orld Trend in Income Inequality, 1 9 7 5 -9 5
(Percentages o f  population)







N o identifiable  
trend
Africa 31.6 11.9 7.7 48.8
East Asia 79.4 4.4 16.1 0.1
Eastern Europe 98.1 0.0 0.0 1.9
Industrial countries 71.8 1.2 27.0 0.0
Latin America 83.8 0.0 11.4 4.8
South Asia and
Middle East 1.4 70.2 14.4 14.0
Former Soviet Union 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
World 56.6 22.1 15.6 5.7
Source: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from Cornia (1999).
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widening. This relatively widespread deterioration in income distribu­
tion did not occur in the industrial world during the two earlier stages 
of globalization.9 According to several analyses (Atkinson 1996, 1999; 
Cornia 1999), inequality rose because of an expanding wage gap, 
caused mainly by the erosion of institutions for the protection of labor, 
coupled with technical progress that favored more highly skilled work­
ers, although trade liberalization may also have been a contributing 
factor. Some authors (Wood 1998) have attached more importance to 
this last element. Industrial countries in which centralized institutions 
continued to be responsible for wage setting (e.g., Germany and Italy) 
and those that placed greater emphasis on the role of labor organiza­
tions and on upholding the minimum wage (e.g., France) were able to 
blunt these factors’ tendency to heighten existing levels of inequality. 
The greatest increases in the inequality of income distribution took 
place in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, where wage negotiations are carried out in a decentralized man­
ner and labor markets are more flexible.
The developing and transition countries displayed a more heteroge­
neous pattern. The greatest deterioration in these areas occurred in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially those of the former 
Soviet Union (see also UNDP 1999b). East Asia also registered greater 
degrees of inequality, mainly as a result of the widening gap between 
levels of development in urban and coastal areas of China, on the one 
hand, and rural areas and the interior, on the other. However, East 
Asia was also the developing region in which the highest proportion of 
the population lived in countries where inequality was on the decline. 
In contrast, most of the population of Africa, the Middle East, and 
southern Asia lived in countries where either indexes of inequality re­
mained unchanged or there was no clearly identifiable pattern. In all 
these regions, the existence of sharp inequalities was associated with 
disparities between rural and urban areas.
In Latin America, the vast majority of the population lived in coun­
tries in which the inequality of income distribution increased in the last 
quarter of the 20th century. In general, as indicated in several ECLAC 
studies (1997, 2000b , 2001b , and 2001c), the upward trend in 
inequality seen in the 1980s was not reversed in the 1990s. On the con­
trary, in the 1990s the number of countries that witnessed a deteriora­
tion in income distribution rose. One explanation for this trend is the 
asymmetric nature of trends in poverty and income distribution in the 
different phases of the business cycle: the debt crisis had a devastating 
effect on the poorest sectors, but the subsequent resumption of growth 
was not accompanied by a commensurate rise in income in these sec­
tors (Cornia 1999; La Fuente and Sáinz 2001). The growing wage gap
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between skilled and unskilled workers, and especially between work­
ers with and without a university education, appears to be one of the 
main effects of the economic liberalization process (see Berry 1998; 
ECLAC 1997, 2000b, 2001b, 2001c; Morley 2000).
This global state of affairs suggests that new factors— in combina­
tion with more traditional ones, such as the distribution of assets and 
access to education— are strongly influencing income inequality. 
These new factors, which are associated with the third stage of glob­
alization and with some of the national policy approaches that have 
accompanied it, are a reduction in earned income as a proportion of 
total income and a simultaneous increase in business profits and fi­
nancial returns, growing skill-based wage differentials, and erosion of 
the state’s redistributive capacity. The impact of these factors varies 
from region to region and even across countries within the same 
region.
Finally, national income distribution structures reflect very dissim­
ilar regional situations. Latin America has the most unequal income 
distribution in the world (see figure 4.3), followed by the countries of 
Africa and the second generation of newly industrial countries in East­
ern Asia. The next group consists of the countries of southern Asia, 
those of the former Soviet Union, those of North Africa, the first gen­
eration of newly industrial countries in Asia, and the Anglo-Saxon 
OECD countries. The last group, which has the best income distribu­
tion, comprises the other members of OECD and the countries of Cen­
tral Europe (Palma 2001).
The existence of a highly unequal distribution of income is an 
important consideration not only because of the ethical and political 
problems it poses, but also because of its implications for economic 
growth (Solimano 2 0 01). Although the reciprocal relationships 
between growth and equity have long been a subject of controversy, 
in recent years numerous studies have highlighted the negative effects 
of inequality on economic growth—the so-called inequality trap (see 
ECLAC 1992b; Ros 2000; Stewart 2000 ; and the review of recent lit­
erature by Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa 1999). The tremen­
dous distributional inequalities found in several regions of the devel­
oping world, especially Latin America, may thus help account for 
international differentials in development levels or the blockage of 
convergence factors. Inequality as an obstacle to growth was a 
favorite topic of economic debate in the 1960s, and it has awakened 
new interest in recent years. However, unlike the debates of that ear­
lier period (which focused on whether the concentration of income 
impeded the development of domestic markets or whether, on the 
contrary, it facilitated capital accumulation), the current analyses are
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Figure 4.3 In e q u a lity  a n d  Per C a p ita  In c o m e
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Source: Palma (2001).
paying more attention to the implications of inequality in terms of 
political economy. The linkages between inequality and political econ­
omy encompass a number of different aspects, including the relation­
ship between social cohesion and investment risk; the interaction 
between business and political cycles, which can undermine the sus­
tainability of public decisions, particularly in the fiscal area; and the 
positive impact that a more equal distribution of production assets 
can have on human capital formation and the development of small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). All of these processes are facili­
tated by a more smoothly operating capital market and by greater ac­
cess to that market.
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Taken together, the foregoing considerations leave no doubt as to 
the existence of a definite trend toward distributional inequality world­
wide, both across and within countries. At the international level, there 
is no evidence whatsoever that income levels are converging. When 
convergence has occurred, it has done so only among industrial coun­
tries and only at specific stages in the evolution of the world economy. 
Trends toward divergence in development levels, truncated conver­
gence, and stagnation in mean income levels have been much more 
common. By contrast, the deterioration of income distribution within 
countries has been widespread in recent decades.
These conclusions suggest the need for caution when examining re­
cent analyses that downplay the second stage of globalization’s favor­
able effects on the developing countries because of their belated and 
limited integration into the world economy, even as they emphasize 
the advantages some of them have gained through greater liberaliza­
tion and integration in recent decades (World Bank 2002b). In fact, the 
relative isolation of the developing countries during the second stage 
of the globalization process coincided with a general acceleration in 
the rate of economic growth throughout the developing world— for 
the first time in history— as well as reductions in some indicators of 
international inequality (between regions and countries). As we noted 
in chapter 2, this positive assessment does not mean that the problems 
associated with the development process at that stage should be over­
looked. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the most recent stage of 
globalization has been marked by increasing inequality at the interna­
tional and national levels, even though, at the world level, this trend 
has been less pronounced than it was in the 19 th century and the first 
half of the 20th (thanks, undoubtedly, to the economic success of 
China and India).
Basic Asymmetries in the Global Order
The persistence and exacerbation of international inequalities in 
development levels described in the preceding pages have been the sub­
ject of considerable debate ever since the Second World War. This 
debate arose at a time when the concept of economic development was 
gaining prominence on the international agenda as the world strove to 
build a new community of nations. From the very inception of the 
United Nations, economic and social development and peace have 
been considered vital and interrelated elements in the construction of 
a new world order. A third such element that serves as their ethical 
foundation is the defense of human rights (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss
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2001). These elements characterize the prevailing vision in the United 
Nations to this day (Annan 2000, 2001).
Debates about development have revolved around two schools of 
thought: one that sees development or a lack thereof as essentially a 
consequence of national forces and another that, although it recog­
nizes the importance of these factors, points to elements at the inter­
national level that tend to engender or perpetuate existing inequalities. 
This discussion is similar to the controversy about the determinants of 
social inequalities at the national level, which has been widely debated 
in the social sciences and in political circles. In this debate, one side 
views inequality as an effect of differences in individual effort, whereas 
the other side believes that a lack of true equality of opportunity has a 
decisive impact.
ECLAC has taken the second position in both of these debates. This 
stance is rooted in an awareness of the fact that true equality of 
opportunity does not exist in the real world, either at the national or 
the international level. Consequently, market mechanisms tend to re­
produce, and sometimes exacerbate, existing inequalities. As noted 
earlier in reference to the international sphere, this acknowledgment of 
inequality should not be construed as an attempt to disregard the 
importance of national policies. On the contrary, a recognition of the 
fundamental role of national factors is entirely consistent with the idea 
that institution building, social cohesion, and the accumulation of hu­
man capital and technological capacity are essentially endogenous 
processes— an idea that is deeply ingrained in the thinking of ECLAC. 
This position is also consonant with the fundamental importance that 
ECLAC attaches to national efforts aimed at achieving a sound macro­
economy, dynamic productive development, greater equity, and envi­
ronmental sustainability, together with the active involvement of soci­
ety as a whole in shaping the public interest (ECLAC 2000a).
The fundamental role played by the international structure, how­
ever, has to do with the way it influences what opportunities will be 
available to countries and what risks they will face, as well as the 
effectiveness of national efforts to maximize the benefits of integration 
into the world economy. Just as the state must take redistributive 
action at the national level to ensure equality of opportunity, national 
efforts can fully succeed at the global level only if they are comple­
mented by equitable and stable rules of the game, together with inter­
national cooperation designed to put an end to the basic asymmetries 
of the global order. These asymmetries fall into three basic categories:
(a) extreme concentration of technical progress in industrial countries,
(b) developing countries’ greater macroeconomic vulnerability, and
(c) high capital mobility and low labor mobility.
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Extrem e Concentration o f Technical Progress 
in Industrial Countries
The first asymmetry is the extreme concentration of technical progress 
in industrial countries, which is the factor that all schools of economic 
thought identify as the primary source of economic growth in those 
countries. This concentration means that not only are research and de­
velopment as such concentrated in those countries, but so are the pro­
duction segments and activities that are most closely linked to techno­
logical change— sectors that are highly dynamic components of world 
trade flows and of the international production structure and that re­
ceive high innovation rents (see chapter 2). The growth impulses gen­
erated by technical progress originating in the countries of the “cen­
ter” are transmitted to the “periphery” through four main channels: 
derived demand for raw materials; relocation to developing countries 
of production sectors considered to be “mature” in industrial coun­
tries; technology transfer per se, including technologies embedded in 
production equipment; and the possible participation of developing 
countries in the most dynamic production domains.
The main problems that arise in this area stem from the fact that, as 
Prebisch (1951, p. 3) affirmed in his classic work, “The spread of tech­
nical progress from the countries where it had its source to the rest of 
the world has . . . been relatively slow and irregular.” This spread is slow 
because all of these mechanisms are subject to constraints or costs. In 
general, demand for raw materials is not income elastic, and because 
the entry cost associated with the corresponding activities is low, de­
mand is often affected by downward pressure on prices, especially dur­
ing periods of diminished global activity (see chapter 2, box 2.1). The 
mature industrial sectors have narrow margins and low entry costs. 
Their low entry costs may also lead to a sharp deterioration in profits 
and prices, much like what occurs in the case of raw materials during 
times of slow growth. The protectionist pressures generated by indus­
trial countries are also concentrated in these two sets of sectors.
In addition, economies of scale and external economies, which have 
been the focus of the classic literature on urban and regional develop­
ment and of more recent studies on international trade, may give rise 
to agglomeration economies that tend to lead to the polarization— 
rather than the convergence— of development levels.10 This is one of 
the arguments highlighted by the various proponents of classical theo­
ries of economic development.11
In addition, technology transfers are subject to the payment of 
innovation rents, which are increasingly protected by the universaliza­
tion of strict regulations concerning intellectual property rights.
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Because of the “tacit” nature of technology— that is, the fact that it 
cannot be fully specified because it is so closely linked to the collective 
human capital accumulated by innovating companies— it may not be 
easy to transfer, or its transference may be attractive only if it occurs 
through transnational corporations’ networks of subsidiaries. The 
production of knowledge is the epitome of an activity subject to strong 
agglomeration economies, as indicated by its overwhelming concen­
tration at the world level. Developing countries therefore have very 
limited opportunities to participate in the most dynamic areas of 
activity, or else their participation is concentrated in low-skill areas 
(e.g., the assembly of electronic products in export assembly plants). 
What is more, the external economies linked to education and knowl­
edge can, by themselves, hinder any trend toward convergence in pro­
ductivity levels, as has been pointed out in the literature on endoge­
nous growth.12 Technological development also requires substantial 
government subsidies, a situation that rewards greater fiscal capacity 
as well as, perhaps, the less urgent nature of competing demands for 
the use of public resources in industrial countries.
The combined effect of these factors accounts for the trend toward 
the stagnation of mean income levels and the truncated convergence or 
outright divergence of income levels, in place of the convergence pos­
tulated by conventional theories of economic growth. In fact, the 
divergence of development levels has persisted despite the impressive in­
dustrialization process undertaken in many developing countries over 
the last half century and, in Latin America, even before that. Although 
this process has translated into a more diversified production structure 
in the developing world, except in the most backward regions, at the 
global level the production structure has continued to exhibit major 
asymmetries: an intensive and continuing concentration of technical 
progress in industrial countries (see box 4.1), their sustained predom­
inance in intellectual property registrations13 in the most dynamic seg­
ments and activities of international trade, and their preeminent posi­
tion in the founding of large transnational corporations (see table 4.6).
Thus, the economic opportunities available to developing countries 
continue to be determined largely by their position in the international 
hierarchy. Certainly, “technical progress” has spread from the center 
through the aforementioned channels, but this transfer continues to be 
“relatively slow and irregular,” and its fruits have been distributed 
unequally in the developing countries. Few countries— or sectors or 
companies within them— are able to move fast enough to catch up to 
the moving target represented by the world technological frontier 
(Pérez 2001); many others succeed only in advancing at the same rate 
as the frontier, and not a few are left behind altogether (Katz 2001).
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Box 4.1  W orld Distribution of Research and 
Development Activities
Empirical evidence shows that the richer a country (or region) is in both 
absolute and relative terms (in per capita gross domestic product, or 
GDP), the more likely it is to undertake research and development (R& D) 
projects. In addition, as involvement in such activities increases, so does 
the probability that the country or region will engage in more technolog­
ically sophisticated and capital-intensive projects, possibly in association 
with other countries and regions.
And in fact, industrial countries account for 8 4 .4  percent of gross 
expenditure on research and development (GERD) and a somewhat 
smaller percentage of scientific researchers and engineers (71.6 percent) 
(see table 4 .5 ). Other indicators paint a more dramatic picture of the ex­
isting asymmetries between industrial and developing countries: the ratio 
of GERD per capita is 19:1, the ratio of the number of scientific re­
searchers and engineers per capita is 7 :1 , and GERD per researcher is 
more than double. This last indicator points not only to sharp differences 
in remuneration (whose share of GERD ranges from one-half to two- 
thirds), but also to a wide disparity in terms of the financial resources, in­
struments, and equipment available for these activities.
As noted in the Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowl­
edge, “Most of the benefits of science are unevenly distributed, as a result 
of structural asymmetries among countries, regions and social groups, and 
between the sexes. As scientific knowledge has become a crucial factor in 
the production of wealth, so its distribution has become more inequitable. 
What distinguishes the poor (be it people or countries) from the rich is not 
only that they have fewer assets, but also that they are largely excluded 
from the creation and the benefits of scientific knowledge” (Declaration 
adopted at the UNESCO World Conference on Science for the Twenty- 
First Century, paragraph 5, Budapest, Hungary, 2001).
Developing Countries’ Greater M acroeconomic 
Vulnerability
A second type of asymmetry is associated with the developing coun­
tries’ greater macroeconomic vulnerability to external shocks, which 
also strains these countries’ lesser and very limited means of coping 
with them. Vulnerability to such shocks has tended to increase with 
the greater financial integration that has characterized the third stage 
of globalization, as have trade vulnerabilities, which have persisted or 
intensified as a result of fluctuations in demand and the terms of trade. 
The increased instability of economic growth in developing countries
Table 4 .5  World Distribution of Expenditures in R & D  and Number of Researchers, 1 9 9 6 -9 7
G roups an d  countries





% w orld  
G ERD




N um ber in 
thousands
% w orld  
total
Per million  
inhabitants
World 547 100.0 1.8 100 5,189 100.0 946 105
Developing countries 86 15.6 0.6 20 1,476 28.4 347 58
Industrial countries 461 84.4 2.2 377 3,713 71.6 3,033 124
M em o
Africa 4 0.7 0.3 6 132 2.5 211 29
Asian NIEs 27 4.9 1.1 66 241 4.6 595 111
Central and Eastern Europe 6 1.0 0.8 49 168 3.2 1,451 33
China 21 3.9 0.6 17 552 10.6 454 38
European Union 138 25.2 1.9 370 825 15.9 2,211 167
India 11 2.0 0.7 11 143 2.8 151 76
Japan 83 15.2 2.8 661 817 15.8 6,498 102
Latin America 17 3.1 0.5 34 348 6.7 715 48
Russian Federation 6 1.0 0.9 39 562 10.8 3,802 10
United States 199 36.4 2.6 750 981 18.9 3,697 203
N ote: GERD = gross expenditure on research and development; NIEs =  newly industrialized economies; SPPP =  dollars with purchasing power 
parity; R & D  = research and development.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of data from UNESCO (2001).
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Figure 4 .4  Instability of Economic Growth
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during the third stage of globalization is a reflection of this fact (see fig­
ure 4.4).
The existing financial asymmetries stem from four characteristics 
of developing countries: (a) the currencies in which their foreign debt 
is denominated, (b) the maturity structures offered on financial mar­
kets, (c) the scope of secondary markets, and (d) the highly disadvan­
tageous relationship between the size of developing-country financial 
markets and the speculative pressures they face. As a result of the first 
three of these features, agents that have access to international mar­
kets (governments and large firms) must contend with currency mis­
matches, whereas those that do not have access to international mar­
kets (SMEs) are affected by maturity mismatches, and it is generally 
impossible to have a financial structure that avoids both risks at the 
same time. These mismatches mean that developing-country financial 
markets are much more incomplete than international markets and, 
consequently, that some financial intermediation must necessarily 
take place in the international market. This state of affairs also points 
to the fact that international financial integration is an example of 
integration between unequal partners (ECLAC 2000a, 2001a; Studart 
1996).
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The existence of these macroeconomic asymmetries is attributable 
to the fact that the international currencies in use today are those of 
the industrial countries and to the procyclical nature of capital flows 
to developing countries. This pattern is linked to the perception that, 
with few exceptions, the developing countries are high-risk markets 
that are subject to sharp financial cycles in which phases marked by a 
greater appetite for risk alternate with droughts triggered by a flight to 
quality (see chapter 3).
The effect of all these factors is a very sharp macroeconomic asym­
metry. Whereas the industrial countries have greater freedom to adopt 
countercyclical policies14 that help stabilize financial markets, the de­
veloping economies have virtually no breathing space, because their fi­
nancial markets tend to intensify cyclical fluctuations and market 
agents expect the authorities to behave procyclically.
From a historical perspective, the industrial countries have largely 
succeeded in exempting themselves from the rules of the game associ­
ated with the gold standard, but those rules have continued to deter­
mine the macroeconomic behavior of developing countries. The 
industrial countries’ freedom from those restrictions came with the gold 
standard’s abandonment in the 1930s. Since then, they have main­
tained a high degree of autonomy within the framework of the inter­
national macroeconomic agreements associated with the second and 
third stages of globalization. The developing countries, on the other 
hand, remained subject to strong external macroeconomic constraints 
during the second stage of globalization, whereas in the third they 
have become increasingly vulnerable to financial volatility. This vul­
nerability to fluctuations has translated into an increase in the center- 
periphery macroeconomic asymmetries already evident in the late 19th 
century during the heyday of the gold standard (Aceña and Reis 2000; 
Triffin 1968).
These asymmetries have become glaringly evident during the fre­
quent crises suffered by developing countries in recent decades, when 
markets have pressured them to adopt “depression (m acroeconom ­
ics,” as Krugman (1999) put it. More specifically, the developing 
economies’ main response to global financial instability has been a ten­
dency to alternate between phases of “boom macroeconomics” and 
“depression macroeconomics” (ECLAC 2000a, 2001a). Since the Sec­
ond World War, multilateral macroeconomic and financial agree­
ments have offered some temporary relief at critical junctures, but 
their scope has been relatively limited in comparison with the financial 
shocks that the developing countries have had to grapple with, and 
their application is invariably subject to the adoption of austerity mea­
sures. Moreover, they have not induced countries to take preventive
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measures during economic booms. This issue has been the focus of 
increasing attention in the international debate sparked by the Asian 
crisis.
High Capital Mobility and Low Labor Mobility
There is also a third type of asymmetry associated with the contrast 
between the current high degree of capital mobility and the restrictions 
placed on international movements of labor, especially among low- 
skilled workers. This asymmetry is a distinctive feature of the third 
stage of globalization; it was not observed in the first stage (when la­
bor was highly mobile) or the second stage (when both factors showed 
little mobility). As Rodrik (1997) pointed out, the asymmetries exist­
ing in the international mobility of production factors skew the distri­
bution of income, placing the less mobile factors at a disadvantage. In 
addition, these asymmetries have a disproportionate effect on devel­
oping countries owing to the relative abundance of low-skilled labor 
in those countries. The limited international mobility of low labor 
costs also tends to help create a glut on international markets for goods 
that are produced mainly by developing countries, which typically 
have low entry costs.
Leveling the playing field by regulatory means does not eliminate 
these asymmetries; on the contrary, it may end up making them worse, 
both because of the different countries’ widely varying levels of insti­
tutional capacity for assimilating and enforcing such regulations and 
because of the differing effects that such regulations have on industrial 
and developing countries. Indeed, the high cost of building the 
national institutions needed to implement the Marrakesh Agreement, 
which established the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been 
regarded as one of its main flaws.
The distribution of the costs and benefits of leveling the playing field 
by regulatory means is also clearly unequal, especially because the poli­
cies and standards whose application is being extended to the global 
level are those of the industrial countries. Protection of intellectual 
property is the most conspicuous case. Regardless of its virtues in terms 
of creating incentives for world technological development, the benefits 
of protecting intellectual property rights accrue mainly to the industrial 
countries, where the bulk of new technology is generated (see table 4.6). 
The W TO subsidies code rewards the industrial countries for their 
greater fiscal capacity to allocate resources for authorized purposes 
while, on the other hand, prohibiting the use of alternative instruments 
that have no fiscal costs (tariffs, investment and export performance 
requirements, and free trade zones) and that have been used extensively
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Table 4 .6  International Asymmetries: Share of Developing 
Countries in the W orld Economy
(Percentages o f  the w orld  total)
B asic in form ation 1990 1999
Population 84.0 85.0
Gross domestic product (current US$) 22.3 23.8
Gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) 43.6 46.9
Gross fixed capital formation (1995 US$) 23.9 24.0
Industrial value added, 1998 (1995 US$) 27.5




Utility models 15.3 44.4
Plant varieties 7.0 17.8
500 largest firms 1999





Market quotas by categories of technology intensiveness 1985 2000
Primary products 62.0 59.6
Resource-based manufactures 31.3 31.8
Low-technology manufactures 33.6 50.3
Midlevel-technology manufactures 10.8 21.4
High-technology manufactures 16.8 36.6
Other transactions 28.8 41.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis 
of data from the World Bank (2001a); Fortune magazine, “America’s Largest Corpo­
rations, 2001”; and Patent Information Services in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (www.wipo.org).
by developing countries. The regulations on agriculture facilitate the 
industrial countries’ traditional forms of protection (tariffs and quotas) 
and reward them for being the only countries with the fiscal capacity to 
devote a considerable volume of resources to subsidizing agriculture. 
Prohibiting the application of local content requirements to foreign 
investors in developing countries runs counter to the general acceptance 
of rules of origin, which constitute another form of local content 
requirement because they force producers to use inputs of a specified 
origin in order to qualify for a preferential tariff.
This situation has a parallel in the financial arena. As has been made 
clear in the recent debate surrounding the Basel agreement on banking
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regulation, the establishment of more rigorous standards or the appli­
cation of internal bank standards to lender ratings may reduce the sup­
ply of funds on markets carrying high risk ratings, which include the 
developing countries as well as SMEs in all countries (Griffith-Jones 
and Spraat 2001 ; Reisen 2001). In addition, the establishment of 
mandatory debt workout mechanisms, unless accompanied by a suffi­
cient supply of official emergency credits, may drive up these coun­
tries’ borrowing costs.
It should be noted that this regulatory leveling of the playing field is 
unique to the current stage of globalization; no attempt was made to 
carry out this type of process in either of the prior stages. In fact, dur­
ing those periods the industrial countries frequently relied on produc­
tive development instruments whose use is not permitted in the devel­
oping countries (see Chang 2001, 2002).
The Rise and Fall o f International Cooperation 
for Development
The creation of international institutions to regulate the interdepen­
dent relations among states was one of the innovative developments 
in international law to occur in the 20th century. Indeed, until the 
beginning of that century, the purpose of the rules established under 
international law was to ensure the sovereignty of nations. States 
defended their full autonomy in the conduct of matters related to their 
national interests, and they ardently opposed any limitation of this 
principle. In reality, however, these principles of autonomy applied 
only to the imperial powers and to independent nations possessing 
considerable military power, because in many cases bilateral agree­
ments between nations having unequal degrees of power limited the 
autonomy of the less powerful nation. Agreements in the 19th cen­
tury that opened up China and Japan to international trade and 
imposed the principles of free trade on the Ottoman Empire were clear 
examples of this phenomenon, as were, in an even more extreme 
manner, colonial expansion and military occupation of foreign 
territories.
In any case, the increase in international trade and financial trans­
actions called for the formulation of new rules and the creation of new 
institutions to ensure that international markets could operate effi­
ciently and that nations could settle disputes without resorting to 
force. However, as pointed out earlier, these institutions were based on 
the existing balance of power among the major states. It was not until 
after the Second World War, with the creation of the United Nations 
and the adoption of the principle of decolonization, that developing 
countries begin to enjoy respect for their autonomy and their right to
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express their views in international forums. This recognition allowed 
them to begin to help build international institutions and to gain access 
to formal mechanisms for voicing their opinions about the asym­
metries in the global order. This shift in international power relations, 
together with the bipolar confrontation that continued for several 
decades thereafter, formed the global political framework that shaped 
the evolution of international cooperation for development. The chief 
elements of this process were the emergence of official development as­
sistance (ODA) and the introduction of the principle of special and dif­
ferentiated treatment for developing countries in trade agreements.
This change was brought about through the efforts of economists, 
thinkers, and political figures to formulate the concept of economic de­
velopment, which was then extended to include the sphere of interna­
tional economic law. Legal experts recognized that, as at the domestic 
level, the application of the same conditions to vastly different eco­
nomic and social situations resulted in greater inequalities. For a num­
ber of years, international economic law was conceived of as a com­
pensatory mechanism for protecting weaker states from stronger ones 
by granting more rights to the former and imposing greater obligations 
on the latter. On the basis of this notion of international “affirmative 
action” for development, the governments of the developing countries 
endeavored to introduce and operationalize the development dimen­
sion in multilateral forums.
In the years following the Second World War, the reconstruction of 
Europe took clear priority, and international cooperation for develop­
ment was relegated to a position of secondary importance. This em­
phasis was reflected both in the origins of the World Bank and, espe­
cially, in the priority attached to the Marshall Plan. The Latin 
American countries’ failure to win approval for the implementation of 
a program in the region along the lines of the Marshall Plan was also 
a reflection of the priorities of that time. The region’s interests did not, 
in fact, meet with a favorable response until the late 1950s, with the 
creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, and early 1960s, 
when the Alliance for Progress was launched.
This period in the region’s history paralleled, to a certain extent, 
what was occurring at the international level. International develop­
ment cooperation and the debates that surrounded it gathered consid­
erable momentum in the 1950s and reached their zenith in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when UNCTAD was established, the generalized system of 
preferences was put in place, progress was made in promoting ODA, 
the United Nations introduced its international development strategy, 
and the dialogue on the new international economic order com­
menced. Nevertheless, the debates and activities that took place in
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those years did so within a context of international polarization, and 
the actual progress achieved was fairly modest.
The breakdown of the debate on the new international economic 
order in the early 1980s ushered in a radically different period. Those 
years were marked by waning interest in ODA; the “graduation” of 
the developing (especially middle-income) countries; a growing em­
phasis on regulatory standardization, to the detriment of the principles 
of special and differential treatment; and the promotion of uniform 
structural reforms within the framework of an excessive amplification 
of conditionality by the Bretton Woods institutions. Under this new 
paradigm, the chief objective of efforts to reorder the international 
economy was to guarantee equitable conditions (a level playing field) 
that would ensure the efficient operation of free market forces. In this 
context, the principal gains for the developing countries would be the 
possible dismantling of the protectionist measures used by industrial 
countries in “sensitive” sectors and the assurance of an export-led 
form of development within an international trading system based on 
clear and stable rules. According to this line of thinking, the correction 
of international asymmetries would be based exclusively on the recog­
nition of the international community’s responsibility to the develop­
ing countries. This was tantamount to a replication at the international 
level of the social policy strategy of targeting the poorest sectors as 
beneficiaries of state action. Here again, the developing countries’ 
gains during this period were no more than moderate.
The evolution of trade relations between industrial and developing 
countries clearly illustrates this shift in the principles of international 
development cooperation. From 1948 to 1955—in the early years of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)— the developing 
countries participated in the negotiations on an equal footing, with the 
same rights and obligations as the other parties. What is more, the first 
six rounds of GATT negotiations focused on intraindustry specializa­
tion within industrial economies, and the areas in which internal ad­
justments would be required in order to respond to possible competition 
from developing countries (liberalization of trade in agricultural prod­
ucts, textiles, and clothing, among others) were taken off the agenda and 
were not addressed by multilateral trade rules. As pointed out by Tussie 
(1987, 1988), intraindustry specialization made it possible for these 
countries to overcome some of the more painful aspects of their adjust­
ment to changing patterns of international trade. Instead of causing pro­
duction to contract and industries to emigrate to other countries, the 
change could be managed on an intrafirm basis or, at least, within each 
industry. None of the countries engaging in intraindustry specialization 
had to cease production or let its control slip from their hands.
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In 1958, a decade after the inception of GATT, the Haberler report 
(GATT 1958) concluded that the barriers imposed by the industrial 
countries on imports from developing countries were the main cause 
of their trade problems.15 This report served as the basis for the cre­
ation of Committee III of GATT, which was given responsibility for 
identifying trade measures that restricted exports from the developing 
countries and for devising a program to reduce those barriers. In 1963, 
after the committee had been working for five years without making 
any apparent progress, the developing countries succeeded in passing 
a resolution within GATT calling for an action program to freeze all 
new tariff and nontariff barriers, eliminate all duties on tropical com­
modities, and adopt a schedule for phasing out tariffs on semi­
processed and processed products.16 In reality, the developing coun­
tries were only seeking the application of GATT principles and greater 
consistency between the industrial countries’ policies and their dis­
course in defense of trade liberalization (Dam 1970). Nevertheless, 
when the Uruguay Round negotiations began three decades later, the 
industrial countries were still applying most of the barriers identified 
by Committee III.
The first session of UNCTAD was held in 1964, and in November 
of that year part IV of GATT was adopted. Part IV provided the legal 
framework for the Committee on Trade and Development, whose 
work, however, remained largely symbolic. Later, in 1968, the devel­
oping countries succeeded in establishing the generalized system of 
preferences under the auspices of UNCTAD. At the Tokyo Round 
negotiations in the 1970s, a coordinated group of developing countries, 
in which Latin American diplomats played a prominent role, achieved 
the inclusion of an enabling clause that provided a more solid legal ba­
sis for special and differential treatment by industrial countries.17 
However, the industrial countries made sure that the generalized sys­
tem of preferences was established on a voluntary basis and that the 
preferences did not become binding under GATT (Michalopoulos
2000). These concessions could therefore be annulled unilaterally, 
without conferring any right to retaliatory trade measures.
In retrospect, it can be seen that at no time in the history of GATT 
did the governments of the industrial countries balk at the developing 
countries’ demands for special and differentiated treatment so long as 
such provisions did not require them to do more than take a tolerant 
view of the use of more closed trade regimes by developing countries 
(especially in cases where they were closed only in respect of goods, 
rather than capital or transnational corporations). However, the indus­
trial countries have never acquiesced to demands for more secure and 
stable access to their markets. This refusal has gradually undermined
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the real significance of special and differential treatment, because pref­
erential access for developing countries has never translated into con­
tractual obligations.
Together with the international community’s growing recognition 
of the specificities of development, new factors began to take on 
greater importance and to push the multilateral system in another 
direction. On the one hand, tariff reductions made the effects of trade 
and industrial policies more apparent, and the need to deal with non­
tariff measures gradually eroded tolerance for diversity in national 
policies, which was the pivotal element of the international consensus 
to create and maintain the multilateral trading system. On the other 
hand, as a result of the slowdown in growth and the transformation of 
the industrial countries, these countries were less inclined to support 
affirmative action on behalf of developing countries within the frame­
work of international development cooperation.
The context of the Uruguay Round negotiations proved particularly 
adverse for the developing countries. The preparations for that round 
marked a turning point in their negotiating capacity, because the 1982 
GATT ministerial meeting (at which several industrial countries ex­
pressed their intention to deepen the liberalization process initiated at 
the Tokyo Round) preceded the announcement of M exico’s financial 
insolvency by just a few months. Large debtors, including Argentina 
and Brazil, recognized the frailty of their bargaining position, which 
remained quite weak throughout the 1980s.18 The institutional prob­
lems confronting these governments hindered society as a whole from 
becoming more involved in the diplomatic trade debate. Furthermore, 
because these countries’ decisionmakers lacked sufficient training in 
technical matters and negotiation skills, their tendency was to continue 
to pursue the traditional market access agenda and maintain a defen­
sive stance in relation to the new issues that were being brought into 
the debate.
In response both to internal factors and to pressure from the struc­
tural reform programs being promoted by multilateral financial agen­
cies, many developing countries embarked upon a unilateral liberaliza­
tion of their economies.19 By the end of the Uruguay Round, they had 
consolidated almost all their tariff structures and had, for the most part, 
given up their demands for greater autonomy in designing and execut­
ing policies on investment and productive diversification and even in 
using trade restrictions to cope with balance-of-payments crises.20 The 
provisions on special and differential treatment contained in the 
Uruguay Round agreements were limited to the extension of deadlines 
for meeting commitments and the implementation of technical assis­
tance programs.21 To a certain extent, these agreements were a
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throwback to the early days of GATT, as they reflected the belief that 
the increase in trade brought about by liberalization would be enough 
to stimulate the growth and development of all the parties concerned.
More recent international debates and negotiations suggest that a 
new stage has begun, although its exact nature is not yet entirely clear. 
Many different factors have contributed to this situation, including the 
following:
• the adoption of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt 
initiative, which began to function in the late 1990s;
• the commitment of some industrial countries to curb the down­
ward trend in ODA;
• the debate surrounding the unbalanced results of the Uruguay 
Round and the difficulties encountered in implementing the W TO 
agreements;
• the priority attached to various development issues at the Doha 
round of W TO negotiations initiated in November 2001;
• criticism of excessive increases in conditionality as a result of the 
adoption of structural adjustment programs during the debt crisis;
• the transition being made by the economies of Central and East­
ern Europe and the Asian crisis;
• formal acceptance of the principle of developing-country owner­
ship of economic and social policies within the context of international 
cooperation policies and multilateral lending arrangements;
• rejection of policy standardization, which, in part, extends to the 
Bretton Woods institutions that promoted it in the past; and
• within the policy debate, widespread criticism of the Washington 
Consensus (for a recent discussion of the Washington Consensus, see 
Kuczynski and Williamson 2003).
In fact, many of these positions are formally shared by the principal 
international financial cooperation agencies (IMF 2001a; World Bank 
2002b).
Thus, this is a particularly good time to engage in a constructive 
debate on development cooperation. Such cooperation should seek to 
correct the basic asymmetries of the international economic order within 
the framework of a world economy that is much more open today than 
it was during the debates on development cooperation of the 1960s and 
1970s. It may well be that the U.N. Millennium Declaration (United 
Nations 2000) is the fullest expression of a new vision of the relation­
ship between peace, democracy, and development that can serve as the 
foundation for a new era of international cooperation for development.
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Notes
1. See also Bairoch (1981). However, this author’s estimates of per capita 
income differentials in the late 18th and early 19th centuries are substantially 
lower than Maddison’s (1995, 2001).
2. Because of Asia’s relative weight in the world population, one of the 
basic reasons for these trends was that the Asian economies (except those of 
Japan and a handful of other countries) stagnated until the middle of the 20th 
century, but then grew rapidly in the period following the Second World War.
3. Bulmer-Thomas (1994); Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp (2000a, 
2000b ); Hofman (2000); and Thorp (1998) present more detailed analyses of 
the region’s performance since the mid-20th century.
4. If the figures are adjusted for the effects of the demographic transition, 
both the acceleration of the region’s growth rate in 1 950 -73  and its later de­
celeration appear to have been even more pronounced. In fact, if GDP is cal­
culated in relation to the working-age population instead of the total popula­
tion, growth sped up from 1.4 percent in 19 1 3 -5 0  to 2 .7  percent in 1950 -73 , 
then slowed to 0.4 percent in 1973 -9 8 . Furthermore, in the postwar period, 
the Eastern and Western European countries, as well as Japan and a number 
of developing nations, began to recover from the sharp contraction that im­
mediately followed the Second World War, whereas the Latin American and 
Caribbean region was not comparably affected at either of these stages.
5. Among the most noteworthy are the periods of rapid growth experi­
enced by three Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries; by Cuba in the first quarter of the 20th 
century; and by Brazil, M exico, and Venezuela for several decades during the 
20th century.
6. See, in particular, ECLAC (1996a, 2001b), Escaith and Morley (2001), 
and Stallings and Peres (2000).
7. See Barro (1997), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Easterly (2001a, 
2001b), Kenny and Williams (2000), Pritchett (1997), Quah (1995), and Ros 
(2000), among many others.
8. Studies that paved the way for this type of analysis include the works 
of Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison (1983, 1991).
9. The trends characteristic of the second stage of globalization have al­
ready been described. In the opinion of Lindert and Williamson (2001) and 
O ’Rourke and Williamson (1999), during the first stage trends varied from 
one type of country to another, with a deterioration in distribution in coun­
tries rich in natural resources, improvements in European countries with a 
broad agrarian base (especially the large countries of continental Europe), and 
no clearly discernible trend in the most highly industrial European countries.
10. As examples of the copious literature on the subject, see Fujita, Krug- 
man, and Venables (1999); Krugman (1990); and Rodrik (2001b).
11. See, among others, Hirschman (1958), Myrdal (1957), Nurkse (1953), 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), and, for a more contemporary perspective, Ros 
(2000).
12. See, for example, the now classic essays of Lucas (1988) and Romer 
(1990) and the extension of this analysis to international trade by Grossman 
and Helpman (1991).
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13. The only exception is the registration of “utility models,” which are 
granted only for “minor” improvements or adaptations of existing products. 
The World Intellectual Property Organization’s legal definition of a utility 
model specifies that, although the requirement of novelty is always to be met, 
that of “inventive step” may be much lower or absent altogether. Moreover, 
the term of protection is much shorter than for patents, and the registration 
process is significantly simpler (www.wipo.org).
14. The degree of freedom enjoyed by the United States is certainly greater 
than it is for the rest of the industrial economies because the U.S. dollar car­
ries the greatest weight internationally.
15. The panel of experts that produced this report was composed of 
Gottfried Haberler, James Meade, Jan Tinbergen, and Roberto Campos.
16. Srinivasan (1996) noted that some elements of this action program 
were still on the developing countries’ negotiating agenda 2 0  years later at the 
1982  GATT ministerial meeting.
17. This enabling clause, also known as the Decision on Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Develop­
ing Countries, became the legal basis for the generalized system of preferences 
and the global system of trade preferences.
18. See Abreu (1993), Jara (1993), and Tussie (1993), which discuss the 
debtor countries’ negotiating capacity and positions.
19. See Sáez (1999) for an analysis of the negotiations and Krueger and 
Rajapatirana (1999) for an examination of World Bank policies on the pro­
motion of trade reforms.
20. Several countries (including Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, 
and Venezuela) consolidated their tariffs before the end of the Uruguay 
Round, because this was one of the commitments required for their accession 
to GATT (Jara 1993). The provisions of the Understanding on the Balance-of- 
Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) 
severely limit the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments pur­
poses (GATT 1994). In 1995 the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restric­
tions rejected Brazil’s arguments for imposing tariff restrictions in order to 
contend with short-term balance-of-payments problems (see document 
WT/BOP/R/7 of 24 November 1995, available on the W TO  Web site).
21. According to the W TO , the Uruguay Round agreements contain 97 
provisions on special and differential treatment for developing countries, 
which may be grouped into the following six categories: (a) provisions aimed 
at increasing trade opportunities, (b) provisions that require W TO members to 
safeguard the interests of developing-country W TO  members, (c) flexibility of 
commitments, (d) transition periods, (e) technical assistance, and (f) provisions 
relating to measures to assist the poorest developing countries (see the W TO 
Web site).
5An Agenda for the Global Era
O n  t h e  b a s is  o f  t h e  a n a l y s is  i n  chapters 1 through 4, this chapter will 
explore a number of elements that are considered essential for the de­
velopment of a better international economic, social, and environmen­
tal order. The basic assumption underlying this proposal is that the 
developing countries, and particularly Latin America and the Caribbean, 
must adopt a positive agenda for the construction of a new interna­
tional order and make a firm commitment to its implementation. This 
view is founded upon an essential lesson of history: that efforts to sim­
ply ignore or resist processes whose roots run as deep as those of the 
current globalization process, as well as the negative agendas that 
emerge out of such efforts, are doomed to failure. Finding ways to 
build a qualitatively better form of globalization and to achieve the 
best possible position within that process are, consequently, the best 
option.
The agenda to be proposed in this chapter seeks to overcome the 
shortcomings of existing institutions. These institutions have, first of 
all, exhibited a disturbing inability to provide a sufficient supply of 
global public goods. This failing is compounded by adverse distribu­
tive trends at the global level and the absence or weakness of institu­
tional systems for ensuring international solidarity. All of this indicates 
that the globalization process requires a new institutional framework 
in which more efficient management of global interdependence can be 
combined with the introduction of firm, clearly defined principles of 
international solidarity. Only then will it be possible, as stated in the 
U.N. Millennium Declaration, “to ensure that globalization becomes 
a positive force for all the world’s people” (United Nations 2000).
There are a number of major obstacles that will have to be sur­
mounted in order to build a new global order. The first is the absence 
of a set of shared principles that are embraced by all the major stake­
holders. The second is the fact that given the asymmetrical power
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relations found in global society, the various actors differ in their abil­
ity to influence this process. The third is the difficulty of forming 
international coalitions capable of offsetting those inequalities, whether 
through developing-country partnerships or international alliances of 
social sectors whose members feel that their interests are being harmed 
by the globalization process. In addition to these obstacles, there is the 
central paradox of the world of today, as discussed in chapter 1: the 
gap between global issues and what continue to be essentially national 
and local political processes.
The challenges involved in building a new institutional order are 
therefore enormous. The first section of this chapter sets out the basic 
principles for the creation of a better world order. The second section 
draws together the elements of various proposals regarding national 
strategies for dealing with globalization: macroeconomic stability in a 
broad sense, systemic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, 
and active social policies. The third section looks at the crucial role 
played by regional actors in a globalized world. The fourth and final 
section discusses some of the main issues that the Economic Commis­
sion for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) feels should figure 
on the world agenda: the provision of global public goods; the correc­
tion of the global order’s asymmetries in the areas of finance and 
macroeconomics, production, technology, and factor mobility; and 
the consolidation of a rights-based international social agenda.
Fundamental Principles for Building a Better Global Order
The construction of a better world order calls for a determined effort 
to pursue the above key objectives, to establish rules and institutions 
that respect diversity, to develop complementarities among national, 
regional, and international institutions and, finally, to guarantee equi­
table participation coupled with appropriate standards of interna­
tional governance.
Three Key Objectives
The globalization process has highlighted the importance of certain 
global public goods, such as the defense of democracy (and, hence, of 
civil and political rights), peace, security (including the war on terror­
ism), disarmament, international justice, the struggle to do away with 
international organized crime and corruption, environmental sustain­
ability, the effort to combat and eventually eradicate pandemics and to
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increase cooperation in the field of health and sanitation in general, the 
worldwide war on drugs, the accumulation of human knowledge, cul­
tural diversity, the defense of public spaces held in common by all, 
global macroeconomic and financial stability, and, more generally, the 
development of an appropriate institutional structure for the manage­
ment of economic interdependence (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 
1999).1 There is a huge gap, however, between the recognition of these 
global public goods, on the one hand, and, on the other, the weakness 
of the existing international supply structures for these goods and the 
amount of resources allocated for them.
support for the international institutions needed to supply or coor­
dinate the provision of global public goods is therefore essential. The 
emphasis should be on the coordination of supply rather than on sup­
ply functions as such, because in many cases the regional level may be 
the most appropriate one for the provision of public goods. Another 
reason for focusing on the regional level is that the concerted efforts of 
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector must be brought 
to bear on this task. As a general rule, the provision of global public 
goods is accomplished through the efficient operation of networks of 
various types of institutions rather than by individual agencies.
The need to provide sufficient financing for the supply of global 
public goods has been underscored by a number of recent reports 
(United Nations 1999a; Zedillo and others 2001). It is important to 
differentiate between these kinds of contributions and official devel­
opment assistance (ODA), because all countries should play a part in 
financing global public goods based on the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” laid down in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development adopted at the 1992 U.N. Conference 
on Environment and Development.
The supply of global public goods is not the only item on the inter­
national agenda, of course. it must be backed up by the accomplishment 
of two complementary tasks: overcoming the asymmetries of the global 
order and formulating a rights-based international social agenda. These 
tasks might also be included on the global public goods agenda. Doing 
so would create confusion, however, because in the final analysis these 
two tasks are aimed at the equitable distribution of essentially private 
goods. Moreover, the elimination of international asymmetries and the 
formulation of a rights-based social agenda involve different spheres of 
activity; the former focuses on rectifying disparities between countries, 
whereas the latter focuses directly on individuals.
in order to surmount international asymmetries, the global agenda 
must include action on three different fronts. The first involves 
enhancing the transmission of growth impulses from industrial to
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developing countries via international trade and technology transfer. 
The second is to work through international lending agencies to give 
developing countries more breathing space for the adoption of coun­
tercyclical macroeconomic policies, help reverse the international con­
centration of credit, and expedite the financial development of these 
countries. The third concerns efforts to make sure that the global 
agenda places just as much emphasis on the international mobility of 
labor as it does on that of capital.
If an international social agenda is to be established, every member 
of the global society must be acknowledged as a citizen of the world 
and, hence, as possessing certain rights. The most cogent expressions 
of these rights are found in international declarations on civil, politi­
cal, economic, social, cultural, and labor rights; on the rights of 
women, children, and different ethnic groups; and on the right to 
development.2 The commitments made by countries at world summits, 
some of which are accorded special recognition in the U.N. Millen­
nium Declaration, complement those instruments to a great extent. 
These instruments also reflect a recognition of the fact that states bear 
the primary responsibility for fulfilling their provisions. Because they 
represent international commitments, however, they will eventually 
have to become enforceable at the international level, because this is 
the only way they can help to build a true world citizenry.
These three key objectives of the global agenda reflect the fact that 
in an interdependent world, the rights of all ultimately depend on the 
existence of a global social covenant. Embracing this widely accepted 
principle of nation building is tantamount to an acknowledgment that 
economic affairs cannot be separated from the social and political fab­
ric and that if nations are to survive and prosper, market forces must 
therefore function within the framework of an institutional order 
based on broader, more inclusive social values and aims.
The existing international order suffers from serious shortcomings 
in terms of its capacity to achieve these three objectives. The United 
Nations is the appropriate institutional framework for a dialogue 
about ways of ensuring the global coherence of the system and of fill­
ing the voids that exist in the area of international cooperation. Deci­
sionmaking authority and executive capacity in certain fields are, how­
ever, held by a wide range of specialized agencies that work not only 
at the global level but in the regional and national arenas as well.
Global Rules and Institutions that Respect Diversity
The essentially national and local nature of policy making has pro­
found implications for the international order. The globalization
AN AGENDA FOR THE GLOBAL ERA 133
process notwithstanding, for a long time to come the primary setting 
for the exercise of democracy will continue to be nations and local 
communities. The focus for global institutions should therefore be on 
acknowledging interdependence and managing it proactively. Ulti­
mately, however, these institutions rely on national responsibilities 
and policies, as sovereignty will continue to reside in communities of 
people organized into nations.
One of these principles’ implications is that it is futile to promote 
democracy unless national representative and participatory processes 
give the people a say in the formulation of countries’ economic and so­
cial development strategies (Ocampo 2001a). For this reason, respect 
for diversity— within the bounds of interdependence and, thus, of the 
common good of a “cosmopolitan society”— is a crucial element of 
any democratic international order.3
This view fits in with the idea that institution building (institutional 
capital), social consensus (social capital), the development of human 
capital, and technological capacity (knowledge capital) are essentially 
endogenous processes. It also reflects the belief that there is not just 
one “right” path to development and integration into the global econ­
omy. There are a range of different options depending on the political 
and institutional history of each country and the differing challenges 
and requirements to be met (Albert 1993; ECLAC 2000a; Rodrik 
1999, 2001a).
This principle is embodied in the more recent thinking on coopera­
tion for development, which emphasizes that its effectiveness will de­
pend on there being a sense of national policy ownership. In fact, this 
principle has won formal acceptance as a basic guideline for the design 
of ODA and the policies of international lending agencies (Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 1996; 
World Bank 1999; and, on conditionality, International Monetary 
Fund [IMF] 2001a). However, quite frequently, it is ignored in prac­
tice. Indeed, an effort is often made to “compel” ownership of the poli­
cies that international agencies feel are appropriate (Helleiner 2000b). 
Even so, the importance of ownership is one of the overarching rules 
governing the operations of international agencies. Their role is to sup­
port national decisionmaking, not take its place.
Complementarity o f Global, Regional, and National 
Institution Building
In the absence of suitable institutions, globalization is proving to be a 
disintegrative force. At the national level, some regions, production 
sectors, and social groups are coming out as “winners” and others as
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“losers” in the intense Schumpeterian process of “creative destruc­
tion” that is now being witnessed worldwide (ECLAC 2000a). This 
process is not only increasing each country’s internal heterogeneity, 
but also undermining the state’s ability to ensure its cohesiveness. The 
powerful centripetal forces that the global economy has been generat­
ing for several centuries now (Prebisch 1984) impel developing coun­
tries to focus on carving out a foothold in industrial-country markets 
and competing among themselves to attract footloose investments. 
Under these circumstances, integration efforts aimed at forming larger 
economic units are relegated to a position of secondary importance. A 
virtuous circle of complementary global, regional, and national insti­
tution building is needed in order to cope with these forces.
international debate has gradually given rise to a broad consensus 
as to the fundamental role of national strategies in determining how 
successful a country will be in forming linkages with the world econ­
omy. such strategies are also essential in order to handle the disinte­
grative forces being generated by globalization within each nation. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, they continue to be the main vehicle for 
democracy in the global era.
Without a suitable international framework, however, the supply of 
global public goods will inevitably be insufficient, and this, in turn, 
will hinder national development. What is more, unless a frontal at­
tack is launched against the strong tendency toward inequality at the 
international level, which has been in evidence for the past two cen­
turies, national efforts may prove relatively ineffective. More specifi­
cally, within the context of a developing world whose overall growth 
prospects continue to be a source of dissatisfaction, the heterogeneity 
existing across countries and between winning and losing social 
groups and production sectors may intensify.
Action at the regional and subregional levels plays a critical role as 
a midway point between the global and national orders. This arena for 
what ECLAC (1994) has termed “open regionalism” has, however, 
been either ignored or regarded as a negative element in many of the 
chief proposals being made regarding international economic and 
social reform. But there are at least four arguments that attest to the 
importance of this intermediate sphere.
The first is the complementarity existing between global and 
regional institutions in a heterogeneous international community. Advo­
cacy efforts toward democracy, peace, and disarmament are all exam­
ples of instances in which, given the existing degree of international 
heterogeneity, it is best to base the provision of the corresponding 
global public goods on a network of world and regional organizations. 
The protection of strategic ecosystems and many spheres of economic
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activity— such as macroeconomic policy coordination and others that 
will be touched upon later in this chapter— are other cases in point.
The second argument refers to the exceedingly unequal positions of 
the actors involved in global processes. In political terms, this means 
that within the global order, the smaller countries will be able to make 
their voice heard more clearly (or perhaps heard at all) only if they 
speak with a regional voice. This voice must be heard not only in the 
development of rules and standards, but also in the defense of their 
interests under existing rules and standards. In fact, the paradox is that 
such global rules are most important for small countries, which are, 
however, precisely the ones that have the least influence over their 
formulation and advocacy. Meanwhile, the most influential actors try 
to avoid making commitments or to compel other actors to accept 
their rules. These problems can be solved only if the smaller countries 
organize themselves.
The third argument, which is closely tied to the first two, is that 
regional and subregional institutions enjoy a greater sense of ownership. 
There are opponents to this view as well, of course, who contend that 
these institutions are less powerful than their individual members. The 
validity of these arguments will therefore depend on the depth of the 
corresponding regional and subregional agreements, which is what ul­
timately determines their effectiveness.
As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, the scope of 
autonomy has shifted to the subregional or regional level in some 
areas, as in the case of macroeconomic policy. It is also the case with 
the regulation of competition and of public utilities when transna­
tional corporations enter the market. In all these fields, the regional 
arena is becoming the crucial sphere for the exercise of some degree of 
true autonomy, and it is possible that this may increasingly become the 
case as time goes on.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that global 
public goods should be provided by a network of world and regional 
institutions, rather than by one or a few international institutions. A 
system of this type can be made to function efficiently and may prove 
to be more balanced in terms of power relations. In fact, this is the 
most advantageous system for the less powerful countries within the 
global order.
The construction of a truly new international architecture is 
founded upon the overall effect of global and regional institutional 
reforms. Unfortunately, many of the reform proposals put forward in 
recent years regarding the financial and, above all, social aspects of the 
international architecture focus almost entirely on adapting national 
structures to the global era. In other words, these proposals are
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looking at the national rather than the international architecture, and 
therein lies their main weakness.
Equitable Participation and Appropriate Rules 
o f Governance
The insufficient degree to which developing countries participate in 
international economic institutions has been a controversial issue in 
recent years. In some cases— in the formulation of financial rules and 
standards, for example— they play little or no role at all, and even 
when they do have some role, their involvement is not commensurate 
with the size of their economies, much less with that of their popula­
tions. In other instances, even though decisions are understood to be 
made by consensus, in practice agreements are reached on a different 
basis, as happens in the world trading system. In addition, the cost of 
active participation in a complex world order may be prohibitive for 
the poorest and smallest countries.
These circumstances demonstrate the importance of ensuring ade­
quate participation in decisionmaking at the international level. 
Achieving adequate participation will require affirmative action in 
favor of poor and small countries on the part of the international 
community. As discussed in the preceding section, it will also require 
an effort on the part of the smaller countries to organize themselves at 
the regional or subregional level.
Another point to be made is that preference should be given to 
institutional schemes having the largest possible number of active par­
ticipants. Although groups formed by countries that share a particular 
interest or specific purpose may contribute to consensus building, such 
groups should channel their views through established multilateral 
mechanisms rather than taking their place.4
The adoption of appropriate rules of governance is another essen­
tial element. Principles developed at the national level in relation to 
democratic and corporate governance can serve as the foundations for 
building and improving international institutions (Marfán 2002). 
There is no single formula for accomplishing this, because constitu­
tions, laws, rules and regulations, and traditions differ in each histori­
cal context and evolve over time. It can be said, however, that the most 
effective and legitimate forms of governance are based on shared prin­
ciples. These principles do not, moreover, develop spontaneously, and 
an explicit effort must therefore be made to institutionalize them.
Four basic principles of good governance can be outlined here. The 
first is that government functions should be carried out by a body with 
executive powers rather than by an assembly. The second is that the
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rights of the governed take precedence over rules and regulations estab­
lished by the various levels of government. Consequently, the rights of 
minorities should be clearly established, while bearing in mind that 
their identification and recognition as fundamental rights are the end 
result of a learning process. The third principle is that the authorities 
should regularly give an accounting of what they have done to safe­
guard the interests of the community and uphold the rights of all 
its members. Transparency, timely disclosure, and, more generally, 
accountability are essential components of this community process. 
The fourth principle is that the authorities should submit to the 
scrutiny of independent bodies and to outside audits that will build 
confidence among minority groups. These groups do not govern, but 
they do have the right to oversee the actions of those who hold power. 
Furthermore, the bodies in charge of enforcing individual rights should 
have the power to penalize wrongdoing.
A good example of the application of these principles is provided by 
political governance in a representative democracy, where executive 
power is exercised by representatives who have been elected by the ma­
jority. It is the duty of this branch of government to uphold the fun­
damental rights of citizens as set down in the constitution and other 
laws that apply equally to all citizens and to provide a regular ac­
counting of the ends and means of government action. Oversight of its 
acts and its enforcement of citizens’ rights and of the law are carried 
out by independent agencies. An important part of this function is the 
watchdog role performed by the principal parliamentary minority (the 
opposition).
Another example can be found in corporate governance. In this 
case, majority shareholders control the firm’s board of directors and 
management. The dispersion and varying interests of minority stake­
holders, on the other hand, make it difficult for them to organize them­
selves effectively. Good corporate governance seeks to prevent the 
shareholders that have a controlling interest from obtaining a dispro­
portionate share of profits or other benefits relative to the size of their 
holdings. To achieve this, executives and members of the board are 
required to comply with certain rules concerning transparency and 
timely disclosure and with regulations that set out their responsibili­
ties. In addition, there are independent oversight agencies (including 
outside auditors) and in-house auditing committees (usually formed by 
members of the board elected by minority shareholders). These bodies 
complement the work of regulatory agencies and the judiciary, which 
have the power to penalize wrongdoing. Recent major corporate scan­
dals in the United States (ENRON and others) are dramatic evidence 
of the consequences of evading full compliance with these principles.
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The governance of the globalization process could be substantially 
improved by adherence to these same principles. The most powerful 
nations are obviously the leaders of the globalization process and 
occupy a dominant position in the major international financial insti­
tutions, in which voting power— and, in a few cases, veto power— is 
based on capital contributions. The resemblance ends there, however, 
because the other principles of governance are not clearly established. 
For example, it is not certain that the more powerful nations’ control 
over the process is legitimized by their respect for the rights of all coun­
tries, nor is there a universally accepted institutional structure for up­
holding the rights of less powerful nations. in fact, quite often there is 
not even a clear idea of what those rights are.
The application of these principles to improve the governance of the 
globalization process will therefore entail according priority to the 
fundamental rights of developing countries (especially the smaller 
ones), institutionalizing accountability, and increasing oversight by 
bodies that will inspire confidence in all the parties concerned. This 
approach involves placing certain limits on the power of the most 
influential countries, as this is the only way to improve the governance 
of the globalization process. it will also lead to a greater commitment 
to the global institutional structure on the part of developing countries 
by increasing their sense of ownership.
N ational Strategies for Dealing with Globalization
After reviewing the appropriate national context for applying strate­
gies capable of dealing with globalization, this section examines some 
major policy components: macroeconomic management, the dynamic 
transformation of production structures, environmental sustainability, 
and social cohesion.
The Role and Basic Components o f National Strategies
As has been discussed at length in the literature on institution building 
in recent years, in today’s global era, any development strategy must 
be founded upon a solid, democratic social covenant to ensure its 
political stability; nondiscretionary local systems and modes of behavior 
that provide security of contract performance; and the formation of an 
impartial, efficient state bureaucracy. These are also, of course, basic 
components of a proinvestment environment.
These general sorts of institutional elements are not sufficient in 
themselves, however. They are the backdrop for the development
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process, but they do not account for the specific forces that drive 
growth in developing countries or, in many cases, lead to the depletion 
of growth impulses.5 National strategies for today’s global era should 
incorporate at least four additional elements: (a) macroeconomic poli­
cies designed to reduce vulnerability and facilitate productive invest­
ment; (b) strategies for developing systemic competitiveness; (c) a keen 
awareness of the priorities of the environmental agenda, which, by its 
very nature, is essentially global in scope; and (d) highly active social 
policies, especially in the fields of education, employment, and social 
protection (ECLAC 2000a 2000b, 2001a; ECLAC and U.N. Environ­
ment Programme [UNEP] 2001).
There are no universally valid models in any of these areas. Thus, 
the institutional learning process and, most importantly, the exercise 
of democracy have a broad sphere of action in which to function. One 
of the most serious mistakes made in the last quarter of the 20th cen­
tury was the promotion of a single “solution” in each of these fields 
based on the principle of full market liberalization. The tendency to 
equate successful integration into the globalized world with economic 
liberalization overlooks the fact that many strategies have not been 
based on all-out market liberalization but instead on various ways of 
forming virtuous circle linkages between the state and the market. It 
would be just as mistaken, however, to take the opposite approach and 
try to resuscitate models that were successful when the world economy 
was less integrated but that are suited only to stages in the develop­
ment of the world economy that are now clearly a thing of the past.
Macroeconomic Strategy
The experiences of Latin America and the Caribbean in the final quar­
ter of the 20th century demonstrate that all forms of macroeconomic 
disequilibrium are economically and socially costly. This recognition 
implies, first of all, that macroeconomic discipline is essential, but it 
should be defined in a much broader sense than it generally has been in 
economic discourse in recent decades, which has focused on fiscal bal­
ances and low inflation. This narrower view overlooks other equally im­
portant dimensions of macroeconomic stability: balance-of-payments 
sustainability, the soundness of national financial systems, and the sta­
bility of real variables such as economic growth and employment. 
Macroeconomic management should be directed toward avoiding un­
sustainable public or private deficits, guarding against financial imbal­
ances in all institutions (in terms of both flows and the way balances are 
structured), controlling inflation, and curbing any instability in real eco­
nomic variables (ECLAC 2000a, 2001a; Ffrench-Davis 2000).
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Achieving these objectives will entail some quite complex policy 
decisions, and, for these purposes, there is no simple way of defining 
stability or any universally valid system of macroeconomic manage­
ment. In a volatile international environment, some degree of flexibil­
ity in macroeconomic management should be combined with suitable 
regulations. Recent events leave no doubt that, in the long run, macro­
economic authorities’ credibility can be strengthened more effectively 
through prudently managed flexibility than through the adoption of 
overly rigid rules.6
Within this framework, one of the authorities’ aims should be to 
lengthen the time horizon for macroeconomic policy management in or­
der to take in the whole of the business cycle and support dynamic long­
term growth. Encompassing the entire cycle will provide the necessary 
scope for the adoption of countercyclical macroeconomic policies that 
can help forestall unsustainable booms and afford sufficient flexibility 
in dealing with external crises (ECLAC 2000a; Ocampo 2002a). The 
option of using countercyclical policies is quite limited without the sup­
port of international institutions, however, and this has consequently 
become one of these institutions’ basic functions in the current stage of 
the globalization process. The short- and long-term objectives of macro­
economic policy are, to a great extent, complementary— because more 
stable economic growth is one of the strongest incentives for fixed cap­
ital investment— but they can also confront policy makers with some 
difficult choices (ECLAC 2001a; Ocampo 2002b).
Based on these principles, fiscal policy should be designed using a 
pluriannual horizon. It should also be based on long-term guidelines 
for ensuring a structural fiscal balance. These guidelines should either 
make allowance for the use of moderate, temporary surpluses or 
deficits for countercyclical purposes or, alternatively, set an explicit 
target for the ratio between the public debt and GDP. The active use 
of stabilization funds (or equivalent instruments) can be the most 
effective way to build up surpluses during booms that can then be used 
to contend with crisis situations. The desirable level and structure of 
public revenues and expenditures will, in the long run, depend on what 
kinds of demands each society’s fiscal covenant places on the state 
(ECLAC 1998c). In countries with very low tax burdens (as is true of 
a number of Latin American nations), taxes can be increased to finance 
the basic functions of the state, especially in social sectors. In fact, as 
recently stated by the World Bank (2002b), the tax burden and levels 
of public expenditure in the developing world tend to be low in com­
parison to those of industrial countries.
Monetary and exchange rate management are, of course, closely 
related. Some degree of flexibility in the exchange regime is necessary
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for countercyclical monetary management (i.e., the application of 
restrictive policies during booms and expansionary ones during the 
downswing in the cycle). The desirable degree of flexibility will be 
greater in the larger economies that have well-developed capital and 
exchange markets. it  may be wise to allow the exchange rate to 
appreciate in order to soak up excess foreign exchange during booms, 
whereas a depreciation may be needed to spur the production of trad­
ables during economic busts and to provide enough breathing room 
for reactivation-oriented fiscal and monetary policies.
in financially open economies, the prudential regulation of capital 
flows, either through the use of reserve requirements or taxes on exter­
nal borrowing or by means of direct regulation,7 is an extremely useful 
supplementary tool for avoiding excessive external borrowing during 
booms and preventing liability structures from becoming skewed toward 
short-term obligations. in more closed economies, caution should be 
used in opening up the capital account. in fact, if a country does not 
have a solid financial system, there is really no convincing argument for 
opening the capital account up at all. strengthened prudential regula­
tion and supervision are one of the pillars of any sound macroeconomic 
policy; their core function is to prevent unsustainable financial struc­
tures from being spawned during economic booms.
From a macro viewpoint, economic growth in the long run hinges 
on a combination of sound fiscal systems that provide the necessary re­
sources for the public sector to do its job, a competitive exchange rate, 
moderate real interest rates, and the development of a deep financial 
market. Macroeconomic policy should be focused on ensuring the first 
three elements. The last is a very important complementary process.
The main objective of financial deepening is to provide suitably 
priced investment finance with sufficiently long maturities. in the ab­
sence of a well-developed financial market, many investors (particu­
larly the larger ones) will turn to international lenders, thereby substi­
tuting exchange risk for maturity risk. Use of this escape valve 
therefore entails serious hazards, as well as being beyond the reach of 
smaller firms. The liberalization of financial systems in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has not deepened financial markets or reduced the 
region’s high intermediation costs as much as had been expected. Con­
sequently, the public sector still has an important role to play in pro­
moting the emergence of new intermediaries and financing mecha­
nisms (e.g., pension and investment funds, bond and mortgage 
markets, and hedging systems) or in arranging for the direct provision 
of such facilities by well-run development banks.
The existence of this unsatisfied demand for investment finance 
is compounded by the absence of suitable financial services for
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micro- and small enterprises and for the poorest households. This sit­
uation creates a greater demand for direct or indirect public interven­
tion. Low national savings rates are another constraint on investment 
financing in Latin America and the Caribbean. Efforts to increase 
public-sector saving, the creation of corporate saving incentives (espe­
cially to encourage firms to retain profits), and special mechanisms to 
foster household saving (for retirement, in particular) may be useful 
means of raising national savings rates (ECLAC 2001a).
Building Systemic Competitiveness
A dynamic transformation of production structures should not be 
viewed as a reactive phenomenon or as an automatic result of good 
macroeconomic management, but rather as an active and essential 
component of any development strategy, even at this juncture in the 
globalization process (ECLAC 2000a; Rodrik 1999). The core objec­
tive of these strategies should be to build systemic competitiveness. 
This concept, whose first formulations date back to work done by 
ECLAC over a decade ago (ECLAC 1990; Fajnzylber 1990),8 is based 
on three elements. The first is the role of knowledge as the foundation 
for competitiveness, because it is the only factor that enables countries 
to produce goods and services capable of “making the grade” on 
international markets while protecting and increasing their citizens’ real 
incomes. The second is the idea that competitiveness depends less on 
individual firms than on the performance of each sector as a whole, its 
interaction with suppliers, and ultimately the smooth operation of the 
entire economic system. In sum, it is essentially a systemic phenome­
non. The third is that given the serious imperfections existing in tech­
nology markets and strong externalities among economic agents asso­
ciated with the systemic nature of competitiveness, the development of 
sound technology markets and production linkages is in large part the 
outcome of the deliberate efforts of the state and business associations 
and, particularly, of collaborative initiatives undertaken by the state 
and the private sector to create a virtuous circle that will bolster the 
system’s competitiveness.
The three basic components of this strategy are (a) the creation of 
innovation systems to speed up the accumulation of technological 
capacity, (b) support for changes in production structures and the for­
mation of production linkages, and (c) provision of quality infrastruc­
ture services. The creation of adequate social safety nets and sustain­
able environmental management are important complements to this 
effort. These elements concern other spheres of activity, however, and 
will be considered later on in this chapter.
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Given the key role of knowledge, any competitiveness strategy must 
be based on increased investment in education, vocational and busi­
ness training, and science and technology (ECLAC and U.N. Educa­
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 1992). This 
process, whose aim is the creation of dynamic innovation systems, 
should be led by the state, but the private sector should also be actively 
involved. These efforts should focus on increasing the capacity of all 
actors to absorb knowledge and on developing appropriate mecha­
nisms for the adaptation of technology and business skills, especially 
for medium-size and small firms. Business associations and incentives 
for various forms of collaboration between these associations and 
providers of educational and vocational training play a fundamental 
role in this effort. Innovation systems should be strengthened at all 
levels (i.e., local, national, and to a growing extent regional).
In view of the intrinsic importance and crosscutting nature of new 
information and communications technologies, efforts to promote 
their active use throughout the economic, social, and even political 
(e-government) systems are of vital importance. Access to a quality 
telecommunications network and to competitively priced information 
and communications equipment is one of the pillars of this endeavor. 
Other mainstays include the production of software, incorporation of 
technology into production and trade, and formation of business net­
works that make effective use of new technologies. The incorporation 
of such technologies into educational and health care systems requires 
special state support and community mechanisms to give low-income 
sectors access to them, because the emergence of a “domestic digital 
divide” (produced by disparities between different social sectors’ 
access to new technologies) is a much more serious threat in Latin 
America and the Caribbean than the international digital divide.
Economic growth necessarily entails an ongoing process of chang­
ing production patterns in which some branches of production func­
tion as growth leaders and others lag behind. This process is not nec­
essarily automatic or harmonious; the expansion of new sectors 
involves the development of a complementary set of activities based on 
a technological learning process, the establishment of commercial net­
works, and significant coordination costs (Chang 1994; Hirschman 
1958; Ocampo 2002c). The diversification of the production structure 
must therefore be an explicit priority of any competitiveness strategy. 
This idea has been expressly recognized in the industrial world, where 
the process has become virtually synonymous with the development of 
cutting-edge technologies. It also enjoyed wide acceptance in the past 
as a component of state-driven industrialization strategies in develop­
ing countries, and today it is an essential tenet in the most successful
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developing economies, especially those of East Asia. in contrast, di­
versification strategies have been discarded by most countries of the 
region.
Within the context of the globalization process, the diversification 
of production is guided by three priorities. The first is to diversify the 
export base and target markets, which calls for a very active form of 
commercial diplomacy aimed at securing stable access to external mar­
kets and the development of a competitive, high-quality service infra- 
structure— in the areas of finance, insurance, promotion, and certifi- 
cation—to back up exports of goods and services (ECLAC 1998a). In 
this endeavor, one obvious priority is to increase the region’s share of 
world trade in technology-intensive goods and services.
The second priority is to develop programs to broaden the linkages 
of activities oriented toward the international market or dominated by 
transnational corporations. The weakening of such linkages is one of 
the most problematic aspects of recent trends in the region. For this 
reason, linkage policies designed to increase value added in export sec­
tors and sectors with a high proportion of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) should be adopted as a forward-looking priority. Among these 
linkages, those associated with the provision of technology-intensive 
services are of special importance. These policies would, in practice, 
amount to a shift away from a policy aimed at maximizing the quan­
tity of exports and FD i to a policy aimed at improving their quality.
A final priority in this regard is to support the formation of pro­
duction clusters in particular locations. This process is a response to 
the growing dynamism of local spheres of economic activity in the 
global era. it is particularly important in steering small and medium- 
size enterprises (SMEs) toward production for the international mar­
ket or linkage with export sectors (ECLAC 2000a).
The other core aspect of competitiveness policy is the provision of 
quality infrastructure services. in a number of countries, various pub­
lic-private partnerships have succeeded in making significant progress 
in this regard, particularly in telecommunications, port services, and 
maritime transport, and—to a lesser extent and with some differences 
from one country to another—in energy services (electricity and gas; 
ECLAC 2001b). It must be acknowledged, however, that private par­
ticipation in these sectors has been accompanied by serious regulatory 
gaps and, in some cases, has burdened the state with contingent liabil­
ities that do not always have a sound rationale (ECLAC 1998c, 
2000a). The main problems in terms of infrastructure continue to be 
found in land transport, including both railways and roads. Short­
comings in both the quantity and the quality of road networks are par­
ticularly severe. Accordingly, priority should be given to substantially
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improving road infrastructure, correcting regulatory gaps, and ration­
alizing the management of contingent liabilities, while also improving 
the efficiency of state enterprises in areas where the state continues to 
provide services directly.
Progress on all these fronts will require major institutional and 
organizational efforts to formulate and implement active competitive­
ness policies, because the pre-existing systems of government interven­
tion in productive development were dismantled or severely curtailed 
in most of the countries of the region during the economic liberaliza­
tion phase. Such systems would, in any case, be ill-suited to the new 
environment. In this area, as in others, it is necessary to “invent” new 
institutions, whose management will no doubt require an intensive 
learning process.
The possible models for these institutions are certainly not uniform, 
as they depend on the specific characteristics of each situation. A pub­
lic-private partnership is essential to fill the information gaps found in 
each of these sectors (i.e., the former’s limited microeconomic infor­
mation and the latter’s insufficient familiarity with global and cross- 
sectoral processes). In other words, institutional design must take into 
account both the forest and the trees. The instruments to be developed 
for this purpose should be based on checks and balances that establish 
a clear link between incentives and results (Amsden 2001) and thereby 
preclude rent-seeking behavior on the part of beneficiary firms.
This endeavor should comprise various combinations of horizontal 
and selective instruments, depending on each country’s institutional 
context, to be chosen on the basis of shared strategic visions of the di­
rections to be emphasized in joint public-private efforts. This choice is 
less an exercise in picking winners, as it is commonly called, than an 
effort to identify opportunities and direct the actions needed to ensure 
that some of them bear fruit. This type of strategic exercise is one in 
which all private investors engage on a routine basis. It is hard to un­
derstand why some schools of economic thought consider it illegiti­
mate to carry out such an exercise in relation to a particular territory, 
whether it be a town, a country, or even a subregion or region.
Environmental Sustainability
The agenda for environmental sustainability has gradually made its 
way into the institutions, public policies, and business practices of the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Although it is not yet, in the 
fullest sense, an integral part of the development process, the progress 
achieved thus far constitutes a much better institutional and 
social foundation than the one available 10 years ago when the U.N.
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Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de 
Janeiro. The concept of sustainable development has also been gradu­
ally incorporated into educational systems, and the change in society’s 
perception of environmental issues has strengthened citizens’ aware­
ness and commitment. The primary hurdles that remain in this area 
have to do with institutional and financial considerations and with the 
perception within business circles in the region of environmental sus­
tainability as a cost rather than an opportunity (ECLAC and UNEP 
2001).
With respect to institutional mechanisms, steps should be taken to 
set up clear and consistent regulatory frameworks and to achieve a 
stable level of public expenditure with a view to generating significant 
synergies with international financing and private investment. On the 
basis of existing management methods, the time has come to develop 
a new generation of more effective and prevention-oriented instru­
ments for the integration of economic and environmental considera­
tions. This process should primarily involve the use of economic 
instruments to provide adequate incentives to meet sustainability goals 
and to promote a greater use of clean production technologies by 
SMEs. One of the most promising lines of action in this area is the cre­
ation of genuine domestic (and regional) markets for environmental 
services, following the pioneering example of the Kyoto protocol’s 
clean development mechanism. Such instruments have the dual pur­
pose of generating incentives to minimize environmental costs (the 
central objective of economic instruments), while at the same time 
channeling resources to the actors that are best able to provide envi­
ronmental services most efficiently (ECLAC and U.N. Development 
Programme [UNDP] 2002).
A more active sustainable development strategy will require the 
allocation of more government resources. One option is to introduce 
“green taxes,” as has been done in some industrial countries. Although 
great strides have already been made in reducing government subsidies 
for polluting industries, further reductions are needed.
in addition, current frameworks must be adapted to integrate 
explicit environmental policies with the implicit ones associated with 
sectoral economic policies and the patterns of structural change they 
entail. in view of the regressive trend in energy efficiency taking shape 
in the region, such integration and the use of this array of instruments 
should give priority to the reversal of that trend (ECLAC and UNEP
2001).
The formation of effective linkages between economic and environ­
mental issues also requires a shift from a reactive agenda to one that 
takes a proactive approach to the relationship between environmental
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sustainability and economic development. This involves, first of all, 
identifying the opportunities offered by the international environmen­
tal agenda, in particular in regard to the supply of global public goods 
and the possibility of becoming net providers of environmental ser­
vices, primarily in connection with the climate change and biodiversity 
agendas. The opportunities afforded by the Kyoto Protocol’s clean 
development mechanism are particularly noteworthy in this regard. 
This proactive approach also entails taking advantage of opportunities 
to expedite scientific and technological development through the sus­
tainable use of biotic resources, a better understanding of the region’s 
natural resources, and the development of its own technologies for 
tapping these resources in sustainable ways (ECLAC 2000a).
In addition, this approach involves the active use of foreign invest­
ment as a potential channel for the transfer of clean technologies, the 
exportation of goods and services having a high environmental content 
(e.g., organic agricultural products and ecological or environmentally 
certified tourism), and the promotion of the international certification 
mechanisms increasingly demanded by industrial-country consumers. 
In fact, foreign investment and export activities in the region are turn­
ing out to be the areas in which the most progress is being made in 
incorporating clean technologies.
Types of production that rely on an abundant supply of natural re­
sources but are slow in leading to the diffusion of technical progress 
are being eclipsed by economies that are successfully developing 
knowledge-based forms of production. It is therefore necessary to redi­
rect the region’s model of competitiveness toward new activities and 
toward an increase in the value added of natural resource-intensive ac­
tivities. This shift requires the promotion of industrial activities and 
complementary services, including those that will increase the sustain­
ability of primary activities.
Because of the territorial specificity of environmental management 
functions, strong operational links with local authorities need to be 
forged. Solving high-priority environmental problems in such areas as 
water resources management, solid waste disposal, ecological land use, 
and urban management requires the decentralization of environmental 
policies and instruments and a more balanced distribution of public 
expenditure and private investment. It is at the local level that the com­
mitment between the state and the citizenry is expressed most clearly. 
Hence the importance of continuing to promote social consensus 
building in relation to the environmental agenda, particularly within 
the context of provincial and municipal sustainable development 
councils and the local Agenda 21 framework (United Nations 2002). 
Forums of this sort can become powerful tools for organizing public
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affairs and mobilizing additional resources to promote environmental 
sustainability at the subnational level (ECLAC 2000a).
Social Strategies in an Era o f Globalization
Globalization has made it all the more urgent to achieve greater inter­
national competitiveness. Owing to the interrelationship between 
competitiveness and employment, however, competitiveness also 
entails new social risks. National globalization strategies should there­
fore focus on three areas within the social sector: education, employ­
ment, and social protection. Progress in these three areas is a prereq­
uisite for equitable participation in the global era. Moreover, such 
progress is essential for the implementation of a rights-based interna­
tional agenda at the national level.
Advances in these three areas are mutually reinforcing. Education is 
the primary means of halting the intergenerational reproduction of 
poverty and inequality. At the same time, globalization has increased 
the need for human resources capable of engaging in new modes of 
production, competition, and coexistence. Employment is at the heart 
of social integration, as an aspect of social fulfillment and as a source 
of income, and it therefore determines individuals’ ability to gain ac­
cess to basic consumer goods and thus avail themselves of their basic 
rights. Such access is crucial in the absence of societywide safety nets. 
Among the risks faced by the population are those associated with 
macroeconomic volatility, the adaptation of new technologies and 
ways of organizing work, and the elimination of jobs in many sectors 
in response to international competition (ECLAC 1997, 2000b).
In education, national efforts should focus on reducing disparities 
in attendance and achievement between income levels and between ru­
ral and urban areas at all levels of schooling (preschool, elementary, 
technical, university). Efforts to achieve greater equity should there­
fore focus on achieving universal coverage, preferably up to the end of 
secondary school, and reducing socioeconomically based differences in 
the quality of the education that is provided.
In developing their educational systems, the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries face both traditional challenges and challenges re­
lated to new technologies. Meeting them will require a diversified 
package of policies, which each country must tailor to fit its own char­
acteristics and objectives. Public education expenditure must also be 
increased, of course, with the general objective being to reach 
levels similar to those found in OECD countries: around 5  percent of 
GDP. To improve educational continuity, governments must give pri­
ority to increasing the coverage of preschool education, which is still
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comparatively limited; expanding secondary education coverage and 
completion rates; increasing the availability and range of technical and 
professional educational options; and achieving greater consistency 
between technical-vocational and higher education, on the one hand, 
and the requirements of the job market and competitiveness, on the 
other. These efforts should be supplemented by targeted compensatory 
measures designed to have long-lasting effects in areas in which edu­
cational performance is poor, as well as more relevant curricula, use of 
new technological resources on a mass scale, and the empowerment of 
communities to assist in furthering educational goals.
Achieving social inclusiveness requires the development of new ap­
proaches to learning based on access to knowledge, networking, and 
the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Edu­
cators need to make better use of the cultural and educational audio­
visual industry by merging cultural programming in the media with 
schooling so that the two will reinforce each other. Urgent steps should 
be taken to ensure that students in poor rural and urban areas can 
learn to use interactive media that are not available to them at home, 
because school is the ideal environment for ensuring, distributing, and 
democratizing their use. The modernization of educational tools is not 
enough, however. It is even more important, in conjunction with these 
new tools, to develop higher cognitive functions by orienting the learn­
ing process toward problem identification and problem solving, an in­
creased capacity for reflection, creativity, the ability to distinguish be­
tween what is relevant and what is not, and planning and research 
skills. All these functions are vital in an information-saturated world. 
Progress also has to be made in the design and use of portals (educa­
tional content) and in the training of educators (teachers, administra­
tors, and families).
In this era of globalization, the primary challenge in the area of em­
ployment is to prevent the expansion of world trade from resulting in 
the violation of workers’ basic rights or in the downward convergence 
of wages and working conditions in countries at different levels of de­
velopment. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its follow-up (ILO 1998) reaffirm the member countries’ 
commitment to such fundamental rights as freedom of association and 
the right to collective bargaining, the prohibition of forced or slave la­
bor, the progressive abolition of child labor, and nondiscrimination.
The creation of new jobs is sustainable only when the economic ac­
tivities concerned are competitive in the long term. This means that pro­
ductivity must be enhanced and, therefore, that comprehensive strate­
gies must be devised to increase investment in human resources and 
ensure that gains in competitiveness are not based on the reduction of
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labor costs or the concentration of wage increases in the most dynamic 
or well-organized sectors. Productive restructuring and increased labor 
mobility make it necessary to give workers opportunities to learn how 
to adapt to new conditions and thus increase their employability. 
Countries will therefore have to invest in worker retraining based on a 
new approach and, possibly, a different institutional framework. The 
development of basic competencies, rather than specific skills, will give 
workers a knowledge base that will enable them to adapt more easily 
to the demands of new jobs. Because informal activities, microenter­
prises, and small businesses play a major role in job creation, they 
should be given access to factors of production (capital and land) and 
to the tools they need to modernize their operations (managerial and 
technological know-how), and programs should be set up to help them 
gain access to dynamic industrial networks (ECLAC and UNESCO
1992).
To these ends, ministries of labor should adopt labor policies that 
place more emphasis on self-regulation by social actors (social dia­
logue) and that focus on the large groups of workers who remain out­
side modern sectors (unemployed and informal-sector workers). In ad­
dition, they should be repositioned in political and administrative 
terms so as to give them a place in economic cabinets and to restore, 
in many cases, their role in setting the direction for labor policy.
The development of social safety nets should be guided by the prin­
ciples of universality, solidarity, efficiency, and integrality (ECLAC 
2000a). Progress cannot be made toward universality unless the sharp 
inequities in access to services and in their quality are corrected. Soli­
darity should be ensured through a combination of compulsory con­
tributions, public transfers, and cross-subsidies between different in­
come strata and risk groups.
Social safety nets are seriously flawed in terms of both coverage and 
the new risk structure associated with globalization. The countries of 
the region, with their chronic shortcomings in the coverage of tradi­
tional risks (illness, old age, disability, and death, as well as those 
existing in the areas of nutrition, housing, and education), now face 
the additional burden of protecting their populations from the effects 
of such risks as employment and income vulnerability.
Sharp business cycles and the rigidity of real wages— which have 
been heightened by the steps taken to curb inflation— have made wage 
earners more vulnerable to changes in those cycles. Because many of the 
existing social safety nets were designed to serve wage earners, it has 
now become necessary to develop a system of social protection whose 
coverage extends to persons who do not hold formal-sector jobs and to 
create more comprehensive unemployment insurance schemes. Job
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creation policies will continue to be of crucial importance in this con­
text, of course. As the experience of some European countries demon­
strates, social protection policies should focus on boosting employment 
as a means of helping to ensure universal social protection. In emergency 
situations, it is necessary to develop special employment and poverty al­
leviation programs for vulnerable sectors based on permanent institu­
tional arrangements that allow such measures to be implemented 
quickly and that link them to other objectives such as job training, in­
frastructure provision, and territorial development (ECLAC 2001d).
Given the current scope of informal-sector employment and unem­
ployment, the potential for providing comprehensive coverage 
through traditional social safety nets is quite limited, as is the useful­
ness of wage-based taxes and levies as a source of funding. Accord­
ingly, emphasis should be placed on the implementation of systems 
based on citizenship rather than on employment. Reforms in general, 
and reforms in the social security system in particular, should therefore 
introduce combined and complementary insurance mechanisms that 
reflect the diverse forms of employment now in use. These types of 
arrangements will also promote labor mobility and provide protection 
in times of externally generated adversity.
The quantity and quality of the social safety nets that can be funded 
by mandatory contributions, general taxes, or a combination of the 
two depend on each country’s current level of economic development 
and on the nature of its fiscal covenant, which embodies political and 
social agreements about the level of well-being that should be guaran­
teed to citizens. A country’s fiscal situation is not static, of course, and 
a fiscal covenant for the protection of citizens’ rights should therefore 
include an element of progressivity whereby public contributions for 
social protection and poverty reduction can be increased at the mar­
gin. Moreover, an inclusive system of social protection must place spe­
cial emphasis on the views of target groups and provide for a constant 
flow of information to the public regarding opportunities for and 
means of accessing social safety nets and for taking part in decision­
making (ECLAC 2000a).
The Key Role of Action at the Regional Level
Latin America and the Caribbean have progressed further in terms of 
regional integration than any other developing region, and these coun­
tries’ experiences may therefore be instructive for other regions. 
Progress in this area was sparked by the political impetus that built up 
around the issue of integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Unfortunately, this momentum has waned in the last few years. In ad­
dition, the institutional structure for integration remains fragile, and 
the convergence of existing agreements toward the formation of larger 
areas and the consolidation of customs unions are tasks yet to be ac­
complished. It is therefore imperative for the countries to renew their 
political commitment to regional integration. Such a commitment 
would not necessarily be incompatible with global negotiations or 
broader trade negotiations, such as those directed toward the forma­
tion of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Nonetheless, if regional 
integration processes are to remain relevant within the context of a 
hemispheric free trade area or the globalization process, they will need 
to be deepened further.
The momentum displayed by the regional integration process in the 
late 1980s was a paradoxical phenomenon inasmuch as, according to 
the more orthodox doctrines, integration was (and still is) a force that 
distorts trade flows. Empirical evidence indicates, however, that inte­
gration actually tends to create rather than divert trade flows. M ore­
over, the flows it generates tend to be of high quality (ECLAC 1998b), 
demonstrated by the tendency of regional flows to have greater tech­
nological content and to create more production linkages. One of the 
main advantages of these processes is that countries with similar levels 
of development can take advantage of specialization economies for in­
traindustry trade. Another advantage is that lower transaction costs al­
low smaller firms to participate in intraregional trade, especially be­
tween neighboring countries, helping to counter the traditional 
tendency for external trade operations to be monopolized by larger 
firms within each sector of production or trade.9
In consequence, regional markets can provide an excellent training 
ground for firms— especially smaller enterprises— to learn how to deal 
with external markets and can therefore help new firms and sectors to 
venture into export activity. A further benefit of such integration 
processes is that they provide an opportunity to harmonize a wide 
range of differing rules and thus reduce the associated transaction 
costs, thanks not only to geographic proximity but also to the similar­
ity of institutional traditions.
This positive vision of integration is borne out by the increase 
recorded in intraregional trade, especially within South America, 
between 1990 and 1997, when the augmented flows consisted prima­
rily of manufactures, particularly technology-intensive ones. Recently, 
however, these trade flows have been hurt by macroeconomic insta­
bility in the region. In fact, they have proved to be highly elastic in 
response to abrupt business cycles in a number of the countries, espe­
cially in South America (ECLAC 2001c).
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Macroeconomic cooperation has thus become a pivotal element in 
efforts to consolidate trade integration processes. in this respect, 
progress has been made in all the existing subregional schemes, and 
these initiatives should continue to move forward from the discussion 
and exchange of information and the adoption of common macroeco­
nomic rules toward the institutionalization of peer review for preven­
tive purposes and the design of stricter forms of macroeconomic coor­
dination. Such mechanisms may eventually lead, in some cases, to 
monetary unions. in tandem with these efforts, the prudential regula­
tion and supervision of national financial systems also stand to bene­
fit from progress in the exchange of information, peer reviews, and the 
development of common standards.
ECLAC (2001a) has also argued that efforts must be made to 
develop regional and subregional financial institutions. Latin America 
and the Caribbean already have valuable assets of this type, including 
a wide network of multilateral development banks made up of the 
inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development Corpo­
ration, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the 
Caribbean Development Bank, and the Financial Fund for the Devel­
opment of the River Plate Basin. The experience gained by the Latin 
American Reserve Fund points to the possibility of providing regional 
resources to augment the exceptional financing furnished to distressed 
countries. This could be accomplished either by significantly increas­
ing the Latin American Reserve Fund’s resources and membership or 
by means of mutual support agreements (specifically, foreign exchange 
swaps) between central banks.
in addition, the expansion of trade makes it all the more necessary 
to harmonize the different regulatory schemes. These include technical 
standards and phytosanitary requirements, customs codes, and gov­
ernment procurement and servicing regulations. Several of these areas 
have already seen some progress. it is important to move forward in 
other areas, however, most notably in relation to rules on competition 
and on the regulation of public utilities. With respect to rules on com­
petition, the European Union’s experience provides grounds for the 
belief that as common markets and an active process of intraregional 
investment are consolidated, agreements on competition issues and, 
eventually, the adoption of a common policy on competition clearly 
have distinct advantages over rules on unfair competition that apply 
solely to external trade. A framework of this nature would, among 
other things, make it possible to deal more effectively with potentially 
unfair practices on the part of transnational corporations.
Because high-technology goods account for such a sizeable percent­
age of intraregional trade, it is important to take joint action to
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promote the development of the corresponding sectors in ways that 
will avoid the rigidities of the old (and largely unsuccessful) sectoral 
complementarity agreements. The aim of such measures should be to 
generate regional and subregional innovation systems and to pave the 
way for the development of broader schemes for cooperation in edu­
cation and in research and development (R& D ). They could also pro­
vide a suitable framework for strategic R & D  alliances or for the for­
mation of new production clusters made up either of domestic firms in 
countries that are members of a regional or subregional agreement or 
of these firms together with transnational corporations. A key element 
in this process would be the establishment of regional funds. Funds of 
this type should also serve to accelerate the transfer of technology to 
developing countries.
In the area of physical infrastructure, in addition to harmonized stan­
dards on transport, energy, and telecommunications, infrastructural and 
regulatory networks need to be geared to the demands of regional inte­
gration. This kind of approach necessarily entails action at a suprana­
tional level. An interesting example in this respect was the creation of the 
Association of Caribbean States in 1994 to promote greater cooperation 
in the subregion. The physical integration plans agreed upon at the 
South American Summit of 2000 and the Puebla-Panama Plan are other 
indications of progress in this area. A number of border-area develop­
ment plans are also under way that represent a further example of the 
major shift in spatial perception brought about by integration. This type 
of approach is also gradually being introduced in initiatives for the pro­
motion of sustainable development in the management of shared ecosys­
tems (e.g., the Amazon, the Andean ecosystem, the Caribbean Sea, and 
the Mesoamerican corridor) and shared river basins.
The uniqueness of the Latin American and Caribbean region stems 
not only from its generous endowment of natural resources and the 
global importance of the environmental services that these resources 
enable it to provide, but also from the global hazards inherent in the 
region’s rapid environmental deterioration. It is extremely important 
for the countries at the forefront of the negotiations regarding the re­
gion’s contributions to the two most significant issues on the global 
sustainable development agenda—climate change and biodiversity— 
to continue to play that leadership role. A clear example of this is the 
support that has been shown for the sustainable development agenda 
adopted by the region within the context of the international negotia­
tions on the clean development mechanism provided for in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which could, in addition, generate income for the region.
Special mention should be made of the potential valuation of the 
environmental services provided by the region’s ecosystems. Drawing
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attention to the region’s unique position in this respect, consolidating 
regionwide efforts to protect strategic ecosystems and garnering 
worldwide support for this initiative represent the starting point for a 
regional agenda oriented toward safeguarding the stability of those of 
its ecosystems that are most important and valuable from a global 
standpoint.
The existing structure of the region’s environmental institutions 
needs to be gradually reformed, beginning with the consolidation of 
the role of the Forum of Environment Ministers and the environmen­
tal programs associated with subregional integration schemes, such as 
the Central American Environment and Development Committee, the 
Amazon Cooperation Treaty, the environmental agreement of the 
Andean Community, and the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States in the Caribbean. 
Efforts must be made to increase the economic, social, and environ­
mental coherence of these programs and to develop an agenda that in­
tegrates relevant sectoral policies and brings about a convergence of 
regional and subregional stances in global debates on sustainable 
development.
In the social sphere, numerous agreements have been reached by the 
different subregional integration schemes, as well as a number of 
broader instruments,10 but the implementation of these provisions is 
very limited (Di Filippo and Franco 2000). In this respect it appears 
preferable to set more limited and concrete objectives whose attain­
ment will have a more thorough-going impact. Two areas are particu­
larly important in this respect. The first is support for intraregional la­
bor migration. To facilitate the migration of workers and to ensure 
adequate protection for them and their families, it will be essential to 
devise means of transferring social security coverage, particularly in 
the case of health and retirement benefits, from one country to an­
other.
The second is the area of education. Progress can be achieved in this 
domain by generating regional exchanges and creating networks of 
experts, governments, and organizations that can operate either via 
electronic communication or in face-to-face meetings. These contacts 
would allow experts to discuss and share best practices, successful and 
imaginative experiences, the strengths and weaknesses of reforms, 
teaching modalities, school computerization programs, and so forth. It 
is also important to undertake joint measures to generate educational 
content, software, portals, and textbooks; compare educational 
achievements; set standards by levels; establish criteria for assessing 
professional qualifications; and implement in-service teacher training 
programs. In addition to contributing to the development of the
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region’s education systems, these initiatives would facilitate the estab­
lishment of regional accreditation systems and contribute to the recip­
rocal recognition of professional qualifications. It is also important to 
“educate for regional integration” and thus increase people’s aware­
ness of the fact that they belong to a region that shares a culture, a his­
tory, and perhaps a common fate. Basic education is the ideal sphere 
in which to instill an awareness of regional identity and put an end to 
xenophobia.
A final point to be made is that the “democratic clauses” included 
in integration agreements, the various forums for the region’s heads of 
state, and the nascent subregional and Latin American parliaments to­
gether provide the cornerstone for a broad agenda of political integra­
tion that is as yet in its infancy.
The Global Agenda
Globalization is a multidimensional process. A detailed examination 
of some of its dimensions— such as its political or cultural aspects, for 
example— goes beyond the bounds of this analysis, however. The fol­
lowing examination of the global agenda is not, therefore, intended to 
provide a comprehensive treatment of the subject. As a case in point, 
the discussion on global public goods focuses on just two— the inter­
national macroeconomic order and sustainable development— out of a 
wide range of subjects referred to in the introductory portion of this 
chapter. The importance that ECLAC places on the correction of 
international asymmetries, on the other hand, justifies a more detailed 
consideration of this issue’s three main dimensions: financial and 
macroeconomic considerations, production and technology, and inter­
national labor mobility. The chapter concludes with a series of obser­
vations regarding the development of a rights-based international 
social agenda.
The Provision o f  Global Public Goods in the 
Macroeconomic Sphere
In recent years there has been growing awareness of the fact that 
international financial and macroeconomic stability is a global public 
good that generates positive externalities for all international market 
participants and forestalls negative externalities associated with con­
tagion, whether from “irrational exuberance” (to use the term coined 
by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board) or 
from financial panics and recessionary impulses in general.
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Hence the importance of taking global action on a number of 
fronts. The first is to build institutions capable of ensuring the global 
coherence of the major economies’ macroeconomic policies. The lack 
of mechanisms for fully internalizing the effects that those policies 
have on the rest of the world is one of the main defects of the existing 
international order. When policy inconsistencies are manifested in the 
volatility of exchange rates for the major currencies, they generate ad­
ditional adverse spillovers for developing countries. The iM F should 
play a central role in efforts to coordinate the major economies’ 
macroeconomic policies. The scope of such an initiative will extend be­
yond the bounds of the dialogues being conducted in more restricted 
arenas, such as the Group of Seven forum.
The second front is macroeconomic surveillance of all economies 
with a view to prevention and the formulation of codes of good prac­
tice for macroeconomic management (in particular with regard to fis­
cal and monetary policy, public and external debt management, and 
management of international reserves). A great deal of headway has 
been made in recent years, and this is reflected in the greater emphasis 
that the iM F is placing on prevention in its article iv  consultation 
process, on monitoring financial markets, and on constructing vulner­
ability indicators or early warning systems.
Work on the formulation of international standards for the pru­
dential regulation and supervision of financial markets and on the pro­
vision of market information has also been moving ahead. Although 
this is clearly a third line of action for ensuring international macro­
economic stability, efforts in this area have received criticism on at 
least five counts: (a) the lack of participation by developing countries 
in the formulation of such standards; (b) the tendency to standardize 
such regulations without taking into account differences in the indi­
vidual countries’ regulatory traditions and absorption capacities; (c) 
the attempts made to tie iM F financial assistance to compliance with 
codes and standards on which no international consensus has been 
reached; (d) the limited attention devoted to such topics as the regula­
tion of institutional investors operating in developing countries, direct 
regulation of highly leveraged activities, and operations in derivatives 
markets; and (e) the failure to devote sufficient attention to the regu­
lation of rating agencies, whose evaluations have proved to be pro­
cyclical and have been severely criticized. Thus, as the process of 
designing international standards proceeds, steps must be taken to rec­
tify these situations.
An even more complex issue is the lack of initiatives for the design 
of international standards in respect of capital flows to developing 
countries. Because of the residual nature of these markets in global
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terms, they are not a central regulatory concern for the industrial 
countries. Their regulation therefore tends to be covered by general 
standards that could have the effect of drastically reducing flows or 
raising borrowing costs unduly. The idea of giving rating agencies a 
major role in the industrial countries’ regulatory systems by extending 
the application of a rule now used for institutional investors to include 
commercial banks could create similar difficulties, given the procycli­
cal nature of risk ratings. These issues have been widely debated as 
part of the discussion of the Basel Committee banking reforms. Care 
should therefore be taken to ensure that any new regulatory measures 
that are adopted do not exacerbate the existing system’s discrimina­
tion against capital flows to developing countries (Griffith-Jones and 
Spraat 2001; Reisen 2001).
Although international cooperation in the area of taxation cannot, 
strictly speaking, be termed a global public good, it is of growing im­
portance, because the tax system is necessarily involved in obtaining a 
sufficient volume of public resources to finance the provision of na­
tional, regional, and global public and merit goods (FitzGerald 2001; 
Zedillo and others, 2001). Competition for footloose investment has 
tended to result in the reduction of capital taxes, and this, in turn, has 
either diminished the public sector’s ability to generate resources or 
driven up the direct or indirect tax burden for less mobile factors of 
production, especially labor. Given these circumstances, steps should 
be taken to promote information-exchange agreements among tax 
authorities and double taxation agreements, as well as other, broader 
agreements aimed at avoiding tax competition, coordinating measures 
to combat tax evasion, and eventually harmonizing tax systems. The 
treatment of offshore centers warrants particular attention in this 
respect.
The international institutional structure in this field is virtually non­
existent. Consequently, in addition to new agreements, it may be nec­
essary to create a new organization to foster international tax cooper­
ation. Subregional or hemispheric agreements and the expansion of 
cooperation activities already being pursued by OECD with nonmem­
ber countries are intermediate options that should also be explored.
Sustainable Development as a Global Public Good
The 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development was 
clearly a milestone in the formulation of a global agenda for sustain­
able development; it marked the birth of a political consensus of the 
highest level. This was the beginning of the transition toward a new 
international environmental regime based on a new generation of
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environmental conventions and a global program of action.11 Agree­
ment was also reached at that time on innovative principles that would 
provide a more equitable foundation for international cooperation. 
Indeed, the conference marked a turning point in the negotiation of 
multilateral agreements by offering a broader vision of development 
that acknowledges the importance of reconciling the aims of economic 
growth and international trade with the sustainable use of natural 
resources and environmental protection. Many of these agreements and 
their protocols include innovative financing mechanisms and instru­
ments for facilitating developing countries’ access to new technologies. 
After the conference, further progress was made with the conclusion of 
multilateral agreements highlighting environmental hazards that, in 
the light of advances in scientific knowledge, have resurfaced as 
important issues. What is essentially new in these agreements is that they 
spell out the linkages between the environment, human health, and 
production and consumption patterns, on the one hand, and eco­
nomic, trade, and social policies, on the other.12 This global awareness 
of countries’ interdependence with regard to worldwide environmen­
tal problems helped ensure that the legally binding instruments dis­
cussed at the Rio Conference were adopted and ratified faster than 
similar instruments in earlier decades and that virtually all countries 
became parties to them.
Although the international community took up these agreements 
enthusiastically, this initial momentum began to wane as the decade 
wore on. Indeed, 10 years after the U.N. Conference on Environment 
and Development, it is clear that the persistence of a piecemeal approach 
to sustainable development has considerably delayed the implementa­
tion of the conference’s outcome. Much remains to be done in terms 
of putting consistent policies into practice in the areas of finance, 
trade, investment, technology, and sustainable development. Further­
more, the financial resources needed to implement the series of agree­
ments concluded since the Rio Conference have not been forthcom­
ing, nor have steps been taken to improve the technology transfer 
mechanisms they envisage. At the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, held in Johannesburg in August and September 2002, the 
participants reaffirmed the political commitments laid down in the 
Rio Declaration, particularly principle 7 on common but differenti­
ated responsibilities and principle 15, which deals with the precau­
tionary approach. In addition, the 34 goals agreed upon in the Plan of 
Implementation of the Summit build upon the Agenda 21 commit­
ments and the development goals set out in the U.N. Millennium 
Declaration. For the first time, countries expressly recognized the im­
portance of region-specific initiatives and of cooperation among
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various public, private, and civil society stakeholders through volun­
tary partnerships.
Some of the most critical items for inclusion on the global agenda that 
are now being discussed at the international level (ECLAC and UNEP 
2001; United Nations 2002) include the need to modify unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns in both industrial and developing 
countries. in this connection, energy efficiency is certainly one of the 
core issues on the agenda. Clearly, one of the goals in this regard has to 
be the formation of a world alliance for the use of renewable energy 
sources and clean, energy-efficient conventional technologies. The 
Kyoto Protocol is the ideal multilateral instrument for driving this strat­
egy forward. The recent agreements reached at Bonn and Marrakesh, 
which elaborate upon the protocol, provide grounds for cautious opti­
mism regarding the implementation of the clean development mecha­
nism, which, with some conspicuous exceptions, has received the sup­
port of the international community. This mechanism represents the 
first material expression of a market for global environmental services, 
which should be expanded upon in this and other fields in the future. 
The negotiation of energy agreements should form part of a broader 
range of activities designed to promote ecoefficiency and the use of clean 
technologies at the global level. Progress in this area can be furthered by 
commitments on the part of transnational corporations to help work to­
ward these goals, the extension of voluntary international standards 
(ISO 14000), technology transfers to developing countries, and assis­
tance for SMEs. individual firms should take on greater responsibilities 
in this regard, and technological development programs should be car­
ried out to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of developing- 
country industries. Further efforts should also be made to promote the 
design of environmentally friendly products; the corresponding labeling 
system; and other transparent, verifiable, and nondiscriminatory means 
of providing information to consumers, while taking care not to let these 
initiatives be used as hidden trade barriers.
Another important sphere of action is the sustainable management 
of ecosystems and biodiversity. in this case the idea would be to form 
a global partnership to build a stronger worldwide commitment to the 
in situ conservation of biodiversity and the relevant ecosystems and to 
prevent their degradation. Such a partnership should operate within a 
framework that combines the principles underlying the global stew­
ardship of terrestrial and marine environments with quantitative tar­
gets and specified means for achieving those aims and should be 
guided by the core objectives of the Convention on Biological Diver­
sity, the international Convention to Combat Desertification, and the 
Global Programme for the Protection of the Marine Environment. In
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order to ensure the effective implementation of these initiatives, a 
multinational clearing house and fund should be set up to finance the 
conservation and restoration of ecosystems and to identify the global 
environmental services generated by high-priority natural marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems. This will also entail generating synergies among 
multinational and regional instruments and conventions dealing with 
the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems, in­
cluding the Collaborative Partnership on Forests.13
In relation to the issue of genetic resources, the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety should be ratified, and approved mechanisms for assess­
ing the possible risk to biodiversity posed by the introduction of ge­
netically engineered living organisms should be implemented. Over 
the past decade, biotechnology has become a major industry that 
plays a strategic role in enhancing competitiveness. However, innova­
tions in this field have been the preserve of the private sector in 
industrial countries and are protected by intellectual property rights. 
This means that the vast majority of developing countries have lim­
ited access to these innovations, whose potential risks are an addi­
tional source of growing concern. The Cartagena Protocol provides 
an international regulatory framework in this area that reconciles 
trade protection with environmental protection. It is also the first 
multilateral treaty to institutionalize the precautionary principle and 
establish an advance informed agreement procedure to ensure that 
countries have the information they need to decide whether to import 
modern biotechnology products. Nonetheless, equitable technology- 
transfer mechanisms designed to enable developing countries, partic­
ularly megadiversity countries, to participate actively in this emerging 
market have yet to be established.
Such mechanisms can be developed only if adequate financing for 
sustainable development can be ensured. To this end, operational 
strategies are needed for mobilizing global resources to address global 
problems based on the principle of common but differentiated respon­
sibilities. The possibility of imposing international levies on environ­
mentally harmful activities should be explored; the revenues obtained 
from such levies could be paid into special funds that could then be 
used to find multilateral solutions for those problems. One possible 
means of achieving this would be to apply instruments similar to the 
clean development mechanism in other fields of activity. This ap­
proach could be used to develop genuine global markets for environ­
mental services based on a flexible interpretation of principle 16 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (the “polluter 
pays” principle) that would permit mitigation actions to be carried out 
in geographic locations other than the pollution site.
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Education, research, development, technology transfer and adapta­
tion, and information access will play an increasingly vital role in the 
achievement of sustainability. Given the existing evidence of the 
world’s increasing ecological fragility owing to cumulative environ­
mental damage on a variety of scales, the precautionary principle is 
taking on new meaning. Environmental protection efforts are no 
longer enough; the need for adaptation and mitigation and, above all, 
for scientific and technological developments to meet new challenges 
is constantly on the rise. Within this context, mechanisms for protect­
ing intellectual property— including both formal knowledge and infor­
mal traditional knowledge— are of particular importance.
The foregoing considerations underscore the need for greater co­
herence and compatibility between the international trading system 
(including the protection of intellectual property) and the cause of 
sustainable development. The declaration issued at the fourth World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting at Doha (November 
2001) represents a major stride forward in this respect, as it explicitly 
acknowledges the need to analyze the interrelationship between W TO 
rules and multilateral environmental agreements. It states in no un­
certain terms that countries that wish to adopt measures to protect 
human, animal, or plant health and the environment may do so pro­
vided that such provisions do not constitute discriminatory trade 
practices or hidden protectionism. In addition, it identifies priority is­
sues for consideration by the W TO Committee on Trade and Envi­
ronment, including the effect of environmental measures on market 
access, especially in relation to developing countries; the relevant pro­
visions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights; and labeling requirements for environmental 
purposes.
Lastly, globalization is giving rise to new imperatives in the area 
of global environmental management and, consequently, interna­
tional cooperation. On the one hand, it prompts governments to 
adopt a proactive stance at the international level that provides for 
the use of innovative multilateral arrangements to protect global 
environmental goods and services. On the other, it encourages the 
private sector to take the lead in this effort, especially in relation to 
certain multilateral environmental agreements and their protocols. 
The issue of governance for sustainable development is of tremen­
dous international interest in this connection. In particular, urgent 
action is needed to bolster the U.N. system’s capacity to meet the 
challenges of sustainable development on the basis of coordination 
agreements and joint programming mechanisms that will enable the 
system to move beyond piecemeal approaches and forge close links
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with regional and subregional organizations, as well as multilateral 
credit institutions.
The Correction o f Financial and M acroeconomic 
Asymmetries
Apart from the systemic issues relating to global macroeconomic and 
financial stability that have been discussed in earlier sections, interna­
tional financial reform efforts should focus on correcting basic finan­
cial and macroeconomic asymmetries in the global economic system. 
This task should be addressed on a comprehensive basis that includes 
macroeconomic surveillance, the regulation of capital flows, the pro­
vision of liquidity during crises, the design of multilateral schemes for 
dealing with debt overhangs, measures for strengthening multilateral 
development banks, and the achievement of a new consensus regard­
ing the scope of conditionality. The aims of this comprehensive effort 
should be to reduce the segmentation and volatility of developing 
countries’ access to international financial resources and to provide 
greater scope for the adoption of countercyclical macroeconomic poli­
cies by developing countries.
A comprehensive approach of this nature suggests that macroeco­
nomic surveillance actions taken by the iM F and complementary 
regional institutions should be oriented toward prevention— that is, 
toward preventing the accumulation of imbalances and high-risk debt 
profiles during economic booms. Programs undertaken by the iM F in 
conjunction with multilateral banks and with the Bank for Interna­
tional Settlements to support the formation of more solid financial sys­
tems in developing countries are a key component of this task. Clear 
incentives should also be provided for compliance with strict, preven­
tion-oriented macroeconomic and financial standards, particularly 
with regard to automatic access to iM F contingent credit lines during 
crises. For development banks, this approach will entail the design of 
credit lines for the express purpose of encouraging developing coun­
tries to adopt countercyclical forms of economic management.14
From the regulatory standpoint of the industrial countries, the main 
objective should be to reduce the risk associated with operations in­
volving countries whose net borrowings (especially of short-term re­
sources) are disproportionate to the size of their economies and finan­
cial sectors. The objective is to discourage high-risk financing at its 
source. This effort may require the application of special standards to 
financial operations with developing countries, rather than the general 
types of standards that have been developed with industrial markets in
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mind. More specifically, rating agencies’ risk assessments should not 
be used for regulatory purposes; on the contrary, these agencies should 
themselves be regulated and should be required to rate sovereign risk 
on the basis of objective, publicly known criteria.
Developing countries should, for their part, maintain full auton­
omy in the management of their capital accounts. International 
financial institutions should analyze regulatory experiences in this 
area very carefully and should encourage countries to take steps 
to constrain external borrowing during booms whenever it becomes 
apparent that such booms or the countries’ current account deficits 
are unsustainable.
Meanwhile, the IM F should gradually evolve into a quasi-lender 
of last resort at the international level. This entails the use of special 
drawing rights (SDRs) as the main instrument for financing its oper­
ations. The additional demand for Fund resources during crises 
should be met with temporary issues of SDRs rather than by means 
of the existing arrangements to borrow, which are made available at 
the discretion of a handful of industrial countries. In the long run, 
SDRs should be used as a multilateral tool for meeting additional 
liquidity requirements associated with the growth of the world 
economy.
In implementing adjustment programs during crises, the authorities 
should take account of how they will affect the most vulnerable sectors 
of the population. The application of this principle, which has gained 
growing international acceptance in recent years, should extend 
beyond the creation of social safety nets to include the design of 
macroeconomic adjustment policies themselves. This approach will 
help ensure a policy mix having the least possible social impact on the 
poorer sectors of the population (United Nations 2001).
In order to deal with problems of moral hazard, preventive macro­
economic surveillance and a sound regulatory scheme will be needed. 
An additional element that is not yet part of the international order 
would be a suitable mechanism for handling debt overhangs. Although 
such schemes may be used to manage liquidity problems, there are 
other, more effective tools that have been used in the past for this pur­
pose. One approach is for the regulatory authorities in industrial coun­
tries to bring pressure to bear on banks to keep the relevant countries’ 
lines of short-term credit open. This should, in any case, be the aim of 
IMF emergency financing. In fact, in the absence of a good emergency 
financing scheme, problems of liquidity may turn into problems of 
insolvency. This is why debt workout mechanisms, whose main purpose 
is the management of solvency problems, should be seen as a supple­
ment rather than as a substitute for emergency financing.
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The chief components of this new mechanism should be the follow­
ing:
• collective action clauses to facilitate negotiations with creditors; 
these clauses should be universally applied to avoid creating a new fac­
tor of discrimination against developing countries.
• an internationally sanctioned (perhaps by the IMF) standstill 
mechanism.
• voluntary negotiations among the parties regarding public and 
private external liabilities. These negotiations could be backed up by 
mediation— and perhaps international arbitration—mechanisms ad­
ministered either by a new agency or by a panel of experts convened 
by the IMF.
• preference in the restructuring process for private financing 
extended during crisis periods and, in some cases, a requirement that 
additional resources be provided.
• credit from multilateral lending agencies during renegotiations 
and the period immediately following their conclusion. The focus 
should be on expediting the countries’ re-entry into private capital 
markets; the most suitable instrument for this purpose may be a sys­
tem of guarantees backed up by a special fund to be managed by the 
major development banks.15
Maintaining a strong multilateral development banking system is 
another component of this strategy. These banks have proved to be 
very important not only in guaranteeing financing to countries lacking 
access to financial markets, especially the poorer nations, but also in 
providing long-term financing to middle-income countries when credit 
on private markets dries up. The countercyclical role played by multi­
lateral lenders— which includes support for programs to protect the 
most vulnerable sectors of the population during crises— should not 
be confused with the provision of liquidity, which is the central objec­
tive of IMF actions. A more active use of guarantees to leverage private 
resources during these periods may be the appropriate instrument in 
this context. Multilateral banks perform a number of other functions 
as well: the promotion of innovative activities, especially in relation to 
social development and private participation in infrastructure projects; 
support for financial deepening in developing countries and for na­
tional development banks’ efforts to promote that process; technical 
assistance in general; and support for the provision of global public 
goods in coordination with U.N. bodies.
The final element in this integral approach is a new international 
agreement as to the scope of conditionality. The aim here is to provide
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a strong foundation in international practices for macroeconomic and 
development policy ownership. Some progress has been made in this 
respect, as indicated by the analysis and discussion of this question 
that occurred within the IMF in 2001. As noted earlier, however, new 
forms of conditionality sometimes lurk behind words of support for 
the concept of ownership; hence the importance of an explicit interna­
tional agreement on this question. Given the tendency for homoge­
neous views to predominate within international lending agencies, a 
public debate regarding their visions of development is an essential 
control mechanism and an important exercise in order to make the di­
verse range of development options a reality (Stiglitz 1999). Even with 
such a debate, however, a greater plurality of views within these insti­
tutions may well be necessary in order to counter the strong inclina­
tion toward institutional homogenization exhibited by these agencies 
over the past two decades.
Overcoming Production and Technological Asymmetries
The transmission of production and technological impulses from the 
industrial world to developing countries involves two basic processes: 
(a) the gradual transference of raw material production, mature 
industries, and demand for standardized services to developing coun­
tries and (b) technology transfer and developing countries’ increasing 
participation in its generation and in higher-technology branches and 
activities of production. The international trade agenda should be 
directed toward the first of these aims, but in the long run, it is the sec­
ond type of process that will lead to the actual elimination of interna­
tional asymmetries.
The main items on the trade agenda are well known (Third World 
Network 2001; UNCTAD 1999; World Bank 2002a). The first is a 
broad liberalization of world agricultural trade that includes a phase­
out of export subsidies, a substantial reduction in the sizeable produc­
tion subsidies provided in industrial countries, the lowering of tariffs 
on these products, and the gradual elimination of the tariff-quota sys­
tem (which, in practice, amounts to a system of quantitative restric­
tions). The second is the successful dismantling of the Multifibre 
Arrangement provided for in the Uruguay Round agreements, together 
with the reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation based on pro­
cessing levels. The third is the industrial countries’ liberalization of the 
supply of labor-intensive services (e.g., construction and tourism) in 
order to permit temporary migration by all categories of labor for the 
provision of those services. The fourth is the establishment of stricter 
multilateral antidumping disciplines and guarantees of full observance
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of the ban on voluntary export restrictions agreed upon in the Uruguay 
Round.
In addition to these priority objectives, steps need to be taken to 
ensure broader participation by developing countries in the design of 
technical standards of all sorts and to facilitate a wider use of W TO 
dispute settlement mechanisms, whose development was one of the 
most important improvements made in the multilateral order in the 
1990s. Because of the high cost of maintaining negotiating teams and 
of using the institutional mechanisms that have been established, all of 
this depends on the proper organization of the smaller and poorer 
countries’ technical teams, on the existence of legal instruments to 
backstop dispute settlement procedures involving these countries, and 
on the provision of multilateral resources to finance these procedures.
Above and beyond all these considerations, the international com­
munity must realize that strategies for creating systemic competitive­
ness are a key component of development processes. To this end, the 
Uruguay Round maintained certain degrees of freedom for import sub­
stitution (by means of specified levels of protection and the infant 
industry principle) and for adjustments in such industries to cope with 
competition (safeguards), but it significantly reduced the scope of 
action for middle-income countries’ export promotion policies. Disci­
plines were established for export subsidies, and trade-related invest­
ment measures were prohibited (performance agreements and local 
content rules), which reduced the degree of discretionality in the active 
promotion of “infant export industries” and export diversification in 
general. As in other fields, as a general rule the agreements tend to 
allow the types of subsidies most commonly used by industrial coun­
tries (subsidies for technology, regional development, environmental 
protection) while restricting those most frequently used by developing 
countries (free trade zones, direct subsidies for export activities, per­
formance agreements). Although the conversion of incentives to bring 
them into line with the results of the Uruguay Round should continue 
to be a priority for developing countries, the discussion of policy 
options available to the countries, especially for diversifying their 
exportable supply, should be accorded a high priority in the Develop­
ment Round that began in Doha in late 2001 .16
Multilateral talks on trade in goods and services are being pursued 
in Latin America and the Caribbean concurrently with a number of 
other negotiation processes that are being conducted with industrial 
countries by the region as a whole, by subregional blocs, and on a 
bilateral basis. Negotiations with the United States and Canada and 
the talks being held with the European Union are cases in point. These 
processes are particularly important because they aim to move beyond
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the bounds of the preferential schemes existing for various subregions 
(which, by definition, do not constitute permanent commitments) in 
order to ensure untrammeled access to the major industrial markets. 
These negotiations also cover other issues, most notably the protection 
of investment and intellectual property.
In line with the above considerations, the respective agreements 
should guarantee the achievement of the priority trade objectives dis­
cussed here, while also maintaining the developing countries’ auton­
omy in the adoption of active competition policies focusing, in partic­
ular, on the diversification of the export base. Issues relating to the 
protection of intellectual property will be discussed in a later section.
The Free Trade Area of the Americas is the most ambitious initia­
tive in this area; its goal is to create the world’s largest zone of this 
type. In addition, it will encompass countries of widely varying levels 
of development and size. From a strictly commercial standpoint, 
because average tariff levels in the United States are already quite low 
(under 2 percent as of 2000) and nearly three-fourths of the region’s 
exports enter the U.S. market duty free (ECLAC 2002b), the greatest 
potential gains for the Latin American and Caribbean countries would 
be the rollback of tariffs on some heavily protected products (agricul­
tural products, textiles, and apparel, in particular) and, most impor­
tantly, the elimination of nontariff barriers, such as the discretionary 
use of antidumping provisions.
It will be important to make sure that this agreement includes spe­
cial provisions to accommodate the widely varying levels of develop­
ment and sizes of the signatory countries’ economies, both during the 
transition period and once it is fully implemented. In the first phase, a 
decisive element will be the provision of technical assistance and fund­
ing for the re-engineering of production activities so that they can meet 
the challenges posed by the agreement. In the second, it is important 
for the countries of the region to maintain the necessary autonomy to 
adopt active competition policies.
The evidence presented in the preceding chapters indicates that free 
trade is not in itself enough to guarantee convergence of the countries’ 
levels of development. Past experience suggests that at least two other 
types of policies are also necessary. Both, it should be said, have played 
a significant role in the past in bringing about the convergence of 
income levels in industrial countries and in the most comprehensive 
integration process undertaken by the United States with a Latin 
American economy (i.e., the case of Puerto Rico; see box 5.1). The first 
type of policy would facilitate greater international mobility for labor, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. The second is a policy of 
transferring resources from the more advanced regions to the less
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Box 5.1 Economic Links between Puerto Rico and the 
United States
The Puerto Rican and U.S. economies are closely integrated. Puerto Rico 
shares a common citizenship, defense force, currency, and market with 
the United States, and there is free movement of goods and factors of pro­
duction between the two.
The basic pillars of the development strategy known as Operation 
Bootstrap that Puerto Rico launched in the 1940s were tax incentives, 
federal tax credits on income earned by U.S. corporations on the island 
(section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which is now being 
phased out), and free trade. Encouraged by these tax incentives, many 
corporations operating in Puerto Rico chose to retain their profits and de­
posit them with financial institutions on the island, thereby providing an 
important source of liquidity for financial intermediaries. A decade ago, 
these resources were deposited in 936 funds amounting to about US$10 
billion and represented around one-third of total commercial bank 
deposits. By 2000 these funds made up less than 6 percent of total deposits.
Federal transfers have also played a key role in Puerto Rico’s econ­
omy, although their relative size has been declining over time. in 2000 
total federal transfers were equivalent to 20 percent of GDP. Transfers to 
individuals amounted to US$5.5 billion, or 14.3 percent of personal in­
come (down from 22 percent in 1990). About 60 percent of these trans­
fers to individuals were earned benefits, including veteran’s pensions, 
Medicare, and social security payments. Grants, which consist primarily 
of payments made under the food stamp program, amounted to 39 per­
cent of transfers to individuals.
in addition to trade and capital flows, labor also moves freely between 
Puerto Rico and the United States. in 1950, Puerto Rico’s resident popu­
lation amounted to 2 .2  million, and 226 ,000  Puerto Ricans who had been 
born on the island were living in U.S. cities. By 2000  these figures had 
risen to 3.8 million and 1.2 million, respectively.
Operation Bootstrap spurred robust industrial growth that trans­
formed Puerto Rico from an agriculture-driven economy into a manufac­
turing- and services-driven economy. Between 1950 and 1990, the is­
land’s GDP grew by 4.4 percent a year, and the manufacturing sector’s 
share of total output expanded from 22 percent to 39 percent. Conver­
gence of living standards has, nonetheless, moved ahead at no more than 
a moderate pace. By 1990, per capita income in Puerto Rico (US$6,000) 
was almost half that of Mississippi, which was then the state with the 
lowest income; this was, nevertheless, an improvement over 1950, when 
Puerto R ico’s per capita income had been 39 percent of that of the 
lowest-ranking state. As of 2000 , however, per capita income in Puerto 
Rico (U S$10,150) was still around half that of Mississippi.
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developed ones for the express purpose of bringing about a conver­
gence of development levels. In the case of Puerto Rico, this policy also 
included generous tax incentives for investment on the island, 
although the results of this measure have been modest.
The European Union has clearly been the international arena in 
which this principle has been upheld most forcefully, thanks to the 
Union’s social cohesion policy. It is symptomatic of the political phi­
losophy underlying these accords that the deepening of economic inte­
gration processes seen during the final decade of the 20th century was 
accompanied by the increased use of an explicit policy of cohesion 
(Marín 1999). What is more, this policy now also embraces the Cen­
tral European countries that hope to join the European Union. The 
possibility of setting up a cohesion or integration fund to provide the 
necessary backing for hemispheric agreements was put forward by 
a number of heads of state at the Summit of the Americas held in 
Quebec in April 20 0 1 17 and therefore warrants special attention.
The expansion of the W TO negotiating agenda to include new issues 
has been the subject of a great deal of debate. ECLAC fully acknowl­
edges the need for the region to make a firm commitment to the inter­
national environmental agenda, the enforcement of fundamental labor 
rights and principles, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. It also, however, shares the view that such 
commitments pertain to other spheres of international action and 
should not be linked to commitments relating to international trade.
A multilateral investment agreement could help to simplify the com­
plex network of bilateral and regional accords that have been signed 
in the past few years, but it would need to meet three basic require­
ments: (a) its scope would have to be confined to protecting invest­
ment; (b) it would have to preserve the developing countries’ auton­
omy in regulating their capital accounts for macroeconomic purposes; 
and (c) it would have to maintain their autonomy in adopting active 
policies on FDI, including policies designed to improve the linkages 
between FDI and national production. Another useful step would be the 
conclusion of a global competition agreement that would rein in the 
strong trend toward international concentration in certain activities 
and branches of production, as well as the anticompetitive practices of 
some large transnational corporations.18 A mechanism of this type 
might also serve as a framework for the development of substitutes for 
more discretionary forms of intervention (such as antidumping provi­
sions). It is not certain, however, that W TO would be the most suit­
able framework for the negotiation of multilateral investment or com­
petition agreements, and it is even more debatable whether it would be 
the appropriate agency to implement agreements in these fields. It may 
well be preferable to create a new international organization that, in
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addition to agreements in these two areas, could also be responsible 
for implementing agreements on intellectual property and trade- 
related investment. W TO could then focus exclusively on the regula­
tion of trade in goods and services.
Another controversial aspect of the Uruguay Round agreements has 
been the application of multilateral intellectual property disciplines to 
all W TO members. Although this agreement may appear to be essential 
to ensure the provision of a global public good (the creation of techno­
logical knowledge), the fact remains that this can only be accomplished 
through the concession of a temporary monopoly—that is, by defining, 
for a specific period, what is potentially a public good as a private good. 
Because technological development is the activity that is most highly 
concentrated in industrial countries, this form of protection— and the 
redistribution of income that it entails—reinforces one of the basic 
asymmetries existing in the international economy.
Given the high cost that this mechanism may have for developing 
countries, the World Bank (2002a) recently stated that its benefits for 
low-income countries are not clear and that the agreement should 
therefore be implemented gradually and in accordance with each coun­
try’s level of development. Middle-income countries derive benefits 
from greater protection of intellectual property for appellations of ori­
gin, for intraindustry trade that relies on trademark protection, for 
cinematographic and television productions, for software, and in a 
number of other cases. This type of protection is also important in pro­
viding guarantees for foreign investment and in ensuring that con­
sumers will have secure access to a wide range of quality products. 
At the same time, however, the protection of intellectual property 
raises the cost of technology and may block technology transfers if the 
country affording such protection does not produce the good or use 
the technology in question.
The agreements reached at the fourth W TO Ministerial Conference 
represent a major stride forward in the definition of one of the cases— 
public health— in which the net effects of the protection of intellectual 
property can be quite harmful. The main problem in this case is that 
protection can drive up consumer prices so much that large sectors of 
the population cannot afford the goods or services in question. This 
case serves to illustrate a broader principle: that the definition of 
knowledge as a public good should, under certain circumstances, pre­
vail over its definition as a private good for the purpose of intellectual 
property protection.
This observation opens the door for a broader discussion of fields in 
which the public good represented by knowledge should predominate. 
Some of the most obvious cases are those in which potentially patentable 
knowledge is scientific knowledge in a strict sense (certain types of
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knowledge about genetics, in particular) or in which access to certain 
types of knowledge is the basis for the acquisition of new knowledge 
(this principle is recognized, for example, in the International Conven­
tion for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, which guarantees ac­
cess to protected varieties for use as breeding stock for the development 
of other new varieties). Actually, inasmuch as technological develop­
ment is the result of a cumulative learning process and relies heavily on 
acquired experience in the production domain, this last case is part of a 
larger set of instances that include secondary innovations derived from 
the adaptation of technology and reverse engineering.
The problem that arises in such cases is all the more serious when a 
country’s priorities for diversifying its production activities conflict 
with the protection of intellectual property owned by firms that do not 
produce the protected good or that do not use the protected technol­
ogy in that country. In such instances, this type of protection is a real 
obstacle. In these cases, as in that of public health, either a new con­
sensus has to be reached regarding limitations on the protection of 
intellectual property, or else more comprehensive regulations will have 
to be designed concerning the use of compulsory licenses or the expi­
ration of intellectual property rights.
Another series of problems is related to particular aspects of the 
intellectual property rights agenda that are of special interest to devel­
oping countries but that have not been properly applied or set down 
in agreements. One such problem is raised by the need for effective 
technology transfer mechanisms and means of ensuring greater par­
ticipation by developing countries in the generation of new knowl­
edge. W TO should accord priority to devising these kinds of mecha­
nisms and instruments, because they are needed to counterbalance the 
adverse distributive effects produced at the global level by the protec­
tion of intellectual property. Another problem refers to the relation­
ship between the protection of intellectual property and the Conven­
tion on Biological Diversity and to the protection of traditional 
knowledge, including folklore. These considerations also draw atten­
tion to the pressing need for the countries of the region to take an in­
ventory of the resources they wish to protect at the international level 
in order to defend their cultural, intellectual, genetic, and geographic 
heritage.
The Full Inclusion o f Migration on the 
International Agenda
The full incorporation of the issue of migration on the international 
agenda is another important element in the formation of an international
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system capable of overcoming the asymmetries of the global order. 
There is no theoretical justification whatsoever for liberalizing goods, 
services, and capital markets while continuing to apply stringent 
restrictions to the international mobility of labor. Moreover, asym­
metric market liberalization has a regressive impact at the global level, 
because it works to the benefit of the more mobile factors of produc­
tion (capital and skilled labor) and to the detriment of the less mobile 
factors (unskilled labor). This constraint also nullifies one of the mech­
anisms that historical studies identify as having played a fundamental 
role in the convergence of income levels in today’s industrial countries 
(see chapter 4). In addition, placing greater restrictions on the mobil­
ity of unskilled labor selectively siphons off human capital from devel­
oping countries, tends to accentuate skills-based income inequalities, 
and sets the stage for one of the most harmful industries in the world 
of today: the smuggling of migrants and other persons. Apart from its 
significance as an economic factor, migration is a very important 
source of mutual cultural enrichment and contributes to the formation 
of a cosmopolitan society.
One of the priority items on the international agenda should there­
fore be to forge agreements that will increase labor mobility and 
strengthen the governance of international migration. The main 
objective should be the conclusion of a global agreement on migration 
policy. The scope of existing instruments is, for the most part, quite 
limited. The broadest instrument of this type is the international 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of M igrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, which was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1990. After more than a decade, the 
condition for its entry into force was met on March 14, 2003 , with 
the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification by Guatemala. 
Six other Latin American and Caribbean countries had previously 
ratified the Convention (Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, M ex­
ico, and Uruguay). The importance of this Convention, which en­
tered into force on July 1, 2003 , lies in its reaffirmation of the fun­
damental human rights of migrant workers and their families, 
including those who lack proper documentation. it  also provides 
states with a legal instrument that facilitates the standardization of 
national legislation.
A closely related element is the reduction of the risks associated 
with discrimination and xenophobia through ratification of the rele­
vant international instruments and compliance with the plan of action 
signed at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimina­
tion, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South 
Africa, in 2001.
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Broadening the commitments made in regard to the temporary 
mobility of workers within the framework of the W TO General Agree­
ment on Trade in Services is another important objective. As stated 
earlier, one of the priorities in this area is to secure greater commit­
ments on the part of industrial countries with respect to services that 
are intensive in low-skilled labor, in which developing countries may 
have comparative advantages.
There is no question that migration issues should be included on the 
hemispheric agenda, in multilateral agreements reached between the 
Latin American and Caribbean region and the European Union, and in 
regional integration processes. There are also a wide range of bilateral 
conventions and negotiations that can help to increase opportunities 
for international migration. One promising example is the recent 
opening of a dialogue between Mexico and the United States on this 
subject. All of these multilateral and bilateral agreements should seek 
to increase temporary and permanent labor mobility and to move for­
ward on issues closely related to migration, such as social security and 
the accreditation of individuals’ academic and professional or voca­
tional qualifications.
In addition to their efforts to do away with xenophobia and dis­
crimination and to guarantee immigrants’ rights, host-country govern­
ments should take steps to help migrants become fully integrated into 
society. This is, in fact, essential in order to ensure the social cohesion 
of societies in which there are a large number of immigrants. To this 
end, states should set up mechanisms in such areas as public education 
and social services to facilitate immigrants’ integration into society and 
thus help them to exercise their economic and social rights. The other 
side of the coin is that immigrants should respect and embrace their 
host culture and should fully comply with the host country’s laws.
The home countries of migrants can also benefit from this process 
in various ways. First of all, they receive remittances, which have be­
come an important source of capital flows for many countries of the 
region. Reducing remittance transfer costs, promoting programs that 
provide emigrants with means of contributing to their home commu­
nities, and using these resources in productive ways are some of the 
types of action that could be taken on this front. Links with emigrants 
can also be used to give their home countries the benefit of their scien­
tific, professional, and entrepreneurial skills, as well as to create a mar­
ket for idiosyncratic products. The countries of the region should also 
recognize the right of emigrants to take part in their home countries’ 
political processes.
Finally, it is the responsibility of home and host countries to work 
together to combat the smuggling of migrants. Their efforts in this area
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should include communication programs in communities of origin to 
warn the population of the dangers of such practices.
Econom ic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Foundations 
for Global Citizenship
One of the main advances associated with the globalization process in 
recent decades has been the worldwide propagation of values or prin­
ciples such as respect for human rights, equity, democracy, respect for 
ethnic and cultural diversity, and environmental protection. Some of 
the most important principles relating specifically to social develop­
ment are those set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, whose signatories are committed to guar­
anteeing their citizens a set of goods and services regarded as essential 
in order for them to lead decent lives. The Covenant identifies the for­
mulation of an international social agenda with the recognition of all 
members of global society as citizens and, hence, as possessing certain 
rights. Viewed from another vantage point, the goods and services re­
quired to obtain a basic level of well-being are both rights and com- 
modities— “merit goods,” to use the terminology of welfare economics. 
Accordingly, the provision of such goods should be subject to regula­
tion, the actual level of supply should be made public, and claims on 
such goods should be enforceable (ECLAC 2000a). This process should 
be regarded as the core element of a holistic poverty reduction program.
Economic, social, and cultural rights, together with civil and polit­
ical rights, form an indivisible, interdependent whole. It is recognized, 
however, that the exercise of economic, social, and cultural rights is 
not automatic and that their progressive enforcement will require a de­
termined economic and political effort. Such efforts should match 
those actions required under national democratic processes to deter­
mine what level of nutrition, health care, education, housing, and 
other rights or merit goods can be supplied on a sustainable basis to all 
citizens; what (public, private, or mixed) schemes should be used to de­
liver them; and what level of public resources will be needed to do so.
This necessarily entails a political process leading to the formation 
of national— but increasingly global— social and fiscal covenants in 
which access to such goods is seen as the result of a political decision 
regarding the allocation of resources for guaranteeing citizens’ eco­
nomic, social, and cultural rights. These covenants should be shaped by 
a political debate on the role of the state and the relationship between 
economic policy and social development— a debate that can ultimately 
result in a consensus on the relevant priorities and what pace of 
progress toward the gradual achievement of those rights is feasible.19
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Upholding these rights continues to be an essentially national 
responsibility, however. No clearly defined, stable international policies 
or mechanisms have yet been devised that would allow countries’ as­
pirations or accomplishments to transcend their national boundaries. 
Moreover, guaranteeing such rights is the job of the state and does not 
explicitly involve other important agents, such as business enterprises. 
Finally, there is thus far no clear incentive for the enforcement of these 
rights or methods to ensure their application.
Consequently, the enforceability of economic, social, and cultural 
rights needs to be gradually shifted from regional and national evalu­
ations to a much more clearly defined political enforceability within 
the context of international forums and, most importantly, represen­
tative national forums where international assessments of the coun­
tries’ fulfillment of their commitments can be discussed. This type of 
evaluation should be a comprehensive one that includes not only these 
rights, but also other internationally recognized social rights (the Fun­
damental Principles and Rights at Work agreed upon within the frame­
work of the International Labour Organization and the rights of chil­
dren, women, and ethnic groups) and the commitments made at world 
summits dealing with closely related issues. This political enforceabil­
ity may gradually lead, under certain conditions, to a legal enforce­
ability in the context of the relevant national and international courts. 
The commitments undertaken and their enforceability must at all 
times be commensurate with each country’s level of development and, 
in particular, its ability to achieve target levels that can be effectively 
guaranteed for all its citizens, thus avoiding the emergence of volun­
tarism or populism.
Given the sharp inequalities and asymmetries of the global order, an 
essential element in the material expression of such rights is the fulfill­
ment of the ODA commitments made within the framework of the 
United Nations (0.7 percent of industrial countries’ GDP, with a min­
imum of 0 .1 5 -0 .2 0  percent of GDP going to the least developed coun­
tries) and adherence to the basic guidelines agreed upon by the inter­
national community (i.e., the importance of placing priority on the 
effort to combat poverty and ownership of economic and social devel­
opment strategies). Within this context, development cooperation 
should be regarded as a means of supporting rights-based efforts to 
build democracy, promote civil and political rights, and eliminate 
poverty. International undertakings such as the “20/20 initiative” are 
an important step in this direction.20 Because a global effort of this 
magnitude will clearly take quite some time to complete, regional or 
subregional integration programs can serve as a much-needed inter­
mediate stage in the process.
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The responsibility for upholding rights and for their development 
and application transcends national boundaries and the purview of the 
state, however. Partnerships will therefore have to be formed with 
many different actors. Awareness of this fact within the United 
Nations has led to the formulation of the Global Compact, which calls 
upon the entrepreneurial sector in all countries to uphold human rights 
in business practices and to support suitable public policies on human 
rights, basic labor rights, and environmental protection.21 This type of 
initiative, together with other undertakings on the part of civil society, 
can contribute to the consolidation of a genuine rights-based culture, 
which is the very essence of global citizenship.
Notes
1. The dividing line between public goods, which are nonexcludable in 
consumption, and those with strong externalities is somewhat blurred, and 
this list therefore includes some goods (e.g., public spaces, many forms of cul­
tural expression and human knowledge) that do not fit the classic definition of 
public goods.
2. The right to development was enshrined in U.N. General Assembly res­
olution 41/128 of December 4, 1986. This resolution defines development as 
“a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims 
at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of 
all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.” Sen- 
gupta (2001) focused on the components of justice and equity inherent in this 
concept and on the importance of making sure that countries’ growth rates are 
not only reasonable but also sustainable and are not achieved at the cost of 
human rights or a decline in opportunities for personal fulfillment. See, in this 
regard, Artigas (2001).
3. Kant (1795) called for the formation— based on a covenant among 
states— of a cosmopolitan society. Kant was one of the first philosophers to 
propose that the social contract be extended to include states, provided that 
they complied with the “republican clause” by guaranteeing individual rights 
and freedoms, the division of power, the supremacy of the law, and a repre­
sentative system of government.
4. See, for example, Culpeper (2000) regarding the proliferation of 
groups or associations dealing with financial issues.
5. To use the terms Maddison (1991) used, these factors are associated 
with the “ultimate causality” rather than the “proximate causality” of eco­
nomic growth. See also Ocampo (2002c).
6. This may, in fact, be the major lesson to be learned from Argentina’s 
experiences over the past decade.
7. Direct regulatory tools include rules on borrowing by public-sector 
agencies at all levels and direct restrictions on certain types of private flows 
(short-term borrowing, portfolio flows, or external borrowing by nontradable 
sectors).
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8. These concepts also contain elements developed concurrently by other 
authors; see, in particular, Porter (1990).
9. See Berry (1992) for a discussion of this topic.
10. There are, in fact, agreements on individual and collective guarantees 
for migrants, modalities of representation of corporate interests (businesspeo­
ple, workers, professionals, consumers), labor mobility and provision of 
health services in border areas, standardization of educational and profes­
sional credentials, and validation of pensions.
11. The participants in the conference adopted Agenda 21, the Rio Decla­
ration on Environment and Development; the Non-Legally Binding Authorita­
tive Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Con­
servation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests; the Convention 
on Biological Diversity; and the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
12. This is particularly evident in the Kyoto and Cartagena Protocols and 
in the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions.
13. See the report of the Secretary General to the Commission on Sustain­
able Development acting as the preparatory committee for the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (E/CN.17/2002/PC.2/7), December 19, 2001.
14. One of the possible options would be lines of credit incorporating ac­
celerated amortization clauses based on specified macroeconomic variables, in 
which national counterpart funds are “saved” in the banks during booms and 
are then disbursed, together with the development banks’ contributions, dur­
ing crises.
15. For a more exhaustive discussion of this topic, see Krueger (2001), 
Machinea (2002), and UNCTAD (1998, 2001a).
16. In paragraph 10.2 of the Doha decision on implementation-related is­
sues and concerns, the Ministerial Conference “takes note of the proposal to 
treat measures implemented by developing countries with a view to achieving 
legitimate development goals, such as regional growth, technology research and 
development funding, production diversification and development and imple­
mentation of environmentally sound methods of production as non-actionable 
subsidies.” Strictly speaking, the only major restriction in the Uruguay Round 
agreements is the provision relating to the diversification of production and, 
more specifically, of exportable supply, because subsidies for the other pur­
poses identified therein are broadly authorized in the Marrakesh Agreement.
17. The president of Mexico made particular reference to the possibility of 
a cohesion fund, and a number of prime ministers from the Caribbean drew 
attention to the importance of having an integration fund. The government of 
Ecuador, which was responsible for coordinating the negotiations until O cto­
ber 2002, later proposed that a fund should be established to promote com­
petitiveness.
18. A d e  minim is clause could be introduced to stipulate that the relevant 
agreement applies only to firms that have international market shares above a 
given percentage.
19. One of the priority courses of action in this regard is the compilation, 
dissemination, and analysis of information on the status of economic, social, 
cultural, and other rights and the fulfillment of goals agreed upon at world 
summits with a view to setting priorities, creating a culture of responsibility, 
and bringing about policy changes.
20. For an evaluation of this initiative as it relates to the countries of the 
region, see Ganuza, León, and Sauma (2000).
21. For more information, see www.unglobalcompact.org.
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L A T I N A M E R I C A N  D E V E L O P M E N T  FORUM
The international response to opportunities and risks arising from globalization has been incomplete and uneven. But a proactive approach by a network of institutions could correct existing asymmetries and build a rights-based international social agenda. Globalization and Development provides a historical overview of economic development in the Latin America and Caribbean region—and proposes an economic and noneconomic agenda that addresses disparity, respects diversity, and fosters complementarity among regional, national, and international institutions.
“This book provides a profound analysis of key problems facing the global economic order. Equally important, the agenda put forward provides perceptive food for thought for all who are committed to overcoming the fundamental asymmetries that pervade the world economy today. It recognizes that success in creating a better global order must go beyond the topics that have been at the center of discussion in the past: There must be an adequate supply of global public goods, and we need to incorporate at the global level values that we often take for granted at the national level—a commitment to global democracy, global citizenship, and global social justice.”
—  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia University, and 
Winner o f the 2001 Nobel Prize in  Economics
“ To date globalization has fallen far short of its promise in Latin America. José Antonio Ocampo and his colleagues at ECLAC have long been ahead of the curve with their prescient analyses of its impact in Latin America. This book offers a valuable road map for rendering globalization development-friendly.”
—  Dani Rodrik, Professor o f International Political Economy 
John F. Kennedy School o f Government, Harvard University
“ ECLAC has provided an informed and highly challenging analysis of globalization and development. This volume offers cogent historical comparisons, details of recent trends, critical assessment of current global asymmetries and, most important, a positive agenda for change. ECLAC has produced the most constructive account of its subject currently available. Prebisch would be proud.”
—  Gerry K. Helleiner, Distinguished Research Fellow 
Munk Centre fo r  International Studies, University of Toronto
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